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RESERVE COMPONENT MANPOWER READINESS AND MOBILIZATION POLICY

VOLUME II

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BASED ON THE
COLLOQUIUM ON MOBILIZATION
WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON GUARD AND RESERVE
COMPONENTS
1-4 NOVEMBER 1983

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
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RESERVE COMPONENT MANPOWER READINESS
AND MOBILIZATION POLICY

VOLUME II - CONFERENCE PAPERS

Based on the
Colloquium on Mobilization
With Special Emphasis on Guard and Reserve Components
1-4 November 1983

Sponsored by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs

with the assistance of the
Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University

and in cooperation with the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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1984

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PREFACE

The 1983 Colloquium on Mobilization with Special Emphasis on Guard and Reserve Components, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs with the assistance of the National Defense University Mobilization Concepts Development Center and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was held on 1-4 November 1983 at Fort McNair. The Colloquium was the first of its kind to convene all sectors of the Reserve community from all Service branches, the military Secretariats, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the academic community for the purpose of analyzing the reality of the Total Force as it actually functions.

The Proceedings of the Colloquium have been published in two volumes. Volume I contains an overview of the Colloquium, the presentations of the distinguished guests and sponsors, and a consolidation of the issues addressed by the presenters. Volume II contains the papers which were presented by the participants.

The many individuals whose work and dedication made the Colloquium a reality are too numerous to mention here. However, without the support of Dr. Edward Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs); Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, USA, President, National Defense University; and Dr. John N. Ellison, Director, Mobilization Concepts Development Center, the Colloquium could never have succeeded.

BARBARA A. HENSELER
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COMPUTERS: THE UNTAPPED RESOURCE
FOR MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

CDR Richard A. Lewallen, USNR-R
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National Defense University Colloquium
on
Guard and Reserve Mobilization: An Essential
Element of Preparedness

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BACKGROUND

↘ Mobilization planning for the Total Force involves making the most effective use of the active and reserve component assets:

- Active units and commands
- Units and individuals in the Ready Reserve,
- Individuals in the Standby Reserve, &
- Retired personnel,

Depending on the requirements (selective, partial, or full mobilization), some or all of the reserve component assets would be merged into the active forces to meet wartime or emergency manning requirements.

➤ Preparation for mobilization must begin long before an actual mobilization can occur. This preparation should include:

- ✕ Assignment of personnel to selected reserve units;
- Preassignment of Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and retired personnel to mobilization billets; -->

- Training of all Selected Reserve personnel (including recording of qualifications);
- Estimating the yield to be obtained in an actual mobilization;
- Planning for administration and management during mobilization execution, (writing orders, making travel arrangements, etc.).

Computers can provide valuable assistance to mobilization planners in all phases:

- Mobilization planning
- Training
- Mobilization execution, &
- Mobilization assessment, —→ over

The Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) has developed a mobilization personnel processing system (MOBPERS), which is designed to assist with the accession of reserve component personnel into active component commands

upon mobilization. The system is run on a regular basis to preassign IRR, IMA/MOBDES, and retired personnel of the Army Reserve and National Guard to mobilization stations in peacetime, thus avoiding delays during an actual mobilization.

The estimation of personnel yield from a mobilization has also received attention from the Army. The Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College performed a study of "show rate," analyzing the various factors which may affect the number of personnel who report as ordered and are deployable. The study proposed that a computer model be developed to assist manpower planners; the model was subsequently implemented by the General Research Corporation and is now used for predicting mobilization yield under various sets of assumptions.

These are only two examples of the use of computers to assist with mobilization planning and execution. If these tools have value for handling the logistics of personnel assignment and order writing, and in their use as yield predictors by Army mobilization planners, then it appears that all the services could benefit from the use of similar systems and models. In fact, the use of a unified approach to mobilization planning and system development might improve the mobilization potential of all the reserve components.

As personnel costs have continued to rise and productivity has declined, U.S. industry has increasingly turned to the use of computers to reverse the productivity trend. While the Department of Defense has also increased its use of automation, the reserve components in particular stand to realize much more benefit through the intelligent application of modern computer technology to the problems of mobilization.

A CONCEPTUAL PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT EXAMPLE

Consider a data base which contains personnel data for all members of the reserve components (see Figure 1). Included in this data base are identifying data, skill codes (military and civilian), geographic data (e.g., state and ZIP codes), etc. Such a data base can be an extremely valuable resource for mobilization planners, with possible uses in a number of different areas.

Consider another data base which contains the total wartime personnel requirements for the Total Force, organized by grade and skill code within each active command (see Figure 2). This data base can be viewed as a requirements file for mobilization planning.

By processing the requirements file against the personnel data base periodically (see Figure 3), the best qualified

personnel can be assigned to each mobilization billet, based on such considerations as grade, skills, and geographic proximity to the gaining command. Both the gaining command and the Reservist should be notified of the assignment so that the command can assist the Reservist in becoming fully qualified to fill his or her mobilization billet. Such a procedure should improve assignments, provide for better pre-mobilization training, and help to avoid assignment and reporting delays during an actual mobilization.

The Army's MOBPERS system performs a similar preassignment function each month, with almost 900,000 unit, IRR, and retired personnel preassigned to 43 mobilization sites. This system also generates orders and travel orders which could be used immediately in an actual mobilization.

A CONCEPTUAL TRAINING EXAMPLE

Consider the following scenario:

A Reservist reports to his gaining command for two weeks of annual training. Seating himself at a computer terminal, he keys in his name, rank, and social security number. The computer responds with a description of his mobilization billet, the billet requirements, and a billet training plan to

help him meet those requirements. It then maps out a sequence of lessons, some of which use computer-aided instruction, and others which use programmed instruction, text assignments, videotapes, hands-on exercises, or classroom instruction. At the completion of each lesson, the Reservist's computer file is updated to reflect his training progress. Checkpoint tests are administered at several stages to verify that learning has indeed taken place. After all the lessons have been completed, a final exam is given and graded by the computer.

A futuristic picture? No, this is well within the state-of-the-art of current technology. In fact, a system called PLATO is now in use at several DoD locations to provide computer-managed instruction (CMI) and computer-aided instruction (CAI) to military and civilian personnel. It is feasible to extend the use of PLATO or similar systems to assist individual Reservists in becoming qualified in their mobilization billets. Initially, this might involve development of CAI/CMI training packages and installation of computer terminals and support equipment at gaining commands; eventually, terminals could be installed in the Reserve Centers so that this training could continue throughout the year. The principal obstacles would be development effort and acquisition cost.

All the U.S. Armed Services have the problem of determining and validating estimates of the availability of pretrained military manpower in the event of mobilization. Total defense planning could be substantially improved if there were ways to confirm the "yield rates" which would be realized for each category of reserve manpower.

Consider a data base which contains manpower data for all the reserve components (see Figure 4). Such a data base, when used with an interactive computer model, could be used by a mobilization planner to predict yield rates for each reserve component under various sets of mobilization scenarios and assumptions.

Assuming that the reliability of such a model is adequate, this planning tool could be used to identify where shortfalls are likely to occur during mobilization. Using this information, DoD planners and policy makers could take action to eliminate these shortfalls by recommending changes in reserve manning levels, changes in deferment legislation, and so on.

The model developed by the Army War College and implemented by the General Research Corporation performs these functions,

using data for the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. Although the current model is somewhat crude and the data quality is poor, it is the most powerful manpower management vehicle now available. Extension of this model to all the reserve components would provide a useful tool to DoD manpower planners and should be considered.

SUMMARY

While planning for mobilization of the Total Force is a very difficult process, actual mobilization would be a massive logistics problem, and assessment of the degree of success of the mobilization might be difficult to determine. Modern computer technology can be applied to all phases of this process - planning, training, execution, and assessment - and can improve mobilization effectiveness while reducing the administrative burdens associated with mobilization activities. While computers have been effectively applied to this problem in several instances by individual services, a much greater potential remains to be tapped.

The Army has developed the MOBPERS system to assist in mobilization planning and execution; the Army has also developed a computer model for predicting the manpower yield from a mobilization. The Department of Defense has successfully used

...and other CMI/CMI systems for training (not necessarily mobilization training for Reservists as yet). The Navy has adopted NAMMOS (Navy Manpower Mobilization System) as its official mobilization system. The Air Force also uses automated systems to support mobilization planning.

All the services stand to gain by sharing their experiences, building on their successes, and avoiding repeats of their failures in the use of computers to support mobilization planning and execution. Such an effort should contribute to improved readiness of U.S. and NATO forces.


1. Name
2. Social Security Number
3. Pay Grade
4. Date of Rank
5. Sex
6. Marital Status
7. Number of Dependents
8. Primary Military Skill Code (NOBC/NEC, MOS, AFSC)
9. Secondary Military Skill Code
10. Tertiary Military Skill Code
11. Language and Skill Level
12. Civilian Skill Code
13. State Code (Residence)
14. Zip Code
15. Home Phone Number
16. Work Phone Number
17. Address
18. Civilian Employer

FIGURE 1

1. Unit Identification Code
2. Billet Sponsor (Department)
3. Billet Identifier
4. Billet Title
5. Pay Grade Desired
6. Primary Military Skill Required
7. Secondary Military Skill Required
8. Tertiary Military Skill Required
9. Language and Skill Level Required
10. Sex (M/F/either)
11. Security Clearance Required
12. Need Date (M + ?)

FIGURE 2

MOBILIZATION OVERVIEW



A-1-13

TO GAINING COMMANDS

FIGURE 3

RESERVE COMPONENTS PROFILE

- Component (Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, etc.)
- Age Distribution
- Mental Group Category Distribution
- Educational Level Distribution
- Sex Distribution
- Marital Status Distribution
- Number of Dependents by Marital Status and Sex Distribution
- Continuation (Reenlistment) Rates
- Term of Present Enlistment by Grade Distribution
- Geographic Distribution

FIGURE 4

1. Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS). U.S. Army Military Personnel Center and Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center. October 1982.
2. PROUD SABER/MOBEX S3 After Action Report. U.S. Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center. February 1983.
3. Feasibility of Predicting Reserve Show Rate at Mobilization: A Proposed Model for Mobilization Manpower Management. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. July 1979.

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"A Day Late — A Dollar Short"

A Unit Level Perspective on Mobilization

Major G. Robert Boesch

Military Police Corps, U.S. Army Reserve

Introduction

International tensions and global politics indicate, now more than any time since World War II, the necessity for a totally trained and deployable reserve military force. With the failure of detente', the lack of verifiable nuclear parity being achieved by SALT, [REDACTED], have further strained U.S. -Soviet relations at a time when the balance of power in the European theater indicates that the NATO mission has been redefined to a delaying force by Threat doctrine. There is no doubt that the Soviets have the capability to move on Western Europe at a moment's notice. When these factors are added to the defense equation, our rapid deployment forces assume the role of a NATO reserve and our National Guard and reserve forces become first line defenders. Likewise, our international prestige and national resolve are being tested in the Middle East and South America daily. Readiness, including mobilization planning and training, must receive the highest priority.

Mobilization Planning and Training

While credibility can often be given to the reverse planning construct, for mobilization it seems more practical to implement planning from the ground up. Reason suggests that alerting and transporting units

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must preempt the movement of corps and armies to the battle area. There is no intent to denigrate the importance of the deployment phase, but the national priority is unbalanced toward overseas deployment, and insufficient attention devoted to initial mobilization.

Reserve mobilization doctrine, as viewed by the field commander, is based upon time. Time to assemble; time to move; and time to train before deployment. There is a presumption that there will be a significant increase in diplomatic tension over time to allow for mobilization and refresher training prior to deployment. To rely so heavily on this presumption is ludicrous. Can we afford to believe Threat doctrine and its strategists are not equally as familiar with Clausewitz and the classic "principles of war" as our own military planners? Who would dare suggest that Moscow would willingly sacrifice surprise on a first strike; whether in Europe, CONUS, or on both areas simultaneously?

Presently, at the unit (company and battallion) level, specific mobilization training appears limited to an annual legal briefing on wills, re-employment rights, and the Soldier's and Sailor's Relief Act. While beneficial and neccessary, there is little actual training devoted to preparing a unit, both physically and emotionally for mobilization. The absence of meaningful mobilization planning and training is conspicuous. Movement of any unit over a significant distance presents unique problems in the best of circumstances. A national emergency mobilization will compound these problems. The Army recently concluded a Mobilization Exercise (MOBEX), however no units were actually moved. The exercise was a staff level paper/telephone war game. Educational war gaming in this fashion has its place in any comprehensive staff

necessary for field mobilization. Mobilization, and its implementation, demand hard skill acquisition gained only by realistic operational training, and mobilization training must share at least equal emphasis with all other operational training.

Unfortunately, realistic mobilization training is both very expensive and time consuming. Reserve forces of this nation already bear a tremendous training responsibility. In the Army there is little difference in the annual training requirements of an active battalion and one of the reserve. In fact, they both are generally evaluated under the same ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program). However, the reserve unit is expected to accomplish a relative level of training proficiency in only thirty-two (32) training days per year that are also filled with administrative requirements, maintenance activities, and housekeeping chores. Considering the commitments on reserve training time, our present state of readiness, such that it is, is remarkable. Were it not for the extreme dedication of its members, our reserve forces would scarcely function at all.

Reality suggests that, continuing our present course could find us "a day late -- because we were a dollar short". The initial element of mobilization is the alert. All reserve units have, as a minimum, an annual requirement to hold a test alert, ostensibly to evaluate the alert notification procedure. In most units, the date of the alert is as predictable as sunrise. Test alerts routinely occur at the same time each year and always on a "drill" weekend. Many units could benefit from more alerts written into their training mission, but most must sacrifice this additional benefit because of the added expense of the telephone charges. This fiscal sensitivity in matters of national security indicates that

our fate, in the event of national emergency, is preordained.

Additionally, units continue to practice the most critical missions under the most favorable conditions. When was the last time a reserve unit was alerted during the week? When was the last time a unit was alerted, assembled, and moved to its mobilization station subsequent to the alert?

Another vital concern is transportation. As many reserve units are not organically transportable as are, and many units considered to be, by definition, organically transportable are only organically transportable in the battle area. Many "heavy" equipment units lack the necessary prime movers or have only limited capabilities. Movement of units from mobilization stations and staging areas to the battle area will be relatively simple compared to the anticipated logistical chaos expected during a rapid mobilization. Availability of transportation is critical.

The entire scope of mobilization planning and training is long overdue for critical review. The trite addage about proper prior planning (and training) has never held more significance than it does today. The implications of a first strike must be factored into the mobilization planning and training, with particular emphasis placed upon the potential disruption of communications, command and control. The alert notification procedure for individual ready reservists needs improvement, as well. A defined service wide doctrine for the acquisition of civilian transportation assets must be addressed.

Motivation

Current mobilization emphasis neglects the psycho-pathology of the individual soldier. The fighting spirit of America was never severely questioned until Vietnam. The seed that bore the disaffection for that war and draft evasion of the 1960's was planted in 1947. Prior to that year the United States had maintained a Department of War. In 1947, the Department of War (representing a proactive perspective) was abolished and the Department of Defense (representing a reactive perspective) was established. This subtle shift in national orientation was severely felt during the 1960's and 1970's and our won-loss record since 1947 leaves much to be desired. Any comparison between Vietnam and a U.S. - Soviet confrontation is purely rhetorical. To assess military conflict in terms of popularity seems a classic contradiction in terms, but nonetheless, it has become a generic description. Vietnam was not a "popular" war. Likewise, nothing suggests the next war will be any more popular, the more serious consequences notwithstanding.

Vietnam, tragic as it was, presented unique opportunities to both sides in the ideological debate. For the isolationists it provided justification for reduced international involvement. For the expansionists it created an opportunity for greater international influence. For the political elite it provided the fuel for countless hours of debate. And for the military professional it provided an excellent training ground for new techniques and technology. Unfortunately, it never provided any of these interests a clear cut opportunity for success. The absence of a decisive outcome in both Korea and Vietnam will have serious effects on national motivation given any future conflict less than total.

The ability and courage of the American professional fighting man is not questioned. However, the possibility exists that our "fulltime" professionals will be significantly compromised as part of the delaying force. There is also no question of the courage or resolve of individual reservists once committed to the fight. The human instinct for survival, as confirmed daily in Vietnam, will supply sufficient motivation once in the battle area. Regrettably there are now less life-threatening nationally sanctioned alternatives available to reservists and conscripts during mobilization. The precedent of the "Carter amnesty" has provided a window through which many may feel compelled to escape. Any comprehensive planning effort for mobilization must include increased emphasis upon individual motivation to counter the increasing apathy.

1

The Fear of Failure Syndrome

The most critical determinant of effective mobilization planning is the accuracy of status reporting. However the propensity for misrepresentation is growing in the system. Analysis reveals a direct linkage between unit status reporting and the personnel efficiency reporting system in all services. This system has fostered and fuels a "fear of failure" syndrome which is escalating rapidly in our military structure. Due to the relative lack of individual rights in employment security for the career military professional, the fear of a "bad efficiency report" has become institutionalized. The very system of efficiency reporting designed to eliminate the ineffective and unqualified has spawned a generation of career-conscious leaders that, when subjected to the intense competition for advancement, find it easier

to ignore or camouflage a problem than report the facts. The desire to insulate the boss from problems is pandemic. The implication is that any field commander willing to "tell the whole truth" about his unit does so at the risk of his career. Likewise, any rating officer disposed to a "fair and honest" evaluation of a subordinate's efficiency runs the risk of inadvertently destroying a meaningful and contributive career. Success in the system requires continuous outstanding fitness reports. In no other activity does "damning with faint praise" have more significance than the efficiency reporting system with which we suffer. Intuition suggests that a soldier should be either good enough to keep or bad enough to discharge, but the built-in inflation of efficiency reporting gives even the marginal performer the highest ratings in proficiency.

The nature of the military system subjects field commanders, to protect their career interests, to value judgements at every turn. Regrettably, many choose to amend the facts, ignore the problem, or disguise the actual state of affairs in the hope that tenure will get them before the truth does. In fairness to the many conscientious field commanders and other officers, it is readily acknowledged that many of these problems and conditons are either inherited, structural and without reasonable remedy or beyond their capabilities to resolve. Nonetheless, the system orientation suggests that to confess the existence of unit deficiencies is to admit failure, and to admit failure will short-circuit one's career.

A Partial Prescription

To raise a question carries with it the responsibility to offer, at

the very least, a possible answer. The foremost recommendation is an increase in the priority and funding for reserve mobilization training. In this regard, funds should be set aside to provide for more alerts, with movement to mobilization stations for selected units. The implementataion of this proactive mobilization training effort will provide first-hand experience in actual movement conditions and problems, and also will serve to heighten the mobilization attitude of all reserve forces. As an aside, this overt mobilization activity will not go unnoticed in the international community.

The reserve forces should be allowed to more numerous alerts, coupled with mobilization mission training activity. This will provide all units with a better understanding of their mobilization role and will, in a subtle way, increase the mobilization attitude of the individual soldier. Those components that have not yet decentralized their mobilization notification process and procedures should do so at the earliest opportunity. The absence of an effective decentralized notification process could prove disastrous in the event of massive command and communnication interruption.

Defined agreements for the nationalization of communications and transportation assets should be negotiated, or legislated, and the knowledge of these provisions should receive the widest possible dissimulation.

There is no easy solution to the reporting problem, for there is no easy way to legislate integrity. Annual inspections, readiness .. inspections, etc., have some effect, but the compromise rate of these "unannounced" visits is appalling. Perhaps the fear of failure syndrome suggests the need for a periodic "amnesty" to allow the most critical problems to reach the conference table without recrimination. Continued

reliance on integrity by regulation is folly. Values in society are changing and a military profession, once coveted as a privilege and honor, is now considered among the younger leaders as only a job. Unfortunately until some positive step is taken to counter this situation, unprepared units will be reported as ready and the vast majority of career personnel will remain in the top five percent in overall fitness.

Conclusion

The maintenance of an adequately trained reserve force is in the national interest, however, both credibility and deterrence are sacrificed if inadequate attention is not given to the capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy. To achieve the level of proficiency required will be expensive, but when one contemplates the billions of dollars spent to maintain a marginally deployable reserve system, the additional expense is more easily justified.

Intending only to raise the "mobilization consciousness" of the United States reserve forces, the preceding comments are based upon observation and experience, as opposed to statistical or scholarly research. Certainly for every point there is a counterpoint. For every assertion there is an "official" report that will condemn the implication. The best to be achieved is the realization that the perspective presented here is a closer approximation of the truth than a systemic appraisal.

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Introduction

Mobilization* has always been a difficult subject in a democracy. In peacetime, people do not like to think in these terms. Usually, the hard questions about mobilization are not answered and only minimal resources are devoted to it. The results, as in World War II and the Korean War, is that significant defeats are suffered before the country can be mobilized and sufficient resources brought to bear to achieve victory (WW II) or stale mate (Korea).

Discussion

This paper will discuss some of the problems involved in mobilization from a fairly narrow perspective - that of a commander of a Navy patrol air wing. Generally, an air wing will control two or three or more squadron VP P-3 Orion subhunters. Each squadron has nine aircraft. From this perspective it appears that 1983 finds the U.S. again with serious deficiencies in its ability to mobilize. The paper will use a case study format to highlight these deficiencies, on the assumption that many of the problems discussed may apply to other forces as well. It does not, however, attempt to speak for other segments of the U.S. defense establishment. Some of the gaps noted in readiness may in fact be already filled. Of course, much of the planning for mobilization is necessarily classified. Thus an unclassified forum has some limitations. However, the problems discussed appear to be real to the reserve commander in the fleet faced with the task of mobilizing numerous squadrons and deploying them in accordance with directives from higher authority.

* For the purposes of this paper, mobilization is interpreted to mean both the assembling forces in a general callup and the deployment of those forces to forward areas where they can be used to affect the outcome of any conflict.

the mobilization point of view (that is, assembling forces, as opposed to deploying them) it is better prepared than many other Navy units. The squadrons are well organized and equipped. Most of the squadrons are at or near their full complement in manpower and all have a complete complement of equipment. The typical individuals in these squadrons have active duty experience in patrol aviation. Flight crews may fly together for up to ten years and sometimes more. This gives them a depth of experience that is the envy of their active duty counterparts. Because of this capability, the reserve squadrons regularly augment the fleet in performing its mission in the forward areas. Thanks to a modernization program, the reserve aircraft will be able to perform their mission as fully as the active duty squadrons for the foreseeable future. The result is the reserve patrol aviation squadrons are ready to mobilize and perform their mission on extremely short notice -- they can be considered trained and ready.

The patrol squadrons are unique in a second respect which interferes somewhat with their ability to mobilize and deploy -- they do not have their own logistical infrastructure to support them in a deployment. The rest of the Navy--ships, aircraft carriers and embarked squadrons, and the Marine Corps -- are structured for deployment. Whatever they need is either already part of their equipment complement or a system exists to ensure that they have it. The patrol squadrons do not have this. In peacetime they typically deploy to Navy Air Stations or Naval Air Facilities that furnish all needed items--everything from communications equipment to bed sheets.

If, however, they are called upon to deploy to a forward area without a logistical infrastructure, deficiencies become obvious. A recent exercise, Ocean Safari, which called for the deployment of patrol aircraft to a forward base, highlighted this problem.

the movement of convoys across the North Atlantic. As noted above, this was the first time that this had been attempted from a remote site. From an operational point of view, the exercise was extremely successful. From the logistical point of view, however, some potential problem areas were uncovered. This is not surprising; problems are to be expected the first time anything new is tried. Rather than looking at an exercise such as this as a problem PER SE, it should be reviewed as a necessary first step along the road that will enable the squadrons to operate successfully from a remote site in the future without any problems.

Problem Areas

That the logistic system was able to supply these aircraft at all was a tribute to the system's resilience and its ability to respond to unforeseen contingencies. The difficulty with which this was accomplished, however, suggests that, in a general mobilization with multiple unforeseen demands on the system, serious problems may arise.

Some of these problems are listed below. It should be noted that they are seen from the perspective of an air wing staff. They might not be problems for others, and the staff may be unaware of all the factors. Further, these problems will primarily apply to a deployment to a remote site rather than an existing Naval Air Station. However current plans call for deployment to remote sites in the event of hostilities, so this contingency must be prepared for.

From the operational point of view, although very successful, two problem areas did emerge regarding sonobuoys and operational support. Sonobuoys were in relatively short supply although enough were ultimately obtained to complete

(ASWOC) available at the remote site. Although the squadrons were able to perform their mission without it, the efficiency with which this was done was severely hampered by its absence.

The problems primarily center around logistics - the ability to provide the wherewithal to operate once they reach their deployment site. The difficulty with which it was accomplished however, suggests that, in a general mobilization, the multiple demands on the logistical system would make it difficult, if not impossible, to operate successfully. Either that, or other units would not be able to function effectively because the system could not support everyone.

Recommendations

* Hold more exercises that test the ability of the patrol squadrons to deploy to remote sites. The current exercise was only a first step. More practice will be needed before these forces will be able to operate easily from these sites.

* Set up mobilization training programs for reserve wing commanders, their staff, and commanding officers, particularly in the area of logistics. Currently, there is a lack of understanding how the supply/logistical system works and how it can be used during a mobilization, and, because of it, commanding officers could not use the system to best advantage.

* Survey would be made of all likely deployment sites and the information made available to the reserve. Thus, preparations for mobilization could begin immediately, rather than await a wartime crisis. As a result, the reserve would be better prepared for mobilization and could accomplish it that much more quickly.

the patrol squadrons are supplied at remote sites. Currently, AD HOC groups arrange for these supplies, a not entirely satisfactory arrangement.

* Ocean Safari demonstrated the need for a mobile Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Center (ASWOC) to support squadron operations at a remote site.

*Develop detailed lists of required supplies for remote site deployment and take steps to ensure that they will be available on M-Day, and prepositioned if possible.

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OSD/MRA&I (RA) Colloquium

on

Guard and Reserve Mobilization

An Assessment Of Guard/Reserve

Mobilization Processes and Systems

By

Lt Col Philip L. Sullivan, USAFR

Air Reserve Forces Advisor

to

HQ MAC DCS/Operations Plans

The views, opinions, and/or findings
contained in this report are those of
the author and should not be construed
as an official HQ MAC position, policy,
or decision.

ARF STRUCTURE PROBLEMS

The joint chiefs' issue planning directives to the unified command CINCs. Forces available to these supported CINCs are listed in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or JSCP as it is called. After developing the concept of operations, which summarizes his intended use of forces made available for planning by JSCP, the supported CINC tasks his component commanders, representing the military services under his command, to develop a force list and an initial time-phased plan for their deployment. Air Forces including Air Reserve Forces are identified in the Air Force War Mobilization Plan (WMP).

This WMP tells the component commander the type of forces that he may use but the MAJCOMs are tasked to actually assign unit flags and source the requirements shown in the component commander's force list. Functional managers throughout the MAJCOM HQ assign units, individuals, equipment, or combinations of these, to satisfy these requirements using both Active and Reserve forces for those contingencies that assume mobilization. Problems arise when a requirement exists that can not be fully sourced by an Active or a Reserve unit but requires individuals from the Reserve unit to supplement the Active unit to satisfy a critical shortfall. For example, there is a critical shortfall of food handlers in the Active force as civilian contractors have taken over much of food service in today's Air Force. In the Air National Guard food handlers are assigned to the combat support squadrons, which total about 114 personnel. The functional manager at the MAJCOM is required to task these food handlers in the combat support squadrons to fill the shortfall.

The problem is critical in OPLANs requiring less than a full mobilization when no requirement exists for the remainder of the combat support squadron. Title 10 USC 672 requires that the entire unit be mobilized in order to obtain the small number (1-8) of food handlers. This is a very expensive and demoralizing procedure when 114 personnel are mobilized and only one or two are used.

An obvious solution would be to assign these individuals in critical fields to one unit, i.g. a mobility support flight, that could be mobilized to satisfy the consistent shortfalls in the active force.

This probably would be the best solution provided that the individuals train in their specialties and not as a mobility support flight (as was done in the past). However, this solution is not without drawbacks. If the rest of the ARF units are mobilized after the mobility support flight has been deployed to support the active force, they find themselves deprived of part of their capability.

Functional managers would have to ensure that ARF units receive backfill support if a needed capability has been previously deployed. This seems to be better than the present procedure of mobilizing large numbers of ARF personnel needlessly.

MOBILIZATION PROCEDURE PROBLEMS

The Military Airlift Command relies heavily on its gained Reserve Forces to support most contingency operations. Thirty-nine percent of the total MAC forces are in the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserve, so it is imperative that mobilization of these forces be accomplished quickly and efficiently during a crisis.

MAC has identified Reserve forces needed to support various OPLANs, but since we do not execute OPLANs, time will still be required during execution planning to review MAC mobilization requirements and create an operations order to be executed. Once the requirements are finalized MAJCOMs must coordinate with USAF/XO to obtain permission to mobilize these forces. Full or total mobilization poses no problem, for all Air Reserve Force units are mobilized. However, previous mobilization exercises have shown this to be a very time-consuming effort resulting in serious delays in the mobilization process if the mobilization is less than full. The present process requires several messages to be sent to HQ USAF requesting approval to mobilize particular ARF units. Several hours may pass before an answer is received. Approval is given as long as the MAJCOM does not exceed the portion it was allotted.

The procedure could be shortened if MAJCOMs were allowed to use their own discretion in mobilizing their ARF units provided the total number mobilized stays within a predesignated amount. Information copies of the mobilization message to the units should be sent to USAF/XO and other concerned agencies to keep them advised of units being mobilized. The present process is sometimes

confusing to other concerned agencies as they now receive copies of USAF/XOOTN's mobilization message to the MAJCOM authorizing certain predesignated units to be mobilized. Those agencies assume that the units shown on the Air Staff message will be mobilized. However, because of unit readiness or tasking changes, the MAJCOM may desire that another unit be substituted for the predesignated unit and begin the process to obtain permission from Air Staff to make the change. Since the unit is not mobilized until it receives its mobilization message, it would seem prudent that concerned agencies receive copies of the message to the unit and not the Air Staff message to the MAJCOM. The recommended procedure would save critical time, lessen confusion, and eliminate needless message traffic.

Present mobilization directives prohibit MAJCOMs, SOAs, units, or members of units from making any press release or statement concerning mobilization before public announcement is made by the Secretary of Defense. Units are not allowed to use radio, television, or newspapers to notify individual members of an alert to mobilize until DOD has provided detailed information to members of the Congress and the public (AFR 28-5, para 2-7g). Consequently, units must rely on their telephone alert procedures to notify individuals of a mobilization. This procedure may have been adequate when Reserves had thirty days to mobilize, but it is entirely unsatisfactory when the unit has only twenty-four hours from the time it is notified to accomplish notification and mobilization of its members.

Recent mobilization exercises have shown that units have extreme difficulty in using the telephone to call off-base to notify key alerters. This problem would be compounded many times over during an actual national emergency.

Instances such as the attempted assassination of the President have proven that telephone communication is almost impossible during times of crisis. Bases such as Andrews AFB that are located in areas that are heavily concentrated with DOD facilities would find it very difficult to use the telephone. The 459 TAW at Andrews had difficulty during the mobilization exercise Condor Redoubt in obtaining telephone lines, even though that exercise was limited to the AF Reserve. An actual crisis would make it impossible to rely on a telephone alert when all agencies would be competing for telephone lines. The problem would be compounded by those individuals that would be trying to call into the base.

Present directives should be changed to allow units and MAJCOMs to use the media to expedite mobilization. Units should set up procedures to notify key radio and television stations to broadcast a predetermined mobilization message to alert their members. Individual contacts at these stations should be designated to lessen confusion and authentication procedures should be set up to prevent unauthorized use. Many Reserve members have jobs that require them to travel and often can not be reached at their predesignated alert phone numbers. Use of the media would increase the possibility of their receiving the mobilization alert.

These procedures should be practiced during mobilization exercises to eliminate confusion in an actual crisis. Some say that practice mobilization messages would panic the public but CONELRAD practices have proven that this is a false assumption. In fact, practice messages could be a valuable and inexpensive recruiting device for it would make the public aware that a Reserve or Guard unit was in the area.

UNIT MOBILIZATION CONCERNS

AFR 28-5 states that units are to be notified of mobilization by classified means. Exercises have shown that this sometimes causes delays. There are a number of units that do not have the means to receive classified messages. For instance, some aerial port units must be notified by Western Union which can not receive classified messages. During one exercise a medical unit was late in mobilizing because the person on duty did not have the clearance to receive classified messages.

The fact that a unit is being mobilized should not be classified. If this information is classified, notification of individual members by non-secure telephone would be a breach of security. Recommend that mobilization messages be unclassified.

Many Reserve and Guard units have not made adequate plans to ensure their members are prepared to mobilize and deploy within the time span allotted. In some instances both husband and wife are reservists and are eligible for deployment with little or no notice. Many of these couples have not made plans for someone to care for their dependents or household goods.

Even single members do not realize the importance of making plans for rapid mobilization and deployment. Reserve and Guard units must stress the fact that they no longer have thirty days to mobilize. Plans should be made at the unit level to ensure members are prepared for quick mobilization and long term deployment. Units could make provisions for some non-deploying members to

assist those that deploy quickly with matters such as care of household goods and notification of friends or relatives of the deploying member.

Host Active units are now required to produce mobilization plans to show how they will support Reserve and Guard mobilization on their bases. A major concern is the billeting and feeding of forces arriving on the Active base, especially at MAC's large bases where a great number of Associate Reservists would be mobilized. Monthly training periods are now staggered because these bases are unable to support an Associate wing if all its members arrive on the same weekend. It may be necessary to make arrangements with hotels or motels to support the large influx, especially in the absence of a national emergency such as the Presidential 100K Call-up.

It is necessary that MAJCOMs ensure that active units designated to support Reserve Force mobilization receive notification of the mobilization. Past exercises have shown that some Active units did not receive copies of the mobilization message or were not notified of the alert and consequently would not have been able to support the Reserve Force mobilization. These organizations must be identified and procedures implemented to ensure they receive word of mobilizations.

Many JCS exercises omit mobilization practices. In many cases mobilization is assumed to have already occurred when the exercise begins. Mobilization procedures must be exercised whenever possible, and to the maximum extent consistent with the exercise to identify and correct problem areas, for it will be critical that the procedure run smoothly in an actual crisis.

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Roundout Brigade Integration Into An Active Army Division

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17 October 1983

DISCLAIMER STATEMENT

"The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization public or private. The purpose of this paper is to disseminate information and opinion on issues of importance to those concerned with various aspects of mobilization, especially of the Guard and Reserve Components."

Roundout Brigade Integration Into An Active Army Division

INTRODUCTION

The current structure of several Active Army divisions includes the presence of a National Guard brigade as a major component of the division force. No longer is this portion of the National Guard a back-up force, a tentative addition to the combat force. Today's Total Army Force concept requires that Roundout Brigades train and operate as a key element of the basic combat division. The mission success of the division overall is directly related to the readiness posture and complete integration of the Roundout Brigade into the division organization. As a result, the techniques of integration, of readiness assessment and improvement, and teamwork to attain optimum training at every opportunity are major considerations in the division's daily activities.

This paper will discuss the existing tools for readiness assessment, present some key factors which assist the integration of a Roundout Brigade into the division, and identify some critical areas requiring further effort to insure readiness of the total division force.

READINESS ASSESSMENT

Inasmuch as the Roundout Brigade provides one-third of the division's combat power, our ability to assess and assist in its readiness posture carries the same emphasis as that for the active component of the force. Physical proximity, unit supervision, and routine observation and coordination provide the glue for the active force. In the Roundout Brigade case units are scattered, and observation is much less frequent. The Unit Status Report is available for both active and reserve units. It provides general information on personnel fill and qualification, unit training condition and unit equipment fill and status to assess readiness in all units. This is supplemented by a new Forces Command active and reserve component USR addendum for combat units which provides training information on major crew served weapons and combat entities such as tank crews, scout and artillery sections, infantry and mortar squads and anti-tank guided missile crews. Further, the Forces Command Annual Training Report for National Guard units elaborates on overall training posture and provides good information on mission capability.

While these reports do provide great amounts of useful information to assist in rapid integration of the Roundout Brigade, there are some critical areas that do not surface routinely. Their importance is magnified by the recognition that the success of the division in combat is directly related to the readiness of the roundout unit. More knowledge of individual and unit training levels is required. Ability of the units to go beyond platoon and company operations is critical. Operating as a part of a larger force with proper command and control interface and logistic support is key to mission success. Comprehensive knowledge of unit status in these areas can only be gained by very close association with all levels of the Roundout Brigade throughout the year. Opportunities for regular training integration must be continually sought. Other key areas include identification of specific

equipment and organizational differences, differences in requirements for spare parts, ability to interface automated logistical information, status of personnel readiness areas such as automated personnel and finance record integration, status of deployment training, etc. All of these and other areas of routine unit interface require special attention in the Roundout Brigade case.

Therefore, we must go beyond the current measurement tools and overcome the distance and limited training time available to the Roundout Brigade. A total interface must be created, along the same lines as that affected with all other major subordinate commands of the division. There must be a thorough and common understanding of mission, organization and procedures, contingency plans and training programs to insure the rapid and successful integration of the roundout unit.

KEY FACTORS AFFECTING ROUNDOUT INTEGRATION:

Numerous factors significantly affect the success of a Roundout relationship. The following discussion of these factors is taken from the Roundout connection between the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Georgia Army National Guard. All of these factors seem equally applicable to other relationships described in the Army CAPSTONE program which aligns reserve component units with active component organizations for purposes of training integration and preparation for deployment and employment in a theater of war. While some CAPSTONE relationships may be altered under actual mobilization, the firm expectation and requirement in the roundout case is that the roundout unit will in fact deploy and fight with its active unit partner under any foreseeable mobilization situation.

A Shared Sense of Mission

The first step in development of the roundout relationship is the presentation and understanding of a common mission. A sense of mission should always drive training and deployment preparation. Whenever unit members can see clearly that their training moves them toward better mission accomplishment, they train harder and learn more precisely.

The 48th Brigade, like the rest of the 24th Division, experienced a burst of new energy and esprit when a rapid response mission arrived. The Roundout unit (in this case consisting of one tank battalion, two mechanized infantry battalions, a direct support artillery battalion and a combat service support battalion) is on a strong umbilical, and what happens to the parent also happens to the sibling. There is no specific official mission statement that brings the 48th Brigade into the forces available to / list at present. The general perception, however, is that since the brigade would round out the division in a national emergency, it should be prepared to deploy quickly and be ready to join forces with the division, perhaps with little, if any, additional training.

This sense of mission carried over to providing the brigade a thorough understanding of contingency plans, potential areas of operation and emplaced a focal point for tactical training. The possibility of actually going increased; mobilization and deployment priorities were moved up. Load plans became more important. Most of all, mission-oriented tactical training quickly took precedence over all other considerations.

This mission orientation permitted some specific identification of possible brigade missions, command and support relationships, expected task organizations, and further defined relationships for coordination and training. While an active brigade of the division continues to support and assist unit training, the division staff is directly involved in training and support coordination for

the Roundout Brigade as a whole. The 48th Brigade is considered the full-fledged 3d Brigade of the division.

Increased Organizational Knowledge

Some parts of the brigade fold into the division base upon arrival, e.g., the cavalry troop rounds out the cavalry squadron, the engineer company to the engineer battalion, the field artillery battalion to division artillery. Support elements similarly integrate the medical, maintenance, and supply forward support elements.

Detailed knowledge of organizational structure and equipment was necessary to deal with requirements for slight organizational modification and additional or different maintenance requirements for some dissimilar equipment. Problems regarding lack of division support for some items of equipment were addressed to find a way to increase the authorized stockage list of spare parts. Techniques to combine use of two types of radars were considered. Plans were coordinated with state and Forces Command authorities to expedite modernization of the brigade's tank, artillery fire control, and anti-tank guided missile fleet to the point where it soon will have the same major equipment as the rest of the division. All of these activities increased coordination and interface opportunities at the division-brigade level.

Common Training Guidance

The connection of a common mission creates common training opportunities and requirements. 48th Brigade operates under the same training guidance as other elements of the division and together with state instructions, develops training programs in consonance with the division guidance. Common planning sessions where roundout and active leaders plan and organize training are routine and frequent. The Division Field Standing Operating Procedures, Emergency Deployment Plan, the Standard Battalion Standing Operating Procedures

and current training guidance provide a common basis for the planning and conduct of all training. The great frequency of these planning sessions breeds a joint trust and confidence that provides for significantly increased quality training. The barriers to communication are vastly reduced and real teamwork in a common direction results.

A key component of training guidance is integration of elements that would fight together whenever possible. Joint training is the norm with the roundout cavalry troop and the cavalry squadron. Cavalry squadron exercises are scheduled whenever possible to coincide with roundout troop availability. The squadron annual Army Training and Evaluation Program evaluation is conducted with the roundout troop present for its annual training period. Like type integration is sought with the engineers, aviators and combat support and service support elements. In September 1983, the roundout tank battalion participated in training with the active 1st Brigade and an active mechanized battalion at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Units were cross-attached with roundout and active mechanized and tank companies in each task force. A battery of the roundout artillery battalion was integrated into the direct support artillery battalion supporting the 1st Brigade. Other roundout elements were integrated into active combat support and service support units, all producing the epitome of roundout integration in training.

Some other highlights of this integration include use of the roundout brigade headquarters as controlling headquarters for active component battalions during Joint Readiness Exercise Bold Eagle '82 in Florida, and provision of a brigade headquarters staff to participate with the division in LOGEX '82, a large Corps level Command Post Exercise sponsored by the US Army Logistic Center.

Hence training integration, based on common missions, common training guidance, and common task organization relationships is a key element of the training plan. This integration further develops the professional knowledge and trust and confidence among all leaders, active and reserve, in the division. The division and elements thereof actively seek opportunities to create this integration routinely.

Common Professional Development

Professional development of leaders and other personnel with special qualification requirements also improves roundout active integration. Roundout brigade leaders participate in "chain (of command) training" initiated by the division commander. The subject areas are then extended downward through the "chain" as they apply at each level, providing another area of commonality in the division.

Division schools for special qualifications such as motor sergeants, repair parts clerks, maintenance management clerks, and nuclear-biological-chemical personnel are attended by roundout brigade personnel along with division soldiers. The division is developing "master trainer" programs for mortar and antitank guided missile leaders along the lines of the Army's Tank Master Gunner Program to further assist professional development. Roundout Brigade trainers in these systems are participating in the pilot "master trainer" programs. Mobile training teams from active battalions are regularly providing training on a variety of weapons systems and other equipment for roundout unit trainers at their home station as well. These associations further develop and improve soldier relations at the lower levels.

The "Keep-up" program, a program supporting reserve component personnel observation of active training is exploited to the maximum. One major twist is included however. Roundout personnel are invited to participate as members of

active unit staffs and units instead of just observing. Today it is normal to have roundout personnel actively augmenting and playing a full roll whenever either the division or active brigade headquarters is operating in any exercise. This extends similarly into signal, medical, maintenance, and supply support activities as well as combat units. This additional exposure helps the roundout leaders to improve their sense of training management and conduct. They see the shortcomings and strengths of more training events and are thus better able to plan and conduct better quality training with their own units in the very limited training time available to them.

Common Standards

All of these associations and training opportunities provide for a common standard throughout the division, including the roundout units. There currently exists a common Army Regulation based appearance standard that was jointly developed with the roundout brigade. Soldiers and leaders from both units understand it and enforce it, giving great pride and joint commitment by all.

Training standards emanate from common guidance, documentation, and procedures to insure quality training and facilitate interface of units in operations. The capstone of this effort is the recent participation of the roundout brigade armor battalion and support elements as part of the division forces at the National Training Center mentioned earlier. The commonality of standards, training goals and operational procedures pursued during training in preparation for the National Training Center provided the foundation for successful performance of numerous missions in the most rigorous training environment in the Army. While the roundout units still have room to grow (as do active units), they learned a great deal and significantly improved their training status.

A Year 'Round Dynamic

The integration of a roundout unit is not a periodic affair. It requires constant attention by all agencies, active and guard. The state of Georgia, its National Guard Bureau, and the 48th Brigade are all fully committed to the special tasks associated with providing a Roundout Brigade. They have continued to provide the extra effort and where possible the resources to help the brigade in all activities. The importance of quick and complete integration of the unit into the whole division to assure mission success is a great challenge well understood by all.

The foundation for successful integration is a common sense of mission and full appreciation of its urgency. This must be followed up with complete knowledge of the organizational structure and unit developmental needs, pursuit of common training goals and techniques, and common professional standards to provide the glue to bind the roundout units, leaders, and soldiers to their active unit compatriots to insure a successful outcome on any mission. This is not done in 39 days a year, the allotted reserve component training time, nor is it done with ease and without expenditure of other resources. The effort must be a year 'round activity totally encompassing mission oriented training for leaders and soldiers, integrating every element possible wherever and as often as possible to insure the highest training readiness attainable.

AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER ATTENTION

While training readiness is being improved dramatically in the roundout arena, there are several areas from a division viewpoint which require more attention to insure rapid mobilization and complete integration. These issues primarily concern the techniques and procedures associated with home station personnel readiness and mobilization, unit deployment readiness, commonality of

equipment and personnel for command and control needs, and systems to insure logistics needs are met. All of these concerns are predicated on the assumption that the roundout unit will move with or closely behind the active unit in a mobilization emergency. In this situation, time to procure, adjust and further develop the integration will not be available for roundout units as it may be for later deploying units.

Personnel Readiness and Deployability

Rapid mobilization from home station requires that personnel posture and preparedness be thoroughly researched and developed. Personnel preparation with proper powers of attorney, Soldier's Government Life Insurance beneficiary election, dependent identification, medical preparation, etc., all need to be up to date routinely. The 24th Division maintains Personnel Readiness Folders on all active personnel to keep track of such things. The procedures differ somewhat in the roundout unit in part because of differing requirements and systems at the state level. Procedures that address both state and active unit needs should be developed on a common footing to reduce the additional requirements upon mobilization.

Another personnel issue concerns detailed accountability of non-deployable personnel in the guard. There now exist personnel who have profiles making them potentially non-deployable, as well as persons who occupy defense related civilian jobs. A system to thoroughly review and maintain current personnel deployability records is critical to insure key personnel will be available upon mobilization or if not, as is the case now in a few instances, adequate replacement plans are in order.

A final personnel issue requiring attention is the integration of roundout personnel into the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Accounting System. Currently this transfer from state personnel accounting is a rather laborious

manual entry into the active component automated system. During Annual Training the roundout units have worked on the problem, but some techniques are required to simplify, accelerate and hopefully automate this transfer.

Deployment Training

Deployment training by air and sea should be increased to reduce difficulties in rapidly assembling and properly loading units and equipment on strategic movement means. Proper and sufficient deployment support materials (blocking, bracing and tie down equipment) are not available in quantity to fully outload the roundout force. (This is an active component problem as well).

Command and Control Needs

Command and control of the unit in combat operations is, of course, critical to apply the full combat power of the organization. This requires the necessary equipment and trained personnel to insure complete integration of the roundout unit. One key area in this regard is the control of indirect fires and targeting information. Command and control of indirect fires is changing dramatically with the addition of the Army TACFIRE system in the division and division artillery headquarters, as well as the firing battalions. This system is similarly programmed in the roundout units at the same time. The challenge here is the amount of training time required to remain current on the equipment. Artillery School estimates and field experience indicate that TACFIRE operators must conduct at least 16 hours of intensive training weekly on this very complex system to remain proficient. Such a training requirement suggests that TACFIRE operators in National Guard firing units and fire coordination billets be

fulltime personnel to maintain proper proficiency in this system. There are indications that these positions will be authorized soon.

Further, the speed and precision required to properly deal with the great impact of Force Modernization, additional training requirements and overall systems integration suggest that a fulltime liaison officer from the roundout brigade to the division is essential. Such a position could pay great dividends in daily staff coordination and planning activity to reduce to the minimum the unforeseen problems that may be expected upon rapid mobilization.

Another area of command and control relates to the provision of an Air Force Tactical Air Control Party to the roundout brigade. The present plan is to provide this capability from the Air National Guard. However, specific identification of this party and routine integration of it into combined arms training is a significant shortfall today.

Logistics Interface

Many challenges exist in the logistics arena to insure speedy integration of the roundout unit. Even with the dramatic and successful effort to equip the roundout unit with the same new major items like M60A3 tanks, artillery TACFIRE, Improved TOW Vehicle (anti-tank guided missile systems) and the like, there remain numerous differences in equipment types and therefore different requirements for repair parts. The Authorized Stockage List (ASL) of spare parts is considerably different in type and often lower in quantity in the roundout units. The ideal, of course, is to return to similar equipment throughout, but short of this at least a common base stockage list in the division, covering all items, active and roundout, seems prudent.

Most of the current National Guard ASL for combat equipment is maintained at National Guard Maintenance of Training Equipment Sites (MATES) where most of the unit combat vehicles are kept. Procedures need to be formulated for rapidly

transferring the roundout unit MATEL repair parts stock to active status, or perhaps a separate contingency stock of roundout peculiar items should be procured and stored in the division ASL to support rapid mobilization and deployment. In any case, a ready supply of these spares is necessary early in the deployment sequence.

National Guard units tend to carry smaller quantities of spares at unit level in their Prescribed Load List (PLL) of repair parts. While current guard PLL consumption is lower due to less equipment use, that situation would change quickly upon mobilization. Therefore additional funds should be allocated to increase the amount of spares maintained in at least roundout units also.

Another area of concern in logistics management is the dissimilarity in automatic data processing equipment supporting logistics actions. The 24th Division is equipped with the new Division Automated System Model 3B, through which all requisitions pass. This system does not connect with the current 48th Brigade system. As a result, the expeditious transfer of outstanding requisitions from one system to the other upon mobilization is not possible. Further, once mobilized the roundout unit would have to enter the system manually at the division support level for normal sustainment actions, a condition that would significantly reduce efficient response to their support needs.

A final area of logistics concern is development and maintenance of key contingency stocks. Examples of needed go-to-war items are camouflage screens, NBC and cold weather clothing and equipment, armored vests, war stocks of packaged petroleum products and the like. All these items, not now present or available in quantity, need to be earmarked and locally stored for distribution upon mobilization.

SUMMARY

The importance of completely integrating roundout units into active divi-

sions is clear and apparent; the division's mission success depends on it. Just supporting roundout unit annual training and periodic reviewing of reports is not sufficient to insure the smooth and detailed integration required. The task requires a joint understanding of a common real world mission, careful and continuous assessment of readiness posture, a detailed knowledge of both organizations, common training guidance to achieve common goals and common professional growth and standards, all leading to a year 'round dynamic that puts and keeps the units together in thought, team spirit, and commitment to a mutually dependent goal: Total Force Readiness.

Time, different procedures, and different (in some cases short) equipment increase the challenge. It is not possible to meet the roundout mission in 39 days a year. The successes enjoyed by the 24th Division and the 48th Brigade Georgia Army National Guard have been the result of much more time together and attempts at every turn to think of new and better ways to expand the 39 days.

Challenges still exist in the standardization of personnel support procedures, but these can be developed relatively easily with a concerted joint effort between active and roundout units and the state headquarters. The addition of a few roundout personnel for liaison and command and control operations now and positive identification of Air Guard tactical air control parties would dramatically improve current coordination and training.

The most pressing longer term requirements for full integration rest in the equipment and contingency stock area. Great strides have been made in providing modern major combat items. Much more needs to be done in the area of repair parts supply integration, automated logistics data processing, and procurement of contingency stocks now for early deploying units.

Finally, with a common mission understanding and goal, efficiencies in training are improved, teamwork is a daily feeling, and units are encouraged to and find comfort in extending themselves to the maximum. The Roundout concept

is a challenging, viable alternative to larger active forces. Constant teamwork and continued pursuit of common goals is bringing the goal of total division readiness well within reach.

The Field Commanders - Why aren't they getting what they need?

Carl Ryznar, CDR, USNR

One of the most perplexing problems facing American military planners is the constant need to deploy large forces to the European Theatre if a major war breaks out. These forces must be deployable with little or no advance warning. Since the end of World War II, budgetary constraints have not allowed the forward deployment of enough active forces to equal the forces available to the Warsaw Pact. This dilemma has been "solved" by U.S. leadership relying on Reserve forces.

In crisis situations, a timely mobilization is planned that hopes to deter aggression, and failing that stop any advance. This ambitious plan depends on rapid mobilization and deployment of reinforcing and sustaining Reserve units. The postulated Warsaw Pact scenario of a quick drive across Central Europe to arrive at the Channel ports between D+14 and D+30 stands little chance of being defeated unless Reserve forces can be mobilized and deployed at the first indications and warning.

The Reserve forces that would be mobilized run the full gamut from squadrons, ships, brigades, and divisions to individuals. The task the nation has set for itself is formidable. The forward deployed active force commander must face the question of Reserve force employment. His exposed location demands that he take a realistic and responsible attitude towards those forces. As a Reserve force manager serving on an active duty force staff I see some questions that should be asked by both active and Reserve components

WHAT IS THE ACTIVE DUTY GAINING FORCE COMMANDER LOOKING FOR?

Most Armed Forces managers have been involved in some form of unit

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

readiness accountability and reporting. The unit commanders (wing, fleet, division, army, CINC) are looking for about the same thing. They want a fully trained, fully manned, fully equipped, and fully supported unit to mobilize to them. They seek homogeneity in composition, equipment, morale, and fighting ability at least equal to the active forces they currently command. The active force commander knows that the likely conflict will involve high intensity operations, and with high attrition. He knows that only a high state of readiness and training will overcome the disparity in numbers that he faces. He definitely cannot afford to take time out after M-Day to train, indoctrinate, and equip "his" Reserves.

WHAT IS THE ACTIVE DUTY GAINING COMMAND WILLING TO DO FOR HIS RESERVE AUGMENTING FORCE?

Little or nothing! This harsh assessment is based on observation of and liaison with naval units and reading the literature of the other services. With the inception of Total Force concepts and upper echelon support from DOD, service secretaries and Congress the answer to the above question should be changed to: "...as little as possible to stay out of high level trouble." This attitude is understandable, if shortsighted, for a number of reasons. Competition for resources, tempo of operations, lack of indoctrination and poor perceptions of Reserves are some of the rationale for these attitudes. There is hope for this -- there are some perceptive and enlightened unit and staff commanders. They understand that their mobilization plans or unit survival have to depend on Reserve augmentation. Their interests are well served by being involved with their Reserves. Generally speaking though, the day to day press of operations and the lack of accountability ensure a lack of interest on the part of the active forces.

WHAT SHOULD TOTAL FORCE MANAGEMENT DO?

This question can be answered by going back to the field commander's perspective of "his" Reserve unit. That perspective and the plan to employ the Reserves in a timely manner should drive management plans for the Reserve. Like many other national defense dilemmas the effectiveness of the Reserve components depend on allocation of resources. The former Chief of the National Guard Bureau, GEN W. P. Wilson has said, "The Guard can achieve any kind of readiness the nation is willing to pay for." The general's remark acknowledges that there will be no magical cures for asset shortfalls. Even with the best of leadership if there is going to be a relatively constant ceiling of available dollars to fund the Total Force, then an increase in the Reserve force commitment must come at the apparent expense of the active duty forces. Tempo of active force deployments, number of active units, Reserve training methods and Reserve equipment shortfalls all must be scrutinized to meet the objective. If the country's strategy demands that the Reserve forces have the same utility as the active forces, if mobilized; it is naive to expect that utility by adhering to present policies. If Reserve Unit Required Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) are the same as active forces then a much greater effort must be made to integrate Reserves and active forces. "Total Force" is meaningless if we continue with cumbersome supervision, divided responsibilities, obsolete equipment, and less than dynamic training programs.

If the field commander is going to be the eventual user he must become more intimately involved in his Reserve units. This means discarding a lot of traditions, and changing organizations that are deeply entrenched. A key problem seems to lie in the area of divided responsibilities. In many cases the gaining commander seldom sees his Reserve unit and is not held

accountable for their readiness. All the services have initiatives that are attempting to overcome this, but the inertias are still very powerful. It is a rare active duty commander that shows aggressive and dynamic involvement with his Reserves. Directives legislating more integration are often met with apathy. Cooperativeness is uneven on the Reserve forces side of the house also. Not all Reserve and Guard managers understand the sophisticated missions that must be performed today and some lack the drive and competence to provide adequate Reserve forces.

CONCLUSION

Theoretically, Reserve forces should be trained, equipped, and managed by the Regular forces. Deployment cycles, budget constraints and a host of other obvious limitations legislate for a more practical solution. Force the active component commander into the Reserve world. Make him accountable for the units he is going to have to depend on. He must make the conscious operational training, budget and leadership decisions. Changing work hours to exercise Reservists at night or on weekend, ensure new equipment is in the POM process, and force Reserve and active units to schedule their active duty training together are a few mundane examples.

A lot of excellent examples have been taking place in the Reserve components lately. It is time to insist on the full involvement of the man who stands the most to lose or gain from his Reservists - the field commander.

constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

The Supported Command:

Key Factor in the Mobilization Equation

by

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National Defense University Colloquium

on

Guard and Reserve Mobilization: An Essential
Element of Preparedness

Sponsored by

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OUTLINE

1. Overall Concept of Military Reserve Forces Support
2. Planning
3. Execution
4. Assessment
5. Conclusion

PRECIS

The role of the supported command in military reserve mobilization deserves greater emphasis and needs to be sustained throughout the planning-execution-assessment cycle:

- * Mobilization is both a comprehensive process and the culmination of that process. A supported command has much at stake in mobilization outcomes and therefore should take part in all aspects of the process.
- * Mobilization involves increasing as well as reallocating finite resources dedicated to military missions in a way that strengthens the national defense. Therefore, responsibility for delivering mobilization support should be shared by the supported command along with the Service reserve program managers and reservists.

A conceptual model of the mobilization planning-execution-assessment cycle can assist responsible officials in coordinating work on each phase of the process:

- * Mutual support is possible if all officials have the same image of the system that they manage or that supports them.
- * Recruiting and training efforts, supported by appropriate incentives and awards, have a better chance of producing results desired by the supported command if it remains actively involved throughout the cycle.

The benefits accruing to providers and users of military reserve forces, as seen through the model, should be measured in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in attaining a common goal:

- * Planners and policy-makers can concentrate on identifying resources that augment existing active component forces and provide additional reinforcement units that enable the supported command to accomplish an expanded mission.
- * Cooperation based upon understanding will enable reserve program managers to focus their attention on training toward specified objectives generated by the supported command.
- * Reservists will be motivated to ensure that they are ready for recall and assured that their services and products not only satisfy valid requirements but receive needed recognition as well.
- * Supported commands gain manpower assets that enhance overall readiness and increase capability.

Military reserve forces ultimately exist to support the Service departments and Department of Defense agencies in carrying out their national defense missions in times of national emergency and war. When all officials concerned with the military reserve forces work in concert toward common goals, those forces will not be viewed as a luxury but as an essential and integral part of the total force.

Gaining commands should take a positive and responsible role in all phases and support every aspect of the reserve mobilization process. Military reserve forces are valuable resources that realize their full potential upon integration into the total force when mobilized during national emergencies and in wartime. They may also provide useful service to the national defense at other times as well, in situations ranging from normal peacetime use through crises and small-scale conflicts to partial mobilization.

"Reserve Forces Employment Spectrum"




Figure 1

Figure 1 shows the spectrum of employment that can be considered in dealing with military reserve forces of the Department of Defense (DOD). The categories of employment are defined by law, regulation, directive, and policy guidance, but the flexibility for actual use of reserve forces varies with political and economic circumstances. With this in mind, it should be noted that restricting employment of reserve forces to mobilization denies the United States much of the potential available from this trained and motivated resource.

An overall view of military reserve forces through the "7-R Concept" will help identify the elements of the programs that deliver military reserve

assets under a wide range of conditions. It will also suggest that these elements must perform in balance as part of an interactive system, and that their successful integration throughout the employment spectrum is required by the Total Force Policy. Service reserve program managers and reservists are traditionally viewed as comprising a supply element and the supported or gaining command as comprising a demand element. Their relationship might be expressed using mathematical symbols in the equation shown in Figure 2.

"7-R Concept"


$$\frac{R_1 + R_2 + R_3}{R_4 + R_5} = R_6 (RP^2 + MR) \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{---} \\ \text{---} \end{array} \right\} R_7$$


Figure 2

The equation begins with and is driven by requirements (R_1) stated by the gaining command to which recruiting (R_2) and retention (R_3) efforts are added by reserve program managers. An incentives (R_4 = rewards) and awards (R_5 = recognition) program supports all three efforts, achieving results (R_6) in the form of reserve peacetime productivity (RP^2) and mobilization readiness (MR). To ensure that the system remains viable, it is exercised and assessments made regarding the degree to which reserve forces meet their recall standards (R_7). For emphasis, the military reserve support system is pictured being assessed all along the employment spectrum, transitioning from peacetime use through small-scale crises to national emergency and war, or back in the opposite direction (see Figure 1).

The equation expresses a complete and succinct supply and demand relationship among the elements involved in delivering reserve support to the gaining command. It also appears to satisfy a budgetary need for thinking

CONCEPT OF MILITARY RESERVE FORCES SUPPORT

PHASE:

PLANNING

Requirements

- * Law and Policy
- * Guidance
- * Plans
- * Assumptions
- * Scenarios
- * Manpower Factors
- * Mobilization Billets

EXECUTION

Recruiting

- * Standards
- * Manning
- * Location


Retention

- * Correct Assignment
- * Useful Task
- * Training
- * Screening
- * Leadership
- * Information

ASSESSMENT

Results

- * Mobilization Readiness
- * Peacetime Productivity



Rewards

- * Pay
- * Retirement
- * Other Benefits

Recognition

- * Reservist
- * Gaining Unit
- * Reserve Program Manager

Figure 3

of military reserve forces as distinct from the active component for recruiting, training, and mobilization planning. Despite the convenience offered by this mathematical shorthand, however, the equation cannot fully describe the complex and mutually supportive roles of reserve program managers, reservists, and gaining commanders. All three DOD military departments have developed successful programs for delivering reserve support which lead to an expansion of the equation into a fuller, more detailed model.

The graphic model portrayed in Figure 3 enables all participants to identify actions required for delivering reserve assets at any point along the employment spectrum. It assists them in determining where they are headed with specific actions and facilitates the measurement of progress toward the goal of readiness. Each action is assigned to one of the seven "Rs" of the mobilization equation; further, each action occurs in sequence under successive phases of the planning-execution-assessment cycle.

Gaining commands can participate in all three phases of the support cycle, just as reserve forces should be considered by the gaining command in all aspects of mobilization planning. No longer simply the passive recipient of what an external system delivers, the gaining commander can support and participate actively in recruiting and retention efforts as well as assume responsibility for defining mobilization billet requirements. Similarly, rewards and recognition should be supplied by gaining command managers as well as by reserve program managers. This increased emphasis on the role of the supported command will increase its confidence in the reliability of reserve forces and thereby strengthen the mobilization readiness of the total force.

Obviously, none of the three factors--reserve program managers, reservists, and gaining commanders--can accomplish the readiness objective independently.

It must be equally obvious that a credible mobilization system depends, in part, upon assigning a larger role to the supported or gaining command on both sides of the equation. Joint efforts will determine the capability of any commander to carry out the total force mission. A more prominent role in the reserve forces support system would raise the gaining command to the level of a key factor in the mobilization equation.

PLANNING

Mobilization plans are intended to bridge the gap between requirements and capabilities and to ensure that the resources for identified needs can be acquired rapidly. It is useful to measure plans against a set of general criteria* that requires answers to the questions who, what, when, how, where, and why. Conceptual plans will perhaps answer only what and who. Detailed plans, on the other hand, will offer systematic answer to all these questions, prescribing proven methods and procedures for carrying out mobilization in a predetermined sequence or according to a time schedule.

The supported command plays a key role in planning by stating the need for military reserve forces. Based upon guidance and assumptions that reflect professional, experienced judgment, the supported command can draw up plausible scenarios which assist in determining mobilization billets. Planning is carried out in consonance with level I master mobilization plans issued at the highest levels of the Executive Branch and the Department of Defense, as

* A plan is a systematic and detailed formulation that prescribes methods and procedures for carrying out a design and achieving an end in a prescribed sequence or according to a time schedule; implicit is the orderly arrangement of individual but related components in a pattern that supports an overall aim, goal, or objective. It is a conceptual and graphic blueprint for evaluating facts, assessing a situation, and making decisions in harmony with law, regulation, policy, and other guidance to ensure concerted progress on a large-scale program of action.

MOBILIZATION PLANNING OVERVIEW

LEVEL

I

(Master Mobilization
Plans--MMPs)

MAJOR SCENARIO

FEDERAL
MMP

DOD
MMP

CONTINGENCIES

JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
PLAN

CONTINGENCY
"X" OPLAN

CONTINGENCY
"Y" OPLAN

CONTINGENCY
"Z" OPLAN

II

(Organizational
Mobilization
Plans)

OSD STAFF
MOBILIZATION
PLANS

JCS
MOBILIZATION
PLANS

DEFENSE AGENCY
MOBILIZATION
PLANS

SERVICES
MOBILIZATION
PLANS

III

(Contingency
Mobilization
Plans)

MOBILIZATION
PLAN FOR
CONTINGENCY X

MOBILIZATION
PLAN FOR
CONTINGENCY Y

MOBILIZATION
PLAN FOR
CONTINGENCY Z

Figure 4

the military departments, and defense agencies may also shape the plans developed by gaining commands at lower echelons.

The planning process involves taking a comprehensive view of future possibilities and generating plausible scenarios. Many of the actions involved in mobilization can be related to routine events performed by the gaining command throughout the year; they should be perceived, however, as occurring in a compressed space of time and in company with numerous other actions that demand short-fuse decisions. Solid analysis at this part of the mobilization process can ensure that even hurried execution of the plans stands a good chance for success.

Supported commands initiate mobilization planning by stating maximum total requirements under the demanding circumstances most likely to occur. The JCS review the threats to U.S. interests and consolidate the requirements in priority order. Based upon national objectives and international commitments, the JCS develops strategic concepts and supporting force postures that will defend U.S. forces and protect the national security. Requirements plans thus establish what resources must be allocated to do what needs to be done.

Next, capabilities plans outline what can be done with existing resources, counting military reserve forces among them. Thus, reserve forces must be activated in order for them to be counted among the Total Force capabilities. Further, almost any comparison of wartime requirements with capabilities leads to the identification of deficiencies. Out of this process comes the supported command's articulation of required additional resources, including military reserve mobilization billets, as well as total manpower shortfall which must be supplied from other sources.

During planning, the gaining command should articulate basic skill standards for each billet as well as the ultimate qualifications expected

or desired. This is a simple matter for many billets because they are commonly understood within the respective Service disciplines; other billets require precise definition of military skill specialty in addition to pay grade, length of experience, level of proficiency, and the like.

For recruiting, training, and mobilization execution purposes, billets should receive a priority designation. A simple scheme with three tiers such as greatest, second, and third priority would suffice, and a designation of need for certain billets in special scenarios might be appropriate.

The command articulating mobilization needs should be able to group billets differently based upon representative scenarios and still satisfy its maximum requirements under the most demanding circumstances. This flexibility enables a gaining commander to respond to different scenarios, selectively recall reservists as conditions change, and continue adding personnel strength up to full mobilization.

Finally, the gaining command's planning responsibilities include adjusting billet requirements to accommodate mission changes, reorganizations or restructuring of the command, fortuitous assignment of reservists with unprogrammed but valuable talent, and the like. This suggests that stating mobilization billet requirements is a continuous process, with opportunities throughout the year to keep pace with dynamic conditions.

EXECUTION

The execution phase begins with acceptance of a member into a reserve component and extends to recall of a fully qualified reservist by the supported command. During that time the reserve component funds most of the training and support costs. By the time the active component accepts a member on its payrolls, the reservist is expected to perform at a level equal to or exceeding the established billet standards. Execution of mobilization plans thus encompasses

reservists.

Each of the three factors represented in this model has certain expectations of the system. The reservist expects that the program manager will make an appropriate billet assignment and arrange training to meet the standards of that billet and that the gaining command needs that mobilization billet. The reserve program manager expects that reservists will maintain their skills and that the supported commander will provide opportunities for required training. The gaining commander expects reservists to possess qualifications of pay grade and career specialty and the reserve managers to supply the right kinds of personnel in the numbers needed at the times required.

Special emphasis on the gaining commander's role during the execution phase highlights the value of cooperation among all three factors. Billet qualification standards, for example, must be communicated clearly to reservists and reserve program managers. It is also essential for a gaining commander to use the same standards because they enable leaders to use reserve resources to gain increased command capability (quality) and to perform additional tasks (quantity). It hardly needs saying here that the gaining command would not seek reserve resources unless they contribute to mission accomplishment.

Where appropriate, gaining commands can urge reserve program managers to assign reservists who are within commuting distance of their training and mobilization sites. If there is an obvious mismatch of reservist and billet for any reason, the sponsoring commander should seek correction, whether through training or reassignment of the individual or even redefinition or transfer of the billet. These steps affect defense preparedness and normal require a gaining command to take the initiative.

Possibly the most challenging yet most critical gaining command action is the assignment of useful training tasks during peacetime. Often, difficult problems have been assigned to reserve personnel and solutions obtained with dramatic effects on productivity, readiness, morale, and further cooperation between active and reserve component personnel. Enthusiasm begets responsiveness, and both are reflections of the leadership demonstrated by gaining command supervisors. Reservists who realize that high performance standards apply to them during training periods attain higher levels of readiness and productivity.

Rewards such as pay are normally controlled by reserve program managers. There are provisions, however, for gaining commands as well to pay for support provided by reserve component personnel. Joint efforts to determine when such support is desired should be made annually and reviewed periodically to ensure that financial support from the gaining command will strengthen the national security. Other forms of recognition for reservists such as letters of appreciation and awards may be less common, but they are no less effective and can be initiated by gaining commands as well as by reserve program managers. The recipients of such recognition can be members of all three factors.

Reserve personnel should become a part of the command they support during peacetime training as the best preparation for their mobilization assignments. When they are treated as an integral part of their supported command, the opportunity for better active-reserve interaction will increase. Actions such as keeping reservists informed has reaped benefits for supervisors who follow this practice. Through such initiatives, the supported command does, in fact, become a "gaining" command.

ASSESSMENT

Determination of readiness for mobilization must be a concerted effort. It must also be continuing and iterative to ensure that the current state of readiness is known to decision-makers. The most frequent and basic evidence

of how well reserve forces are prepared for their mobilization tasks is obtained through their performance throughout the year. Gaining commanders should consider annual training duty as a test of readiness, measuring the skills of the reservist, the ability of the reserve program to deliver, and the ability of the command to receive and gainfully employ each reservist. Bluntly stated, annual training must be considered a mobilization exercise.

The differences between employment of reservists at various points along the spectrum (Figure 1) are differences in the numbers of members recalled to active service or the conditions relating to the conflict. Regardless of the conditions, the gaining command should expect the same levels of proficiency and the same support philosophy to prevail: reservists are on board to augment the active component personnel in accomplishing their mission. This argument aims at building a credible reserve force that the participants believe will work and is worth the effort to sustain. Aggressive leadership by gaining commanders should enable them to assume the responsibility for readiness assessment.

CONCLUSION

Mobilization is at once a process and the culmination of that process. It is necessary because the DOD requires more resources in certain contingencies than can be provided from the active components under normal peacetime manning authorizations. These contingencies are described by statutes and in policy directives and other guidance. The U.S. Government, both the Congress and the Executive Branch, endorse the Total Force Policy which views the active and reserve components as part of an integrated and harmonious resource, one that encompasses all personnel available under the capability plan. It remains the task of those directly responsible for implementing that policy to ensure realization of its potential in strengthening the national defense.

This overview serves two purposes in furthering that end. First, the

model and the equation provide a common frame of reference useful to those responsible for planning, executing, and assessing the military reserve support forces. Second, the argument favoring greater gaining command involvement highlights a key ingredient for an effective mobilization system, one that serves a vital defense purpose. The advantages of cooperation among all factors can be measured in money, motivation, and management terms.

The model is compatible with a gaining commander who influences subsequent actions by stating clear billet requirements and then demands results during all contingencies throughout the mobilization spectrum. Mobilization billets need to be established, then filled, and training conducted to meet the needs of the sponsoring command. If the system fails to deliver, its deficiencies should be visible; the manager can ask questions about each phase until the causes of breakdown become apparent.

In the current era of tensions and international uncertainty, no responsible citizen would propose creating or operating a reserve program that overlooks, ignores, or denies a gaining command its role as outlined. Reserve programs not keyed to the needs of specific gaining commands have questionable utility for the national defense, however valuable they may appear to peacetime managers. Maximum orientation to and identification of reserve forces with gaining commands promotes the keen support of reserve units and reservists, and provides the strongest ultimate support from reserve forces.

In the final analysis, the question becomes one of perceptions regarding the role of the official who receives military reserve resources upon mobilization:

Is that official a "forgotten commander," a "necessary evil," or a "full partner and key factor" in the mobilization equation?

The answer to that question will determine the ultimate assessment whether Guard and Reserve mobilization have become an essential element of preparedness.

Mobilization of Guard and Reserve Forces
and the Legal System

by

CAPT William L. Bolton, USNR

National Defense University Colloquium

on

Guard and Reserve Mobilization: An Essential
Element of Preparedness

Sponsored by

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Introduction

The entire scheme for the mobilization of Guard and Reserve personnel is based upon federal and state legal systems including constitutional and statutory law and implementing regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Defense and the respective service Secretaries. Everything done in furtherance of mobilization is expected to be accomplished within the this framework of law and regulation.

As will be seen, to ensure an effective and efficient mobilization, the inevitable conflicts in the relationships between (1) the body and substance of the statutes and regulations on the one hand and (2) the delivery system and administration of law on the other should be identified; management action should be initiated at the earliest opportunity to minimize their impact.

REVISION OF BASIC AUTHORITIES

In response to the serious deficiencies experienced during the Korean call-up of Reserves, Congress enacted the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952¹ which is the basic statutory authority for the organization and mobilization of Reserve Forces. The scope and relationship between this and other authorities are illustrated in the tabulation in Appendix A. These statutes have been revised and amended from time to time, especially in 1953, 1956, 1967, and most recently in 1982.

As these changes were effected, anomalies and inconsistencies developed between the authorities, particularly between the statutes and the important

implementing DOD Directive 1235.10, "Mobilization of the Ready Reserve," which has not been updated since its issue in 1970 and which is seriously outdated. An example of inconsistency is a recently enacted provision allowing a service Secretary to call up retired Regular service personnel.² This statute is in direct conflict with an existing statute requiring a Congressional determination of war or national emergency before such action is taken.³ This circumstance is an invitation to litigation and possibly the frustration of an efficient mobilization of these forces.

Besides inconsistencies and anachronisms, there are potential problems with the clarity of language employed in these authorities. Nowhere is this problem better illustrated than in the criteria established for the important determination of "fair treatment" in a partial mobilization under Section 673:

(b) To achieve fair treatment as between members in the Ready Reserves who are being considered for recall to duty without their consent, consideration shall be given to: (1) the length and nature of previous service, to assure such sharing of exposure to hazards as the national security and military requirements will reasonable allow; (2) family responsibilities; and (3) employment necessary to maintain the national health, safety, and interest.⁴

The uncertain definitional criteria set out in the statute, e.g. "family responsibilities," invite attack for vagueness.⁵ There are similar "fair treatment" provisions contained in DOD Directive 1235.10, and they are also vulnerable for the same reasons.

It is worthy to note that the legal efficacy of the section supra has been jeopardized further through the failure of the Secretary of Defense to comply with a requirement contained in the statute:

The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such policies and procedures as he considers necessary to carry out this subsection. He shall report on those policies and procedures at least once a year to

the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.⁶

Inquiry by the author to both Armed Services Committees has revealed that the Secretary of Defense has never reported to either committee as he is required, according to the memory of staff personnel.

Questions of law relating to deferments and resistance to recall will most likely account for the bulk of litigation arising from a future mobilization. In addition to issues of "fair treatment," litigant resisters may also be expected to raise basic challenges to issues of jurisdiction⁷ and issues of additional procedural due process. Two of the predictable issues in the latter category are challenges relating to the adequacy of "reasonable notice"⁸ and failure of the mobilizing authority to adhere to the procedural requirements imposed by statute and their own regulations.⁹

Because the courts have generally been liberal with the power of the President and his representatives to call reservists,¹⁰ the real danger in these resister cases is not the ultimate outcome but rather the damage to good order and discipline these cases can produce by interrupting the mobilization process. An extreme example of this potential threat occurred during the Viet Nam era when a Federal District Court imposed an injunction that stayed a reservist's mobilization for almost two and one-half months.¹¹ If the resister in this instance had brought his case under the class action statutes,¹² it is conceivable that mobilization of large numbers of Reservists would have been delayed, and the effectiveness of the mobilization would have been severely limited.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has stated that the criteria used to determine the adequacy of these types of emergency authorities include:¹³

- o Completeness
- o Consistency
- o Clarity
- o Currency

Viewed as a group, the Reserve mobilization statutes and implementing DOD Directives do not meet the tests of consistency and currency and, arguably, do not conform fully to any of the four criteria. To forestall prospective litigation and to improve effectiveness, a thoroughgoing review and appropriate revision of these basic mobilization authorities should be undertaken immediately to provide consistency among statutes and regulations.

THE CAPACITY OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM

The capacity of the military justice system to respond to a "full mobilization" must be questioned seriously. Current DOD guidance mandates that mobilization planning will be for "full mobilization" -- a worst case scenario envisaging a 180-day NATO-related war. Should reality match this guidance, a mobilization limited to Ready Reservists would produce about 1,356,100 service personnel¹⁴ and an estimated 2,985,000 dependents¹⁵ if the "show rate" is 100%. The current JAG Corps manpower available to all of the Services approximates that in Table 1.¹⁶

Judge Advocate General Corps Current Professional
Manpower Strength — October 1983

	Current Active Duty	Current Reserve	Total
Army	1,800	1,420	3,220
National Guard	—	530	530
Navy	1,140	773	1,913
Air Force	1,284	850	2,134
	—	—	—
Total	4,224	3,573	7,797

Table 1

Presumably, the incremental 4,342,100 potential clients of the military justice system will be serviced, in large measure, by the 3,573 mobilized JAG Corps professionals because the current active duty cadre is working close to capacity in its peacetime mode. Whether one professional can serve 1215 military-related personnel in addition to the service requirements of the military is uncertain. In comparison, the ratio in the civilian community today is about 362

persons to one "licenced" attorney,¹⁷ but an unknown number of those licenced are not in practice.

However, it is unlikely that the "show rate" of Reservists will be 100%, and as the show rate goes down, the workload for the various JAG Corps will go up. Although there is little historical data, the experiences of the Korean Conflict and the Berlin Crisis provide a limited measure of insight. During the Korean Conflict, the Air Force recalled about 100,000 Reservists; 24,000 of these requested deferments; of the 24,000, 60% (14,400) claimed hardship.¹⁸ The Army Reserve experienced about a 20% loss among those recalled, as did the National Guard (Appendix B). During the Berlin Crisis, 3,912 Individual Ready Reservists were called up, and 1,380 (35%) failed to mobilize for one reason or another (Appendix C).

These historical results conservatively indicate that a fall-out rate as high as 20% may be experienced, somewhat higher than the 5% in current DOD guidelines. If this were the case in a "full mobilization," in excess of 271,420 service personnel would become involved in the military justice system in varying degrees. The potential for system overload and resulting failure to function is apparent. Clearly, further detailed study of this issue is warranted, and other sources of legal professionals should be identified as possible augmentees for the mobilized JAG Corps -- such as Reservists who are attorneys but who are not designated as such and civilian professionals available for assignment under contract.

A number of other questions could be asked briefly. In the event of the need for incarceration of large numbers of resisters, what facilities are available? As part of premobilization planning, can JAG Corps officers be assigned responsibilities within individual Reserve components? What potential problems can

be avoided by anticipation -- having some matters such as simple wills and powers of attorney completed as part of a legal package as a function of regular reserve procedures? Are procedural matters similar among the various Services, e.g. to forestall equal protection issues?

Summary

The entire mobilization scheme is based on a questionable foundation of statutes and directives that, in some instances, are inconsistent -- and in others, completely out of date. As a whole, current authority does not meet the criteria for adequacy in an emergency. Furthermore, a "full mobilization" may severely stress the personnel capacity of the military justice system as it is constituted.

-
1. 66 Stat. 489.
 2. 10 U.S.C. 688 (a).
 3. 10 U.S.C. 675; 10 U.S.C. 672(a).
 4. 10 U.S.C. 673.
 5. Sledjeski v Commanding Officer, 478 F.2d 1147 (2nd Cir. 1973).
 6. 10 U.S.C. 673.
 7. Runkle v United States, 122 U.S. 543, 7 S.Ct. 1141, 30 L.Ed. 1167 (1887); United States v Barrett, 1 M.S. 74 (CMA 1977).
 8. Goldberg v Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed. 2d 287 (1970).
 9. Keister v Resor, 462 F.2d 471 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894, 93 S.Ct. 116, 34 L.Ed. 2d 151 (1972).
 10. O'Mara v Zebrowski, 447 F.2d 1085 (3rd Cir. 1971); Winters v United States.

281 F.Supp. 289, aff'd. 390 F.2d 879 (2nd Cir. 1968).

11. Fox v Brown, 402 F.2d 337 (2nd Cir. 1968).

12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

13. U.S., Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Compendium of Emergency Authorities, April, 1981

14. U.S., Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, RCS:DD M (M) 1147/1148, April, 1982.

15. U.S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1982-83, (103d edition), Washington, DC, 1982.

16. Author's communications with each of the Service's JAG Corps.

17. Author's communication with the American Bar Association. As of October, 1983, there are 612,593 licenced attorneys in the United States.

18. Testimony of BGEN Harlan C. Parker, Hearings on H.R. 4860, House Armed Services Committee, 82nd Congress, 1st Sess., at 266 (1951).

A	B	C	D	E
1. If the situation is	2. and the requirement is	3. then the minimum action is	4. authority	5. applicable statutes are
1. a war or national emergency	to mobilize NG/Reserve units	passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress	10 USC 672 and appropriate orders of higher authority	10 USC 161, 10 USC 498
2.	to mobilize individual members of the Ready Reserve		10 USC 672	
3.	to mobilize individual members of the Standby Reserve		10 USC 673, 10 USC 678	10 USC 672 a
4.	to recall members of the Retired Reserve		10 USC 675	10 USC 672 a
5. war	to extend enlistments in the Regular forces		10 USC 506	none
6.	to extend enlistments in the NG/Reserve		10 USC 511(a)	none
7.	to extend period of active service for duration of the war plus 6 months		10 USC 671a	none
8.	to draft individuals through the Selective Service System			
9. a national emergency	to mobilize units of Ready Reserve	a proclamation of a national emergency and issuance of an Executive order by the President under 10 USC 673(a), as amended by PL 96-564	10 USC 673	
10.	to mobilize individual members of the Ready Reserve		10 USC 673	
11.	to extend appointments, enlistments, and periods of service when Congress is not in session	determination by the President that such extensions are in the national interest	10 USC 673b as amended by PL 96-564	
12. a domestic emergency	to provide Federal aid to State governments under 10 USC 331	a Presidential proclamation to disperse under 10 USC 334 and issuance of an Executive order under 10 USC section appropriate to the purpose of the call	10 USC 4502 and appropriate orders of higher authority	
12a. a domestic emergency (Coast Guard only)	to mobilize Selected Reservists to augment Coast Guard active forces at times of serious natural or man-made disaster, accident or catastrophe.	Direction of the Secretary of Transportation with approval of the President	14 USC 712 ¹	
13.	to enforce Federal authority under 10 USC 322			
14.	to suppress interference with State and Federal Law under 10 USC 333			
15. any level of emergency	to accept volunteers for service in the emergency		10 USC 672(d)	
16.	to order retired members of the Regular forces to active duty		10 USC 668	
17.	to order members not assigned to units in a Reserve component under the jurisdiction of the Service Secretaries to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. Consent from Governor required before members of the Guard can be ordered to active duty under this authority		10 USC 672(b)	
18. an operational mission requiring support of Reserve Forces	to order units and members of the Selected Reserve to active duty for not more than 90 days	Presidential direction under 10 USC 673 ²	10 USC 673b Appropriate orders of higher authority	

¹ "Steel-plant": 10 U.S.C. 511(a)-Reserve; 10 U.S.C. 506 and 10 U.S.C. 671(a)-Regular
² Authority limited to 1,000,000 under this Law.
³ Limited to periods up to 18 days in a 6-month period and 30 days per year.
⁴ Authority limited to 100,000 under this Law.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 21, Mobilization, Washington, DC, 1953, pp. 111-3

APPENDIX B

"Korean Conflict Mobilization History for Army National Guard"

<u>DIVISIONS</u>		<u>ALERT DATE</u>	<u>REPORTING DATE</u>	<u>ALERT PERIOD</u>	<u>ALERTED STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOSS ALERT TO IND</u>	<u>LOSS % OF ALERTED</u>
CA	40	1Aug50	1 Sep 50	30	9,601	1,956	20.2
OK	45	1Aug50	1 Sep 50	30	8,188	2,248	27.5
NEW ENG	43	2Aug50	5 Sep 50	33	8,385	1,259	15.0
PA	28	1Aug50	5 Sep 50	34	9,970	1,365	13.7
AL,MS	31	16Dec50	16 Jan 51	30	10,135	1,992	19.6
MINN	47	16Dec50	16 Jan 51	30	7,354	1,308	17.8
OH	37	13Sep51	15 Jan 52	122	7,093	1,583	22.4
ILL	44	13Sep51	15 Feb 52	152	7,825	1,633	20.9
CUMULATIVE					100%		19.5%

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Feasibility of Predicting Reserve Show Rate at Mobilization: A Proposed Model for Mobilization Manpower Management (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1979), pp. F-IX-4.

APPENDIX C

"Berlin Crisis

Partial Mobilization of the Army Individual Ready Reserve"

(War Not Declared)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>
Ordered to Active Duty	3,912	100
Exempt under AR 601-25 (Hardship + Dependency)	371	
Special Mobilization Criteria	175	
Medically Disqualified	289	
Physical Disqualification	(147)	
Further Medical Consultation	(142)	
Not Locatable	325	
"Non-Locatees"	(210)	
"Refused Delivery"	(115)	
Delay Requests	984	
Granted--up to 60 days	(292)	
Disapproved	(565)	
Exempted	(127)	
Referred to DA--Appeals	(370)	
Delay Granted	(50)	
Exemption Approved	(143)	
Disapproved	(177)	
 MOBILIZED	 2,532	 64.7%

Source: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College,
Feasibility of Predicting Reserve Show Rate at Mobilization: A Proposed
Model for Mobilization Manpower Management (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsy-
 vania, 1979), pp. F-IX-10.

**Mobilization and The Guard and Reserve:
The Unit, The Service Headquarters, and The Joint Command**

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United States Readiness Command
and Joint Deployment Agency

Colloquium on Guard/Reserve Mobilization

Sponsored by OSD/MRA&L (RA)
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This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

"The views expressed in these proceedings are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization public or private. The purpose of these proceedings is to disseminate information and opinion on issues of importance to those concerned with various aspects of mobilization, especially of the Guard and Reserve components."

INTRODUCTION

Guard and Reserve mobilization will be addressed in three parts in the body of this paper.

- o Unit considerations and views of mobilization and mobilization demands at the unit level will be discussed.

- o The broader concerns that are presented when Active as well as Reserve factors are dealt with at a Service Headquarters will be covered in part two.

- o Rounding out the three level view presented in the following pages, will be unit and service considerations that the Joint Command must carefully weigh in dealing with joint service mobilization needs.

By viewing Guard/Reserve mobilization from these three directions, it becomes apparent how each--the unit, the service headquarters and the joint command--must keep constantly in mind the balance that must be maintained between the three.

THE AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT

One who has served as an Air Force Reservist from the early 1960's into the 1980's has seen significant change take place. In the early '60's service with Reserve flying units was sometimes compared to "membership in a flying club." Interestingly enough, it can be observed that, even then (1962), specific units mobilized successfully and became an integral part of the Cuban Missile Crisis contingency.

Since the '60's, Air Force Reserve units have progressed and modernized to a point where today they compare very favorably to Active units. They have displayed their professionalism and ability to perform their mission should they be needed. Operational Readiness Inspections have continually shown the capabilities and readiness of the Reserve.

Mobilization capability is a specific area in which the Reserve unit has progressed in meeting the defense needs of the '80's. In those '60's alluded to, mobilization tests usually involved an effort at testing the ability of the unit to communicate with personnel by phone prior to a drill weekend. During that drill, an effort occurred, usually on a Saturday, to process combat personnel through a mobility line. Unit support was aligned with the mobility efforts. In early days, those efforts were not always very satisfactory. With one other progress occurring over the years, mobilization training has kept

pace. Increased emphasis for commanders brought mobility capabilities to their present state.

Today you can meet with a Reserve fighter unit commander and you will find he has mastered problems mobilization brought in the past. He has planned for the eventuality his unit will be mobilized. He has worked to be in the position he can gather his personnel and equipment and be able to move quickly to the fight. Factors like cube, weight, and sustainability have been planned for.

Certain realities are not always dealt with as we move up the chain from unit to service headquarters to joint command. The Services and Joint Commands have not always dealt with mobilization keeping the unit in mind. For instance, if a unit has tasking in the operational plans of several theatres, have those CINC's and the services provided for what is needed to mobilize and deploy those units? Have unique deployment problems of specific units found their way in front of service and joint command planners?

THE SERVICE HEADQUARTERS - USAF

Headquarters US Air Force in Washington has the responsibility to plan and coordinate mobilization and related areas within the Air Force. As indicated in Air Force Regulation 28-5, USAF MOBILIZATION PLANNING, "In the Department of Defense (DOD), both Active and ARF components are considered part of a single United States military resource." Air Reserve Force staffs (USAFR and ANG) interact with the headquarters Active Duty staff.

Air Force Reserve, with involvement at HQ USAF level, has successfully taken part in numerous JCS, REDCOM, and other exercises. The Air Force Reserve itself has exercised the mobilization process successfully in the past. Lessons learned lead to adjustments that have resulted in increased capability to do the job when and if mobilization occurs.

The Reserve, as well as the Active Air Force staff, works overseas beddown questions on a regular basis that increasingly has provided the basis to improve on the capability of the Guard and Reserve in a mobilization.

The WMP III, a part of the USAF War and Mobilization Plan, documents the planned availability and force allocation of combat flying and non-flying support forces. The Air National Guard

prepares the NGB UTC Readiness Document (NURD) to stimulate coordination and provide a common baseline for the planning and manpower communities. Air Force Reserve is developing the Consolidated Unit Tasking Document (CONUTAD). CONUTAD will show taskings of Air Force Reserve Units showing each commitment that unit has. Among other things, that document is pointing to the multiple uses for Reserve units, some of which are in conflict.

A Headquarters Air Force system highly pertinent in the mobilization process is the UNITREP (Unit Status and Identity Report) system. The Air Force system provides frequently updated information as to a unit's readiness. Such information should bear very significantly on mobilization priorities, but does it when blended with all the services?

All of the systems and efforts heretofore described as occurring at the Air Force headquarters level, and many not dealt with, contribute to making Guard/Reserve mobilization processes function smoothly. But there continues to be instances where the Guard/Reserve needs and capabilities in the Total Force are misunderstood or not known at all. It is here that work must be done at the HQ USAF level.

THE JOINT COMMAND - USREDCOM

The United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) is one of six United States unified commands (others are PACOM, LANTCOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and CENTCOM). As Commander in Chief of USREDCOM, Army General Wallace H. Nutting wears a second hat, that of Director of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA).

USREDCOM:

- o Commands US based general purpose Army and Air Force Forces and provides planning and forces for land defense of the US and Canada.
- o Provides US based combat forces to overseas combat commands and provides forces and a Joint Task Force Headquarters to conduct planning and operations worldwide as directed.
- o Trains US based forces during joint exercises and develops operational concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations of US forces.

USREDCOM works many joint service issues and is a "purple suit" command in the truest sense of the term. It is when bringing together the needs and functional methods of each service that unit and service headquarters issues take on new dimension. For example, when working Reserve Component issues bearing on

mobilization with US Army Forces Command debate ensues over application of the joint approach as opposed to the service approach. Further, mere numbers cause Army mobilization issues to differ widely from Air Force ones. Considering projections of Navy requirements further complicates the equation.

USREDCOM, in its role to train forces in joint exercises, has long dealt with Guard/Reserve issues in those exercises. Issues raised in IVY LEAGUE '82 were of considerable interest to USREDCOM as it deals with disposition of Guard/Reserve forces.

Tab A contains five issues believed by USREDCOM to have been important in PROUD SABER '83. Issue 1, dealing with status of residual forces, bears significantly on Guard/Reserve mobilization and emphasis on that issue is planned for NIGHT TRAIN '84 upcoming.

In the follow-on exercise to NIGHT TRAIN '84, MAJ GEN Hemphill, USREDCOM/J3, has made personal contact with Guard/Reserve chiefs to arrange for ongoing Reserve Component involvement in planning for that exercise.

The Joint Deployment Agency is a transportation management agency operating as an extension of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It provides centralized management for worldwide deployment of US forces in support of unified commanders and joint task force commanders. Development of a worldwide automated management

system for military is ongoing. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has approved acceleration of design and implementation of a Joint Deployment System (JDS) to reach full operational capability in FY 1985.

The Joint Deployment Agency interest in Guard/Reserve mobilization increases as JDA capabilities and interests increase and as reliance on Guard/Reserve forces in the US military increases.

Reserve involvement in the TPFDD (Time Phased Force Deployment Data) refinement process conducted by JDA is being deemed advisable. The process to date has included representatives from active perspective only. Instances come to mind where active duty misconceptions about the Guard/Reserve can cause built in error in mobilization and subsequent deployment of Reserve Components.

:

CONCLUSION

The Colloquium on Guard/Reserve Mobilization includes participants from all persuasions within and without the Department of Defense.

Within the Department of Defense a critical step in improving the Guard/Reserve Mobilization picture will be for the unit, the service headquarters, and the joint command to strive to incorporate their mutual interests to provide the best options for the Nation in a mobilization. Finally, it is a must that Active and Reserve Components are ever mindful, each, of the critical role of the other.

PROUD SABER 83

1. Residual force data.

Problem - Accurate identification and determination of the readiness status of residual forces (to include reserve/national guard forces) during or subsequent to major deployments and mobilization.

Discussion - Difficulties exist in identifying forces remaining in CONUS which were available for use in executing follow-on OPLANS. Difficulties were also encountered in identifying unit and current readiness status of recently mobilized reserve and national guard forces.

Recommendation - An improved unit reporting system is needed to provide key decision makers and planners details on:

- a. 100,000 call up, partial, full, and total mobilization.
- b. Deployability of units prior to insertion into unit reporting or allocation to commands.

2. 100,000 person call up modification.

Problem - Full use of the 100K call up with the initial mobilization action does not leave room for later adjustments or additions.

Discussion - When omitted unit identification codes were noted in PROUD SABER 83 100K call up, they could not be added until "partial mobilization" was declared.

Recommendation - To allow room for adjustments and additions, if required, by the scenario, the 100K person call up should not be totally committed prior to major command final scrub of force list.

3. Real world exercise activities vs. PROUD SABER 83 CPX activities.

Problem - Realistic mobilization activities were not directed by Headquarters USAF to units that planned to train during the CPX.

Discussion - Air National Guard, USAF Reserve, TAC gained units, scheduled mobilization training during their drill weekend to coincide with PROUD SABER 83 activities. The CPX scenario did not develop to the point of directing mobilization of these units by the time their training commenced. Therefore, recalls,

TAB A

reaction to mobilization message traffic and deployment simulation had to be self-generated by the units.

Recommendation - If activities by Reserve Force units are planned in future exercises, procedures should be outlined in the exercise to provide them with realistic headquarters inputs regardless of the CPX scenario. The exercise control group should have the authority to direct mobilization of Reserve Forces when the exercise scenario has not developed to the point of including participating real world reserve force units.

4. Untimely mobilization authority.

Problem - TAC gained Air Force Reserve Units at Andrews, Bergstrom, Grissom, Barksdale, New Orleans, and Kelly received the authority to mobilize too late to realistically play/exercise mobilization recall.

Discussion - The above units dedicated their 30-31 October 1982 UTA weekend to exercise mobilization and mobility processing. Their scenario called for mobilization alert recall on Friday, 29 October followed by 30-31 October activities. Mobilization authority (USAF CSS message 292200 Oct 82) was not received at unit level until several hours after the UTA weekend began.

Recommendation - Send mobilization authority sooner with a heads up call from the CSS that it is on the way.

5. 100K call up/mobilization requirements list.

Problem - Unplanned mobilization requirement lists should be made for each plan that could be exercised.

Discussion - When PROUD SABER 83 kicked off, the 100K call up had already been initiated, with emphasis on the RDJTF (now USCENCOM). However, the UIC's identified by the US Air Force Contingency Support Staff were inadequate to successfully deploy any of the units (pertinent UIC's were omitted). Also, many incorrect units and locations were listed on the initial US Air Force message.

Recommendation - For exercise purposes, preplanned lists should be made for each plan.

TAB A

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Legal Limits: A Study of Federal
Statutes and Defense Directives Governing Reserve Mobilization

by

Mr. Michael G. Wagner

National Defense University Colloquium

on

Guard and Reserve Mobilization: An Essential
Element of Preparedness

Sponsored by

OSD/ASD(RA)

with the assistance of

The Mobilization Concepts Development Center
National Defense University

Introduction

Modern day warfare dictates that reserve forces be mobilized as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. With the abolition of the draft in the United States, the status of reserve mobilization has become even more crucial to the national defense effort. With the short time period involved in modern warfare techniques, it is essential to be able to mobilize the reserves to active duty in minimal time.

This paper will examine the statutes dealing with reserve forces in general, the statutes dealing with reserve mobilization and the enabling DoD Directives that will become operative during any mobilization.

Reserve Statutes in General

The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires (10 U.S.C. 262). The reserve components of each armed force is divided into three types of reserves: a Ready Reserve; a Standby Reserve; and a Retired Reserve. (10 U.S.C. 267).

The Ready Reserve, at an authorized strength of 2,900,000,

consists of units or reserves liable for immediate call-up under the law. Within each Ready Reserve component there has been created a Selected Reserve, which because of its training, is subject to call-up first (10 U.S.C. 268, as amended in 1982). Units of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard are members of the Ready Reserve of the Army and the Air Force respectively (10 U.S.C. 269). The Ready Reserve is, by statute, required to be continually screened to ensure that each unit has a proper balance of the military skills needed for that unit to perform its mission should the unit be called to active duty (10 U.S.C. 271).

The Standby Reserve consists of members who are liable for active duty only upon certain specified events occurring. The Standby Reserve is thus an inactive reserve (10 U.S.C. 273).

The Retired Reserve consists of personnel who have been retired either from the regular components of the armed forces or the reserve forces (10 U.S.C. 274).

STATUTES CONCERNING THE MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES

The mobilization of the Reserves is set out generally in Sections 672, 673 and 673(b) of Title 10, United States Code. Subsection 672(a) states:

"In time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of a reserve component under the

...for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter. However, a member in an inactive status list or in a retired status may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection unless the Secretary concerned, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in the case of the Secretary of a military department, determines that there are not enough qualified Reserves in an active status or in the inactive National Guard in the required category who are readily available."

The first sentence of this subsection gives the general mobilization power to the Secretaries of the military departments (and the Secretary of Transportation for the Coast Guard) and their designees only after a state of war or national emergency is declared by the Congress. Note, however, the escape mechanism in the second clause which allows a mobilization under authority of other law. Since Subsection (a) was rewritten in 1980, it can be assumed that Congress had in mind the provisions of Sections 673 and 673(b) which allow a partial mobilization by authority of the President. The second sentence of the subsection is in conflict with the provisions of Section 688(a) of Title 10, United States Code, as it pertains to the ability to mobilize retired members. Under Section 688, a member of the Retired Reserves who has retired from a regular component of the armed forces may be recalled to active duty at any time. The comparison of these two subsections leads to the anomaly that a retired member of the regular armed forces components may be recalled to active duty at the pleasure of the Secretary concerned (at any time) under Section 688, but may not be recalled under Section 672(a) (in a war or national emergency) until after all members of the Ready Reserve and the inactive National Guard have been mobilized.

A short response option for mobilization, without a declaration of war or of national emergency by Congress, can be found in Subsection 672(b).

"(b) At any time, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in an active status in a reserve component under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 15 days a year. However, units and members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States may not be ordered to active duty under this subsection without the consent of the governor of the State or Territory, Puerto Rico, or the Canal Zone, or the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard, as the case may be."

This subsection seems "tailor made" for the occasion where reliable intelligence information indicates that war or a national emergency is imminent, but where the exigencies of the situation do not allow the luxury of waiting for Congress to make a declaration of war or national emergency. Under this subsection, the Secretaries concerned may activate their reserve units for a total of 15 days per year. Should the war or national emergency threat become reality, then either the provisions of Subsection 672(a) (Congressional declaration) or the provisions of Sections 673 or 673(b) (Presidential declaration) will take effect to lend authority for a mobilization to active duty in excess of 15 days.

Subsection 672(c) provides that involuntary activation of reserve units should maintain unit integrity by calling up all members of the unit at the same time. However, once the unit is activated, its members may be reassigned to other units as needed.

Subsection 672(d) allows the Secretary concerned to order a member of a reserve component to active duty at any time, but only with the member's consent. If the individual is a member of the Army or Air National Guard, then that member can only be ordered to active duty with his consent, and with the permission of the authorities to whom the Guard member is attached (i.e., Governor).

Subsection 672(e) was amended in 1980 to conform the notice of reserve activation to the exigencies of modern warfare. Previously, the Secretary concerned was required to give 30 days advance notice to the Reserve before the Reserve was to report for active duty. Now the time period between notification of reserve activation and the reporting for active duty is flexible based upon the military operational requirements at the time the decision to activate is made.

The scope of Section 672 covers all of the reserve forces of the United States. The intent of the statute was to provide authority for the nation to mobilize during time of war or national emergency. In operation Section 672 provides much more. During times of increased tensions, the Secretary concerned may determine that his active duty forces are insufficient to handle a rapidly developing crises. The Secretary could then ask members of reserve components to volunteer for active duty call-up under Subsection 672(d). Should the crisis be of major proportions and the threat of war be imminent, the Secretary may order reserve forces activ-

ated for a period of 15 days under Subsection 672(b). Of course, should the situation lend itself to a Congressional declaration of war or national emergency, then subsection 672(a) provides for the mobilization of all reserve forces of the United States.

Under the statutory authority granted in Section 673 of Title 10, United States Code, the President of the United States has the power to order to active duty a maximum number of 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserves of the United States. Subsection 673(a) reads as follows:

"(a) In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 24 consecutive months."

The operation of this statute is evident. Once the President has made the declaration that a national emergency exists, the authorities described under the statute may order units and members of the Ready Reserve to active duty status for a period not to exceed 24 months. Subsection 673(c) provides the major limiting factor on a mobilization under this statute since no more than one million members of the Ready Reserve may be on active duty at any one time without their consent under the authority of this statute. It should be noted that the total authorized strength of the Ready Reserve (2,900,000 members) may be called up under the authority of this statute, provided, no more than 1,000,000 at a time are summoned and the aggregate call up does not exceed 24 months.

Section 673(b) provides another method for the President to mobilize members of the Ready Reserve during periods that do not meet the war or national emergency criteria of the previous two statutes. Subsection 673(a) provides:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of 673(a) or any other provision of law, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission, he may authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, without the consent of the members concerned, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section 268(b) of this title), under their respective jurisdictions, to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 90 days."

This subsection provides the President the authority to activate members of the Selected Reserve for a period up to 90 days in order to augment the active duty components of the regular armed forces. Should it be necessary to commit regular armed forces to an operational mission (e.g., Marine forces in Lebanon), then the President may call up members of the Selected Reserve (e.g., the Fleet Marine Reserves) to active duty to bring the service (Fleet Marine Force) back up to the strength needed for its commitments elsewhere. The only limitations, other than the 90 day active duty restraint, provided by the statute is contained in Subsection 673(c) which limits the total number of Selected Reserve members called up under the authority of the statute to a total of 100,000.

Members of the Standby Reserve can only be ordered to active duty under the authority and provisions of Section 672. This requires a war or national emergency be declared by Congress.

Moreover, in times of national emergency, the operative statute, 10 U.S.C. 674, requires that all units of the Ready Reserve be called to active duty before any unit of the Standby Reserve is called up. Before any individual member of the Standby Reserve is called to perform active duty, there must have been a determination made that there are not enough qualified members of the Ready Reserves in the required category.

Retired Reserves come under two directly conflicting statutes. Under 10 U.S.C. 675, a member in the Retired Reserve may, if qualified, be ordered to active duty without his consent, but only as provided in Section 672(a) of Title 10. This means that not only has there been a determination of war or national emergency by the Congress, but also that all members of the Ready Reserves and the inactive National Guard have been called to active duty. Subsection 688(a), which was enacted as part of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-513), provides:

"Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, a retired member of the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps may be ordered to active duty by the Secretary of the military department concerned at any time. The Secretary concerned may, to the extent consistent with other provisions of law, assign a member ordered to active duty under this section to such duties as the Secretary considers necessary in the interest of national defense."

This statute, which is not mentioned in the legislative history of DOPMA, means that a retired member of a regular component may be called up at the discretion of the Secretary of the military department concerned. At present there are no regulations governing

the call-up of retired members of the regular components. From the operation of the statute, there is a vast manpower pool for call-up at any time that the national defense interests so require; subject, of course, to the overall manpower limitations set by the Congress on the active duty forces.

MOBILIZATION UNDER DOD DIRECTIVES

DoD Directive 1235.10, "Mobilization of the Ready Reserve" was promulgated on October 27, 1970 and as such does not take into consideration the authority of the President to call up a maximum of 100,000 members of the Selected Reserve for a period not to exceed 90 days. The Directive provides the following definitions:

"SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION -- Expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of Reserve Component units and/or individual reservists, by authority of Congress or the President, to satisfy an emergency requirement for a force tailored to meet that requirement, Differs from partial mobilization in that it would not normally be associated with requirements for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION -- Expansion of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) resulting from action by Congress or the President, to mobilize Reserve Component units and/or individual reservists to meet all or part of the requirements or particular contingency and/or operational war plans, or meet the requirements incident to hostilities. Units mobilized to meet the requirements if this paragraph will be ordered to active duty at their authorized strength.

FULL MOBILIZATION -- Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all units in the existing approved force structure and all individual reservists, and the material resources needed for these units.

TOTAL MOBILIZATION -- Expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of that troop basis and the mobilization of all national resources needed to round out and sustain such forces."

The policies for mobilization are set out in general detail in Section V, paragraph B of the Directive (Tab B, page 6) and should not have changed significantly since their writing. Paragraph C, which deals with Alert and Notification, should be revised to take into consideration the changes in the enabling statute - more specifically Subsection 673(e) of Title 10, United States Code, which now provides a more flexible approach to notification and reporting for active duty.

Enclosure 2 of DoD Directive 1235.10 should also be rewritten to conform the statutory authorities listed therein with the law as it now exists. Specifically, there have been changes in 10 U.S.C. 672, 10 U.S.C. 673, and 10 U.S.C. 673(b) has been created as additional statutory authority.

DoD Directive 1235.9 "Management and Mobilization of the Standby Reserve" promulgated on August 28, 1973 is hopelessly out of date and is probably unworkable. The major procedure in implementing a mobilization of the inactive Standby Reserves depends upon the Selective Service Administration. Since the abolition of the Draft, it is not certain whether the Selective Service Administration keeps adequate records for locating personnel who are "assigned" to the inactive Standby Reserves. What is certain is that the recall procedures for acting members are such that a mobilization of the Standby Reserves would take a long period of time and may not be manageable. This Directive should be examined in light of

current federal law dealing with the Selective Service and mobilization needs.

There is no DoD Directive dealing with 10 U.S.C. 688 which deals with recalling retired members of regular forces to active duty. The statute dictates that such regulations will be set forth by the Secretary of Defense, however, none have been issued as of this date (24 October 1983). Since this is a fairly large manpower pool of trained and experienced personnel, it should not be overlooked as a potential resource during a mobilization.

The only requirement under the statute to screen reserve personnel comes under 10 U.S.C. 271 which requires that only the Ready Reserve be screened. This is a continuous process and the guidelines for this screening is detailed in DoD Directive 1200.7, "Screening the Ready Reserve", November 28, 1978. There is nothing wrong with the procedures as set forth; however, it is quite possible that the screening process does not go far enough. It has already been suggested that there is a large manpower pool available in the Retired Reserve that could be tapped under 10 U.S.C. 688. Since the procedures for screening are available under DoD Instruction 7730.54, "Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System", October 26, 1981, it would be quite easy to screen the Retired Reserve for available skills in a mobilization. Those skills that match up with the "critical" skills listed in DoD Directive 1200.7 enclosure 2 should be notified so that little time is wasted on a call-up.

The same procedures could be adapted for the Standby Reserve. The Standby Reserve would only be called out during a war or national emergency. By identifying personnel with critical skills to be called up first, this would enable the government to get the best possible use out of the personnel mobilized.

CONCLUSION

The current statutory scheme for mobilization of the reserve components of the Armed Forces is a patchwork of "band-aid" cures. Recognizing that the effective recall and use of our reserve resources is vital to our national defense, we must develop a comprehensive integrated system of mobilizing all reserve forces to whatever degree the situation demands.

The DoD Directives and Instructions for carrying out a mobilization, likewise requires a re-examination in light of current statutes and realities. At a minimum, most should be overhauled.

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Call-Up Under Presidential Authority 100,00/10 USC 673B

Col William H. Welker
HQ USAF/XOOTN

Introduction

Total Force Policy

IN AUGUST 1970, DEFENSE SECRETARY MELVIN R. LAIRD ANNOUNCED A NEW DEFENSE POLICY. HE SAID, "...GUARD AND RESERVE UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS OF THE SELECTED RESERVES WILL BE PREPARED TO BE THE INITIAL AND PRIMARY SOURCE FOR AUGMENTATION OF THE ACTIVE FORCE: GEN JOHN D. RYAN, THEN USAF CHIEF OF STAFF, SAID THIS MEANT RESERVISTS WERE TO BE MOBILIZED SOONER AND WOULD PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN FUTURE EMERGENCIES.

ASIDE FROM PERCEIVED COST BENEFIT ADVANTAGES, AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DOD'S INTEREST IN PROMPTING A TOTAL FORCE WAS THE PERFORMANCE OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD (ANG) AND AIR FORCE RESERVE (USAFR) UNITS MOBILIZED IN 1968. THESE UNITS WERE IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS AND THEIR ABILITY TO DEPLOY AND BE EMPLOYED UPON MOBILIZATION SHOWED THE RESERVE COMPONENTS COULD MAKE A TIMELY CONTRIBUTION WHEN NEEDED.

Past Mobilizations

THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF GUARD AND RESERVE MOBILIZATIONS IN RECENT YEARS: KOREA, BERLIN, CUBA, AND VIETNAM.

GUARD AND RESERVE MOBILIZATIONS
SINCE 1950

KOREA (AUG 1950-MAY 1951)

	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
AIR NATIONAL GUARD	22 WINGS	45,000

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AIR FORCE RESERVE	25 WINGS	30,257
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE		<u>147,000</u>
	TOTAL	222,257

AUTHORITY: PL 599, "THE SELECTIVE SERVICE EXTENSION ACT OF 1950"

BERLIN (OCT 1961-AUG 1962)

	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
AIR NATIONAL GUARD	9 WINGS 3 SQUADRONS	21,000
AIR FORCE RESERVE	2 WINGS	5,613
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE		<u>9,802</u>
	TOTAL	36,415

AUTHORITY: PL 87-177, "CONGRESSIONAL JOINT RESOLUTION"

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (OCT 1962-NOV 1962)

	<u>UNITS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
AIR FORCE RESERVE	8 WINGS 6 SQUADRONS	13,852
	TOTAL	<u>13,852</u>

AUTHORITY: PL 87-763, "CONGRESSIONAL JOINT RESOLUTION"

PUEBLO CRISIS/SEA MOBILIZATIONS (JAN 1968-JUN 1969)

AIR NATIONAL GUARD	14 GROUPS 1 SQUADRON	10,511
AIR FORCE RESERVE	2 WINGS 1 GROUP 6 SQUADRONS	5,931
	TOTAL	<u>16,442</u>

AUTHORITY: PL 89-687, "DOD APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR 1967"

FAILURE TO MOBILIZE MOST OF THE RESERVE FORCE FOR VIETNAM, HOWEVER, CREATED ACTIVE FORCE RELUCTANCE TO RELY ON THE RESERVES. THE CONCERN WAS THAT FOR CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING LESS THAN AN

ALL-OUT NATIONAL EFFORT, RESERVES WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE MOBILIZED.

Legislative History of the 100,000 Presidential Authority

THE ORIGINAL LEGISLATION (PASSED 14 MAY 1976) AUTHORIZED UP TO 50,000 SELECTED RESERVES TO BE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS TO AUGMENT THE ACTIVE FORCE. THIS LAW WAS LATER AMENDED (23 DECEMBER 1980) TO ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO ORDER TO ACTIVE DUTY UP TO 100,000 SELECTED RESERVES FOR THE SAME TIME DURATION.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 100,000 LIMITED AUGMENTATION LAW STATES THAT THIS AUTHORITY WAS GRANTED "...TO ORDER A CAREFULLY-LIMITED CALL-UP OF THE SELECTED RESERVES...." IT APPLIES TO ANY UNIT, OR MEMBER NOT ASSIGNED TO A UNIT, IN THE SELECTED RESERVE. IT WAS TO BE USED ONLY WHEN RESERVE FORCES ARE NECESSARY TO AUGMENT ACTIVE FORCES IN ANY OPERATIONAL MISSION. THE 90-DAY DURATION WAS ESTABLISHED TO "...CLARIFY THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER SOME DEGREE OF NATIONAL MOBILIZATION IS REQUIRED OR THAT NO FURTHER NECESSITY EXISTS FOR TROOPS IN AUGMENTATION OF ACTIVE FORCES..." FURTHER, IT PROVIDES A QUICK RESPONSE (WITHIN 72 HOURS). THUS, THE INTENT WAS A LIMITED CALL-UP, PRIMARILY OF UNITS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME TO SUFFICIENTLY MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

THERE WERE A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY THIS AUTHORITY WAS NEEDED, E.G., INCREASED RELIANCE ON RESERVE FORCES; COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX; AND THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF A DECLARATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RECOGNIZED THE CONTRIBUTION OF VOLUNTEERS AND CITED THE 1973 MIDEAST WAR AS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THEIR USE IN THE RESUPPLY EFFORT.

BUT, THE HISTORY ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT THE RELIABILITY OF SUCH ASSISTANCE IN THE FUTURE, WITH AN ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY, IS QUESTIONABLE.

Discussion

Mobilization Procedures

AIR FORCE REGULATION, AFR 28-5, USAF MOBILIZATION PLANNING, ESTABLISHES AIR FORCE POLICY, ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY, AND GIVES GUIDANCE ON ADMINISTERING AND MANAGING THE ARF DURING PLANNING, ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION PERIODS. THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS, (AF/XOX) IS THE AIR STAFF FOCAL POINT FOR MOBILIZATION PLANNING. HEADQUARTERS OPERATING INSTRUCTION (HOI) 55-1 DETAILS AIR STAFF ACTIONS BEFORE, DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER A MOBILIZATION. THE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AND READINESS (AF/XOO) IS THE AIR STAFF FOCAL POINT FOR MOBILIZATION EXECUTION. AF/XOO VALIDATES THE REQUIREMENT, IDENTIFIES FORCES NEEDED, AND PROVIDES THE JOINT STAFF WITH THE INFORMATION FOR JCS. AFTER MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY IS RECEIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO THE SERVICE SECRETARIES, AF/XOO PREPARES AN AF/CC MOBILIZATION DIRECTIVE ORDERING MAJCOMS AND SOAS TO MOBILIZE THEIR GAINED RESERVE FORCES.

Categories of Call-Up/Mobilization

THERE ARE FOUR SEPARATE CATEGORIES UNDER WHICH RESERVE FORCES CAN BE ACTIVATED TO SUPPORT US ACTIONS FOR OPERATIONAL MISSIONS, NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND DECLARED WAR. EACH TYPE OF ACTIVATION REQUIRES SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION BASED ON PUBLIC LAW, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE/OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES CAN DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM CATEGORY TO CATEGORY. THE SPECIFIC DETAILS MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD FOR EFFECTIVE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF MOBILIZATION/CALL-UP ACTIVITIES.

Presidential 100,000 Call-Up Authority/(Not Considered Mobilization).

- AUTHORIZED UNDER 10 USC 673 AS AMENDED BY PL 96-584
- CAN BE AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER IN SUPPORT OF AN OPERATIONAL MISSION WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
 - DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY OF WAR IS NOT REQUIRED
- PROVIDES UP TO 100,000 MEMBERS OF SELECTED RESERVE FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS
- UNIT INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED
- ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY VICE EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY
 - PERSONNEL RECORDS AND PAY ACCOUNTS REMAIN WITHIN RESERVE FORCE SYSTEMS
 - COMMAND CHANNELS REMAIN WITHIN THE RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE (I.E., COURTS-MARTIAL ETC.)
 - OPERATIONAL CONTROL CHOPPED TO THE GAINING MAJCOM
- AF/XOOTN MAINTAINS A LIST OF UNITS EXPECTED TO BE CALLED UP

Partial Mobilization

- WHEN AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT
 - REQUIRES DECLARATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER
 - PROVIDES UP TO 1,000,000 MEMBERS OF THE READY RESERVE FOR NO MORE THAN 24 MONTHS
- WHEN AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS
 - REQUIRES SPECIAL LEGISLATION
 - MANPOWER CEILING AND DURATION SPECIFIED BY CONGRESS
- AUTHORIZED BY 10 USC 673
- ADDS TO END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE FORCES
- DRAWS FROM THE READY RESERVE

- UNIT INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED
- ORDERED TO EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY
- PERSONNEL RECORDS AND PAY ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO REGULAR COMPONENT SYSTEMS
- COMMAND CHANNELS AS WELL AS OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO THE GAINING MAJCOM
- UNITS/INDIVIDUALS ACTIVATED UNDER PRESIDENTIAL 100,000 CALL-UP AUTHORITY MUST BE RECALLED UNDER PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

Full Mobilization

- REQUIRES DECLARATION OF WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY BY CONGRESS
- REQUIRES PASSAGE OF PUBLIC LAW OR JOINT RESOLUTION
- LIMITED TO ACTIVATION OF EXISTING APPROVED FORCE STRUCTURE PLUS INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS AND RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL
- PERIOD OF ACTIVATION LIMITED TO THE DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS
- ALL OTHER ITEMS IDENTICAL TO PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

Total Mobilization

- CONDITIONS AS OUTLINED IN FULL MOBILIZATION
- EXTENDS AUTHORITY TO ORGANIZE/GENERATE ADDITIONAL UNITS OR PERSONNEL BEYOND THE EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE

100,000 Presidential Call-Up Actions

GUIDANCE THAT SUPPORTS THE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP), ANNEX N, MOBILIZATION, AND ALLOCATES THE AIR FORCE PORTION OF THE 100K, IS CONTAINED IN THE AIR FORCE WAR AND MOBILIZATION PLAN (WMP), VOL 1, ANNEX W. THIS ALLOCATION WAS PREDICATED ON EACH COMMAND LOOKING AT THEIR VARIOUS WAR PLANS AND DETERMINING RESERVE FORCES SUPPORT.

AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT WAS PLACED IN AFR 28-5 STATING THAT AF/XOO WILL SELECT AND PRIORITIZE WITH MAJCOM RECOMMENDATIONS

THOSE UNITS AND INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES (IMAS) TO BE RECALLED UNDER THE 100K CALL-UP AUTHORITY. THEIR PRIORITY LIST IS COMPOSED OF VARIOUS MAJOR CONTINGENCY ACTIONS THAT COULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE RESERVE SUPPORT. ALL THE TASKED MAJCOMS HAVE BEEN VERY RESPONSIVE TO THIS REQUIREMENT. BY HAVING THIS PRIORITY LIST, AF/XOO/XOOTN/CSS WILL BE ABLE TO EXECUTE A RECALL MESSAGE IN A RELATIVE SHORT TIME DURING AN ACTUAL CRISIS.

TO INSURE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION TO THE MAJCOM'S THAT SOME FORM OF A MOBILIZATION/CALL-UP IS ABOUT TO OCCUR, THE EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE (EAP-USAF) HAS AN EMERGENCY ACTION MESSAGE (EAM) REQUIREMENT. THIS EAM WOULD ALERT THE MAJCOM'S TO THE SPECIFIC PREPLANNED ACTION OR SIGNIFICANT EVENT CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING CALL-UP/MOBILIZATION. ADDITIONALLY, ALL CALL-UP/MOBILIZATION MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE SENT THROUGH THE AF OPERATIONS CENTER AS A JOPREP JIFFY MESSAGE.

Conclusion

VARIOUS USAF COMMAND POST EXERCISES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE RAPID CALL-UP OF THE AIR RESERVE FORCES IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT MAJOR-OPLANS. THESE FINDINGS HAVE UNDERScoreD THE REAL NEED FOR EARLY-ON USE OF THE 100K, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY SO ARF FORCES CAN SUPPORT THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND IN STRATEGIC AIRLIFT, TACTICAL AIRLIFT, AERIAL PORT AND MEDICAL EVACUATION UNITS. MAC-GAINED ARF AUGMENTATION IS CRITICAL TO ACHIEVING WAR-TIME AIRLIFT SURGE REQUIREMENTS DUE TO THE FACT THAT ARF PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTE ALMOST 50% OF THE TOTAL CAPABILITY OF THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND.

THE PRESIDENT HAS A NUMBER OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO HIM FOR THE USE OF RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES. THE MOST FLEXIBLE IS THE 10 USC 673B, 100K CALL-UP AUTHORITY. IT IS POLITICALLY PALATABLE, PROVIDES IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO SPECIAL CAPABILITIES NOT NECESSARILY AVAILABLE WITHIN THE ACTIVE COMPONENT, AND COULD DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE OF THE NATION. THIS ACTION COULD ACTUALLY LEAD TO A DECREASE IN TENSION.

WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT CAN INITIATE NUMEROUS OTHER MOBILIZATION OPTIONS TO INCREASE RESERVE SUPPORT TO AUGMENT THE ACTIVE FORCE. USE OF THESE MOBILIZATION AUTHORITIES WILL PROVIDE ACCESS TO EXPANDED MANPOWER FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME.

TO INSURE WE ARE READY TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR READINESS THROUGH THE PRIORITIZATION OF OUR UNITS FOR THE 100K CALL-UP AUTHORITY, THE ENHANCEMENT OF OUR EMERGENCY ACTION PROCEDURES AND THE CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF OUR CALL-UP/MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES IN ALL JCS EXERCISES.

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Historical Perspectives on Mobilization and Readiness

Ronald Spector

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For some months the Center of Military History has been conducting in depth research into the history of military mobilization in the U.S. in support of the Army's on-going study of the broad topic of mobilization. When I first learned that I would be asked to do this paper I met with one of the people conducting these studies and asked him if he would give me some historical examples of good and bad mobilizations. After regarding me for a few moments with that benign expression which psychiatrists reserve for the slightly demented, he replied, "There were no good mobilizations!"

Actually my learned colleague was exaggerating slightly. In every mobilization since World War II National Guard and Reserve Units have improved their TO and E strength, from less than 50 percent before World War II (10 percent for the Army Reserve) to 86 percent for units mobilized in the 1968 call-ups. Unfortunately this improvement has had no effect on the overall preparedness of these units or the amount of time required for them to reach a state of readiness for deployment or combat.

In the World War II period mobilization, National Guard divisions, although called to service fifteen months before Pearl Harbor, were not ready for assignment to combat any sooner than new divisions created from scratch. This was due to the low level of training of most of the units, a shortage of training centers, lack of prewar planning, obsolete equipment and shortages of key personnel.

During the Korean War most large units mobilized had great numbers of inadequately trained personnel and these had, in effect, to undergo basic individual training before the unit could even begin unit training. In the

case of two National Guard Divisions, the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, thirty-two to thirty-five weeks of training were required before the units could be committed to combat. The total time from mobilization to entry into combat was 15 to 16 months. As in World War II Reserve and National Guard Divisions were not ready for combat much earlier than units made up of new accessions.

In contrast to the long period of stateside training required of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard units during the Korean War, Marine reservists deployed overseas with almost astonishing speed. On July 20, 1950 the first Marine reservists were ordered to active duty. By August 4 virtually the entire Organized Marine Corps ground reserve has been called up. In October 1950 the first Marine Division, composed of at least 20 percent reservists, less than four months removed from civilian life, landed at Inchon.

How did the Marine Corps Reserve accomplish this miracle? Very simply by going out of business. In June 1950 the Organized Marine Corps Reserve was composed of 21 infantry battalions, 13 artillery battalions, 3 amphibious tractor, 2 tanks battalions, and numerous smaller units. Not a single one of these units deployed to Korea as an entity. Instead their personnel were simply absorbed into the existing regular First and Second Marine Divisions which were frantically being brought up to war strength. For example, the 7th Marines, one of the three regiments of the First Marine Division, was activated by incorporating 1800 reservists! Any Marine reservist with more than ninety days experience on active duty or who had attended 72 paid drills plus a summer camp was classified as "combat ready" and assigned to a unit

earmarked for deployment. In effect, the Marines dealt with the problem of unit readiness by dissolving the units and dispensing with the normal criteria of what constituted adequate training for combat.

In the 1961 Berlin crisis mobilization the problem of readiness was shown to be still present. All of the units mobilized required a full program of unit training. In the case of the National Guard Divisions this entailed an intensive 13 week program which required an actual 16 to 17 weeks to complete. In addition to inadequate training many units lacked essential items of equipment. Most units were not considered deployment ready for at least seven months after the Berlin call-up.

The partial mobilization of April 1968 was far smaller than any of the preceeding recent mobilizations and the majority of the units mobilized were drawn from a special Selected Reserve Force whose components were authorized 72 paid drills a year and two weeks of active duty as well as full TO and E strength. Nevertheless most of the units called were at a low level of readiness due to shortages of qualified personnel and equipment. These shortages were due, at least in part, to a major reorganization of the Army Reserve components which had not yet been completed. Some units had been reorganized less than sixty days before being called up for active service and consequently had large number of officers and enlisted men not MOS-qualified or familiar with their new equipment.

Most of the units earmarked for Vietnam did not leave for that country until four to five months after mobilization. Ironically there were no apparent differences in overall readiness between Selected Reserve Force units and other units mobilized in the 1968 call up.

The reasons for the continued low state of readiness of U.S. reserve and National Guard units through successive mobilizations are many and varied. They include chronic shortages of money for peacetime training and equipment, lack of training facilities, poor planning, and failure to accurately measure unit readiness in peacetime, as well as frequent reorganizations with their accompanying turbulence.

This should not be taken to mean that mobilization of the Guard and Reserves has contributed nothing to U.S. military capabilities. Although units, as a whole were not completely trained and lacked experienced leaders many individuals in those units were trained and experienced professionals whose affiliation with the National Guard or Reserve had enabled them to maintain their proficiency. In World War II and the Korean War the reserves and guard furnished a valuable pool of potential leaders, many of whom would later rise to positions of responsibility and achievement. It is also important to remember that the ability of the U.S. to project forces overseas is not always directly related to the speed of mobilization. During World War II deployment of divisions overseas was primarily a function of the availability of shipping and port facilities rather than of the time required to complete a training cycle.

The history of recent mobilizations also shows that the T0 and E strength, equipment and training of a unit do not, in themselves, determine the effectiveness of that unit. The Reserve and Guard units called up during the Vietnam War in 1968 were in a far more satisfactory state of readiness than those called during the Korean War yet the poor morale and poor leadership in some of the latter units made their actual effectiveness doubtful. During the first few weeks following mobilization ten company commanders and about two dozen lower echelon commanders were relieved for failure to exercise proper control of their units or for incompetence. In one transportation company sixty men actually went on a hunger strike, hundreds of others petitioned their congressmen, while some challenged the legality of the entire call-up in the courts. The reserves had come a long way from the eager Guardsmen of 1898 who were ready to riot at the mere rumor that they might not be allowed to fight the Spaniards.

If the recent history of mobilization suggests any conclusions it is that people are more important than units. From World War II on, a steadily declining proportion of reserve and guard units have been employed as units in military operations. A steadily growing proportion have been cannibalized to provide cadre, instructors or replacements. The larger the reserve or national guard unit called to active service, the longer it has generally taken to prepare that unit for deployment. There will probably never be a time when the U.S. can afford to maintain large reserve formations in a state of near-total readiness.

reserve organizations above the level of, say the battalion, and concentrate instead on training and professional experience for individual officers, NCOs and specialists who will be needed in the event of mobilization. It makes little sense to maintain the large and expensive command and administrative apparatus for brigades, divisions, air groups, etc., which will have to be dissolved upon mobilization anyway because their personnel are needed as fillers and replacements.

If we have limited resources for readiness let's invest them in people not organization.

Taking the long view we can say that U.S. armed forces reserve units have shown steady improvement since World War II. National Guard and reserves were least ready for the mobilization which began in the summer of 1940, for World War II, a war we won. They were somewhat more "ready" for the mobilization for the Korean War, which was a draw. And they were most "ready" for the 1968 mobilization for Vietnam, a war we lost. This suggests that there is something less than a one-to-one relationship between the degree of readiness of the reserve components and a nation's success in warfare.

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MOBILIZATION--
HYPOSTASIS FOR OR CONTINGENT UPON WAR PLANNING

by

BILLY M. KNOWLES

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

MOBILIZATION--
HYPOSTASIS FOR OR CONTINGENT UPON WAR PLANNING

"An overwhelmingly superior country can show flexibility and patience, meting out the military medicine in small doses to begin with, but this course is unlikely to commend itself to a country risking defeat. There is a military logic which it dare not ignore. This logic warns that military options cannot be maintained indefinitely and that some are highly perishable; that there are risks attached to tentative actions taken merely for demonstrative effect and that, confronting a capable enemy, there may be risks attached to doing nothing at all; that military campaigns rarely involve a simple buildup to some grand finale, but that the bloodiest and most difficult operations may be amongst the earliest; and that military action is unpredictable, so that what looks good in the plans can look awful in reality."

Lawrence Freedman

Since the raison d'etre of the Air Force Reserve is to augment the active establishment when needed, in peace or war, it is indeed of paramount importance that each element of preparation for such an eventuality receive close scrutiny and constant review. Predominant elements should be the deliberate determination of force mix, the subsequent establishment of units, their manning, equipment and training, and their ability to mobilize and deploy in a timely fashion. While none of these may stand alone or be resolved in total isolation, the decisionary process for mobilization and mobilization procedures generally receive the least attention, are the least understood and are fundamental to the use of Reserves as the primary source for augmenting the standing military forces.

Though no Air Force Reserve unit has been mobilized during the past 15 years, it is worthwhile to recall that of the six most recent recalls to active duty, none were carried out exactly as preplanned and were accompanied by both administrative agonies and considerable confusion.¹ Except for a handful of

reservists whose careers have brought them to duty on the staff of the Office of the Air Force Reserve in the Pentagon, and who have themselves mobilized at least once, few officials on the Air Staff or in the headquarters of the gaining major air commands remember the mobilizations. It is one thing to prepare the Air Force Reserve for mobilization; it is quite another for timely mobilization decisions or for the active force to properly assimilate the reserve force upon mobilization.

It is conceivable the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are considerably advanced on all counts, if only when compared to all other reserve components. This probability results from several influences. Their missions requiring early response, even in voluntary status prior to the Presidential 100-K call-up option, dictate a sense of urgency. However, the most influencing factor has been the attitude of the United States Air Force towards its Reserves.

Public Law (PL) 90-168, though vague and inexplicit in some respects, was interpreted and implemented by the United States Air Force in such a fashion, in retrospect, as to have met the original Congressional intent: revitalization of the Reserve.² The Honorable O. C. Fisher, in a letter to the then Acting Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, Jr., was compelled to reinforce congressional intent on June 4, 1973.³

Among other things, the Air Force structured the Air Force Reserve nearly identical to that of the active force; the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and his staff (USAF/RE), providing direct counsel to the Chief of Staff (USAF/CC) and policy and guidance to the command; Headquarters Air Force Reserve (AFRES) at Robins AFB GA through its three numbered air forces, exercising command and

control; wings/groups, compliance, execution and direct management of the force.

This traditional layered command structure, having historically served the active Air Force so well, incorporated a totally new philosophy of "Reserves managing Reserves." Every unit, from the smallest flight to HQ AFRES, is commanded by a Reservist. With the exception of the staffs of the Chief of Reserves and HQ AFRES, all units and the three numbered air forces are manned entirely by Reserves, including full time management personnel (Air Reserve Technicians). Even the above listed exceptions' force mix is 60/40 percent active duty/Reserve personnel.

This Air Force response to the law was reinforced in 1970 by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's proclamation of the Total Force Concept and its subsequent elevation to policy in 1973 by his successor, James R. Schlesinger. In the meantime, the United States Air Force provided the Air Force Reserve (AFR) in 1971 one more significant management opportunity: participating partnership in the budgetary process. Through the years, this participation has evolved into a near exclusive process that incorporates budget development, submission, congressional testimony, distribution, disbursement and accountability.

Thus stimulated, the Air Force Reserve has evolved as a ready force capable of rapid mobilization. Manning, skill-manning, training to meet war-time tasking, mobilization and mobility capabilities and modernization have all progressed exponentially due to both the Air Force acceptance of Total Force and the philosophy of Reserve-management-by-Reserves. Just as one might suspect, room is still left for concern and/or improvement in most areas.

For the past several years emphasis has been primarily directed towards manning, readiness and modernization with major progress chiefly in the first two. Aging equipment or its timely upgrade is still unresolved.

But for purposes of this paper, mobilization issues have experienced relative inattention in deference to those more visible, tangible aspects. Major General Richard Bodycombe, Chief, Air Force Reserve (1979-1982), did institute a series of command-wide annual exercises designed to address mobilization issues.⁴ These exercises (REDOUBT series 1977-1981), over time, included not only Category A combat/support/sustaining units, but Category B Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Reservists as well. The final REDOUBT exercise in 1981 involved 42,988 Reservists, more than 200 aircraft from all disciplines, Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC), Air Force Accounting and Finance Center (AFAFC), and Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) interface and the direct involvement of four gaining major commands (GMAJCOMs). About this time, the Air Force Inspector General conducted a formal Air Force-wide Functional Management Inspection (FMI) of Air Force mobilization capabilities to receive, process, and support mobilized Reserves and active/Reserve retirees/dependents.⁵

Not only did these exercises create an acute internal mobilization awareness and procedural capability within the AFR, but other Air Force-wide benefits also accrued. Some examples are: tested and improved transition from Air Reserve Pay and Allowance System (ARPAS) to the Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS); simulated and practiced methods and procedures to transfer mobilized units from the Reserve Advanced Personnel Data System (APDS) to the active ADPS; employed notification messagegrams to mobilize individual MAs

and accessed them from Reserve to active duty status. These three personnel activities were accomplished by and required interface among AFAFC, ARPC and AFMPC. Additionally, AFR 28-5, USAF Mobilization Planning, replaced AFRs 45-19 and 35-36 in May 1980 consolidating and streamlining mobilization guidance.⁶ It is equally important to note that each of these five exercises required AFR-wide a common Unit Training Assembly (UTA) weekend, not only to facilitate mobilization, but to execute marshalling of all equipment and personnel, mobility processing for deployment and actual deployment of selected units.

Having achieved even greater benefits than originally envisioned, these exercises were terminated in favor of other mobilization issues previously slighted. The first such issue addressed was War Mobilization Planning (WMP) beddown of AFR augmentation forces. Each January, the Air Staff hosts such a conference including the supported commands (USAFE, PACAF, AAC, etc), the supporting commands (TAC, MAC, SAC), the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Force Reserve (AFRES).⁷ The first meeting (1981), in which HQ AFRES participated in full, resulted in a more stabilized beddown alignment of active/guard/reserve tactical airlift units. Unlike previous taskings, agreements were reached based upon such factors as: a) theater requirements (ACL and range), b) Collocated Operating Base (COB) saturation and commonality of aircraft model/series from a standpoint of maintainability and sustainability, c) command and control and, d) attrition priorities.

However, questions still remain regarding beddowns of the Air Reserve Forces (ARF) fighter forces due to conflicts between actual theater requirements versus unit assigned Designed Operation Capabilities (DOC). Since unit equipage

and training are driven by DOC statement, not actual wartime tasking, it is imperative that theater requirements be translated into such DOCs. In other words, if a unit's DOC directs primary Close Air Support (CAS) capabilities, but the theater commander plans to employ that unit in Air Defense or Maritime Operations, the unit is highly skilled in one discipline, but ill-equipped and untrained for its actual wartime task.

As a related issue, close scrutiny of wartime beddown of flag units (flying units) revealed that collocated and subordinate support and sustaining units, though available, were not tasked with their parent unit aviation package, were tasked to support some other unit/location or were not tasked at all. HQ AFRES requested and received an opportunity in the fall of 1982 to discuss this issue conceptually with both MAC and TAC.⁸ Such discussions confirmed current mal-alignment and insidious effects upon an already strained strategic airlift capability and individual subordinate unit readiness training. Both MAC and TAC began, and continue their efforts to realign support/sustaining unit wartime beddown with that of their parent flag unit, whether active, reserve or guard. The first reflections of any improvement will occur during FY 83 Time Phase Force Deployment List (TPFDL) review. No matter the degree of initial success, there will remain the necessity to review such taskings and alignment annually until such time beddowns of flag units automatically impact support/sustaining unit taskings.

HQ AFRES has not as yet explored tasking, beddown or support for our Combat Rescue or Special Operations units. It is likely more deliberate planning is required for these combatant disciplines as was the case with tactical airlift and fighter units. One more area might well require closer attention:

Base Operating Support (BOS). Every ANG and AFR flag unit has a subordinate Combat Support Squadron or Combat Support Group, well manned and comprised of all required journeyman skills. Few of these units are tasked to assigned Minimum Essential Facility (MEF) or COB of their parent organization.

Thus, the Air Force Reserve is organized to manage its forces; is designed to interface with GMAJCOMs and Air Staff; has initiated certain undertakings to streamline and economize the process of mobilization and has joined with the ANG and GMAJCOMs to influence the actual wartime tasking process. Nevertheless, all this must be reinforced by formal Air Force guidance specifically directing supporting or supported commands to include ANG and AFR participation in all aspects of War Mobilization Planning (WMP) and Joint Operational Planning (JOP). The willing cooperation of the Air Force and its GMAJCOMs is clearly evident and has been manifest through positive reaction to almost every ARF initiative during the immediate past. Publication of such a formal philosophy, one that directs full ARF participation, would insure continued contributions, possibly greater, by the Air Reserve Forces.

The recent successes of the Air Reserve Forces reflect the benevolent attitude of the Active Force. Nevertheless, as NIFTY NUGGET and PROUD SABER have shown, there remains a widespread lack of understanding of laws establishing or executive orders and service regulations defining mobilization decision-making, mobilization authorities, procedures for implementing mobilization or assimilating mobilized forces. There is equal ignorance of options to utilize voluntary reserve forces short of mobilization.

But, if credit rightfully belongs to the farsightedness of and attitude demonstrated by the Air Force, the credit for disarray, in say the Army Reserve,

must be given to the active Army. While they are governed by the same PL 90-168 as the Air Force, and have reorganized several times in its interpretation and implementation, to this date there does not exist a philosophy of "Reserves managed by Reserves", nor does there exist a reserve layered command structure that can interface as participants laterally or vertically with mobilization planners. Nor does the Army Reserve play a significant role in the budgetary process. This, notwithstanding numerous DOD-sponsored studies and Congressional admonitions urging that they take a close look at the Air Force approach.¹⁰ The point to be made is that even with high level attention to the principle of reserve mobilization, desired improvements of the force to be mobilized is unlikely without extensive changes within those components demonstrating the least responsive Total Force Policy. The AFR and ANG have all too often in the past been painted with the same brush intended to obliterate unresponsiveness and inefficiencies observed in the other service components. Total Force is not nearly so evident in the sister services as in the Air Force. There is no question but that while the Air Force can and should strengthen its procedures to direct Air Reserve Force participation in deliberate War Mobilization Planning and Joint Operational Planning, it will make little sense in the long run if the Army, Navy and Marines don't advance to at least the point currently enjoyed by the Air Force and its two Reserve components. No matter the advanced readiness state of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, or their ability to quickly respond short of or during mobilization, their doctrinal role is one of support to the ground components whose reserve forces at present are less than ready and lack the capabilities requisite for timely mobilization responsiveness.

Not addressed specifically in this paper, but obviously intended as an objective of this colloquium is the need to redefine and streamline guidance and procedures for mobilization of Reserves. The hundreds of statutes, executive orders, memoranda, directives and regulations have evolved over time to the point that it is understandable why the process is unwieldy and confusing. Perhaps effort will be expended to produce a usable single source document; inject into Professional Military Education and Military Science curriculum a scholastic understanding of the impact of mobilization upon war planning; but any progress in this regard, without acknowledging its inextricable relationship to war-readiness of the force to be mobilized, will achieve less than desired results. To carry this point to a plausible extreme is to visualize a world crisis that falls within the present national strategy, as reflected in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Defense Guidance (DG) then assume, through these deliberations, that the mobilization authority and procedures become widely understood and appreciated only to find that basic decisions to react must be delayed or laid aside due to actual or perceived deficiencies in readiness of the primary sources for augmentation. Thus, the very first step in the mobilization process is influenced immediately by war readiness of the reserve forces to be mobilized.

What is suggested then is not that the mobilization process not be addressed for major overhaul, from both scholastic and practical approaches, but that such an effort be paralleled with and equaled by readiness initiatives. Otherwise, we will be faced with occasions when forces are ready enough for a given circumstance to be properly and effectively utilized, but either are denied the authority or fail to realize the option; or granting the authority and requirement, doubt the capability. Treated separately, as has been historic

practice, synchronization is not possible.

There was a time when the two Air Force Reserve components were clearly second rate forces; undermanned, underfunded, under-equipped, without meaningful wartime tasks and certainly not the ready force it is today. But of course that was before PL 90-168 and prior to the Total Force Policy and its acceptance by the Air Force. Those bad times were also prior to the Air Force philosophy of "Reserves managed by Reserves". As respectfully and politely as possible it is submitted that the key inhibitor to Army, Navy and Marine readiness, and therefore their ability to mobilize and deploy expeditiously, is the degree to which each parent service practices total force. It is not enough that total force is espoused at various levels. Unless layered organizational structures provide full participating command and managerial partnership by the Reserves, within a framework that supports the "Reserves managed by Reserves" philosophy, few improvements will accrue in areas of force structuring, war planning, mobilization planning or readiness in real terms. The two bottom lines are: address reserve readiness simultaneously to any redress of mobilization, and review differences among the services in their practice of Total Force.

FOOTNOTE PAGE

¹Gerald T. Cantwell, History of the Air Force Reserve, "The Evolution and Employment of the Air Force Reserve as a Mobilization Force 1946-1980," Dec 1981.

²Public Law 90-168, approved by the 87th Congress, 1 Dec 1967, effective 1 Jan 68, generally strengthened Reserve management in all services (including establishment of Assistant Secretaries for Reserve Affairs at Defense and Service Components), sometimes called the "Reserve Bill of Rights".

³Personal letter from senior member of sponsoring House Armed Services Committee to Acting Secretary of Defense resulting from concerns over testimony to the Ninety-Third Congress. Letter strongly reinforced intent and purpose of PL 90-168.

⁴Gerald T. Cantwell, "Operation REDOUBT: The Evolution of an Idea and Its Implementation," Jan 1982.

⁵TIG Report of Functional Management Inspection of USAF Support of Reserve Forces (ARF) During/After Mobilization PN 81-620, 16 Mar 1981 - 4 Dec 1981.

⁶USAF Mobilization Planning regulation AFR 28-5, 29 May 1980, superseded AFRs 45-19, 16 Apr 1976 and 35-36, Sep 1976. Sets policy, assigns responsibility and furnishes guidance for USAF mobilization planning to include responsibilities for USAF mobilization planning to include responsibilities for supporting, training, mobilizing and deploying active and reserve units and individuals. Implements DOD Directives 1000.3, 29 Mar 78; 1225.6, 18 Apr 70; 1235.10, 27 Oct 70; Annex N to JSCP and JCS Pub 21.

⁷HQ USAF/XOXI Annual Invitation to participate in WMP-3 Force Allocation/Beddown Conference - January.

⁸HQ AFRES/CS letter of 28 Jan 82 to HQ MAC/CS and 27 Sep 82 to HQ TAC/CS requesting conceptual conferences to realign beddown of support/sustaining units with wartime tasking of parent flag units. HQ MAC/CS letter of 9 Jul 82 accepted and scheduled the conference for Aug 82. HQ TAC/RF letter of 19 Nov 82 scheduled similar conference for Dec 1982. Both conferences validated concern and resulted in continuing efforts to properly align the forces.

¹⁰Brookings Institute, "A Study of Guard and Reserve Forces", Martin-Binkin 1972, states in part, "Air Reserve Forces maintain the highest degree of readiness and mobility of all services studied."

Letter from the Honorable O. C. Fisher (HASC) to the Acting Secretary of Defense, Nov 1973 said in part, "It would be equally tragic if the other services did not learn from the example of the Air Force and apply the Total Force Policy in its full meaning to the task of improving the stature of the other Guard and Reserve components."

U. S. Comptroller General Study of Reserve Forces, "Need to Improve Effectiveness of Reserve Training", June 1975, states in part. "Reflects that AF Reservists tend to be better equipped, more productive and generally more satisfied than reserves of the other services branches."

Office of the Secretary of Defense News Release, Sep 1977, from the study, "Guard and Reserves in Total Force", stated, "The Total Force Policy is further advanced in the Air Force than the other departments. Compared to the Army or Navy Components, the Air Reserve and Air Guard forces are ready to deploy earlier, and are more thoroughly integrated into a single command structure and operate equipment that is more modern."

Senate Report No. 97-330, 97th Congress (1983), pp 130, 131, states in part, "The inefficiencies and even dangers inherent in the unwieldy Reserve (Army) command structure have been described by the GAO, OMB and the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

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Professional Research and Writing on Reserve Forces:
Perceptions of an Overlooked and Underutilized Asset

by

Charles C. Chadbourn, III

National Defense University Colloquium

on

Guard and Reserve Mobilization: An Essential
Element of Preparedness

Sponsored by

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Introduction.

The subject of mobilization has been broadly addressed in a wide variety of books, periodicals, reports and public documents.¹ This literature is complete with a plethora of studies on the vital importance of manpower mobilization in any large scale conflict involving the United States or our NATO allies. Not so clear, however, is precisely how reserve forces are to be utilized should mobilization in fact be executed.

Scanning the available titles leaves the discerning reader with the inescapable suspicion that reserve components are a frequently overlooked and often underutilized asset. Not surprisingly, analyses of recent mobilization exercises reveal that military capabilities of reserve forces are not sufficiently understood, sometimes even at the highest levels within DoD.

With these observations in mind, the intent of this essay is twofold:

- ° First, to examine perceptions on the importance of reserve forces as indicated by professional military and/or scholarly writing, and
- ° Second, to offer some specific suggestions as to how the overall quality of research on reserve and mobilization issues might be improved.

Perceptions of Reserve Forces.

Perceptions on the "real world" importance of reserve forces may be examined in a number of ways. One approach would be to analyze what is taught about reserve forces in military education programs. Of particular importance

in this regard would be the curricula of the senior service colleges. In these institutions the flag and general officers of tomorrow are being educated in order that their decision-making abilities will be enhanced in preparation for assuming higher command and management responsibility. That they, of all people, should understand fully the mission and capabilities of reserve forces as well as mobilization issues is of fundamental importance. Unfortunately, one recent assessment of what service colleges include in their academic programs about reserve and guard components concluded that the extent and depth of reserve force education was generally "rather narrowly focused. . . (and) often more informational than analytical in nature."² Apparently what the service colleges teach on this subject is somewhat superficial at best.

Another approach would be to examine what is being written on the topic of reserve forces by defense intellectuals and thinkers. Using this method two basic problems are readily apparent from even a cursory review of the literature on mobilization. First, the majority of studies appear to focus on manpower availability and procedures. Granted these are complex and important concerns which need to be addressed. All too often, however, the writers do not discuss what might be described as the "bottom-line" issue: what are the strategic implications of any manpower mobilization.

The second problem area is extremely subtle and perhaps more of a deduction. Clearly, a significant volume of articles, reports and other writing has been compiled to convince a professional military audience that

- ° Reserve forces are a large and useful source of needed manpower assets, and

- ° Reserve components should be considered as an important aspect of overall defense planning.

Left unsaid is the very necessity for undertaking such studies.

Some have suggested that this problem is particularly prevalent in the Navy. One report concluded, for example, that "the most significant criticism of the Naval Reserve is directed against what has been viewed as the persistent unwillingness of the Regular Navy to give more than nominal support to Reserve forces and acknowledge the utility of Reserves in performing naval missions in both peace and war."³ Obviously there continues to be a pressing need to educate the defense establishment on both the desirability for and utility of significant reserve components.

Three of the nation's five senior service colleges publish a professional military journal.⁴ In theory these journals are devoted to examining those issues which are considered of vital importance to today's military leaders. Table 1 provides a compilation of data on the numbers of articles specifically dealing with reserve components published in these and other selected professional military journals in the decade since the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. What is striking is the paucity of scholarly assessment on reserve forces.

In his book On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, COL Harry G. Summers has suggested that one of the critical mistakes in the Vietnam War was a failure to call up the reserves on any large scale.⁵ One might argue that this phenomenon provides an explanation for the absence of extensive writing on strategic or historical importance of reserve forces. From the viewpoint of a naval historian, however, this observation should come as no surprise. In fact, the only historical study of the U. S. Naval Reserve to be published in the last decade was Reuben E. Stivers' Privateers & Volunteers: The Men and Women of our

ARTICLES ON RESERVE/GUARD FORCES
IN
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY LITERATURE, 1973-82

Table 1.

<u>Journal</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>United States Naval Institute Proceedings</u>	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	0	7
<u>Naval War College Review</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Marine Corps Gazette</u>	7	6	4	5	4	0	5	0	7	1	39
<u>Air University Review</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Parameters</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
<u>Strategic Review</u>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	8	7	5	5	4	2	6	1	8	2	48

Reserve Naval Forces: 1776 to 1866, a book which clearly deals only with the "Old Navy."⁶ Probably the best work to date on the history of the modern Naval Reserve remains an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation prepared at the University of Pittsburgh in 1952 by Harold Wileand entitled "The History of the Development of the Naval Reserves, 1889-1941." Of the momentous events from 1941 on there is still no definitive historical treatment devoted strictly to the role and contribution of the Naval Reserve.

Clearly the volume of articles and books on the Naval Reserve during the last ten years is not impressive. A major source, appropriately enough, has been the United States Naval Institute Proceedings. While providing interesting and informative articles, even here most writers do not express any innovative or original thinking. The major exception is CAPT James G. Abert's thoughtful paper "The Naval Reserve Should Work." The author suggests an imaginative approach whereby reservists could be used to respond to peacetime "peak load" work requirements of the active forces such as training exercises or serving as specialists to assist in areas where unique expertise might be required. The end result, Abert argues convincingly, would in fact be the most valuable kind of mobilization training possible. The reservist would train by working, that is, doing what would be expected should he or she be recalled to active duty.

Abert's ideas are certainly controversial. Nevertheless they represent precisely the kind of provocative thinking and writing that is needed on the capabilities that reserve components can make to the nation's overall preparedness. Given today's concern in the Congress with ever-rising defense costs and the subsequent desire to re-vitalize the role of reserve components, perhaps ideas such as those of CAPT Abert's should be closely reexamined.

Improving the Quality of Research on Reserve and Mobilization Issues.

The preceding paragraphs have pointed out major shortcomings in the publicly expressed professional views on reserve forces. In this section a series of corrective actions will be suggested.

Fundamentally, what has been demonstrated in this brief paper is that while the Navy manifests strong interest in the general readiness of its reserve forces, in reality there is far too little knowledge of what the reserves are all about. This statement can probably be applied to other reserve components as well. One place to begin in correcting this deficiency is with the Armed Forces' education system as a whole. A major contribution would be the development of issues-oriented electives courses on reserve and mobilization issues in the academic programs of the service colleges.

While courses on reserve issues would represent an important contribution, participation would be far too limited. Consequently, a second major remedy would be to encourage and stimulate informed and thoughtful writing on the strategic importance of reserve forces which might reach out to an even broader audience. One way in which this objective might be accomplished would be to encourage editors of service college journals to consider articles dealing with mobilization and reserve issues. Another specific measure which should be given strong consideration is that of urging the National Defense University to begin publication of a professional journal to serve as a forum for such ideas. A journal of this kind would doubtless receive wide dissemination throughout the DoD and academic communities.

Finally, the specialized research centers of the service colleges such as the Mobilization Concepts Development Center (ICAF), Strategic Concepts Development Center (National War College), and Department of Naval Warfare Studies

(Naval War College) should continue to encourage research and writing on reserve components and their role in the nation's defense posture. In the process, greater scholarly and professional interest in reserve forces will be the end result. Finally, perhaps strong consideration should be given to holding an annual mobilization/reserve components conference in order to encourage continued dialog begun by this colloquium.

Summary.

This paper has addressed the perception that reserve forces are, in general, an overlooked and underutilized asset. From an academic viewpoint this observation is substantiated by the paucity of articles in the professional journals of the senior service colleges on the subject of reserve forces. The most logical institution to link the issues of manpower mobilization with strategic concerns, the National Defense University, unfortunately does not publish a professional journal.

Finally, five specific recommendations have been offered during the course of this paper:

- ° Development of electives courses on reserve components at the senior service colleges,
- ° Encourage publication of articles on reserve concerns in the existing professional journals sponsored by the service colleges,
- ° Establishment of a new professional military journal to be published by the National Defense University devoted to strategic and mobilization concerns,

° Continued sponsorship of military and academic research efforts on reserve matters on the part of the service college "think tanks,"

° Hold an annual conference devoted to specific aspects of reserve/mobilization issues.

Obviously no single panacea exists for resolving the problem of how to increase professional interest and concern for reserve matters. Taken collectively, however, the actions proposed above should significantly increase a general awareness of these vital issues throughout the DoD and civilian academic communities.

Endnotes

¹Mobilization: A Bibliography, National Defense University Library Bibliography 83-1, Washington, D.C. 1983.

²CDR Peter J. Lumianski, USNR, "A Survey and Analysis of Selected PME Service Schools to Determine the Extent to Which Guard and Reserve Component Education is Included in Their Academic Programs," paper presented at Colloquium on Guard and Reserve Mobilization at National Defense University, 2-4 November 1983.

³Robert L. Goldich, et. al, "The U. S. Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Realities," Strategic Study Report 82-41, National War College, Washington, D.C.

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⁵Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, U. S. Army War College, 1981.

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OSD MOBILIZATION COLLOQUIUM

1-4 NOVEMBER 1983

ARMY MOBILIZATION DOCTRINE:

DOES IT EXIST?/SHOULD IT EXIST?

BY

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This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

ARMY MOBILIZATION DOCTRINE:
DOES IT EXIST?/SHOULD IT EXIST?

Introduction. It would seem that in time of national emergency, a condition which would exist for the mobilization process to be exercised, that some form of doctrine would need to be in existence to guide the accomplishment of the mobilization effort. However, in the US Army such is not the case. There is no formal doctrine for mobilization. Perhaps one should start with a definition. Webster defines "doctrine" as "something that is taught" or "a principle or position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge or system of belief." In the Army structure, volumes of written material concerning mobilization do exist. However, the principles are not taught in the services schools at any level, other than a short block in CGSC (Fort Leavenworth), therefore defying Webster's first definition -- thus this plethora of verbage must not be doctrine. Indeed, the volumes of written material have grown over the past few years, primarily because of periodic Mobilization Exercises (MOBEXs). However, written word alone does not doctrine make and the Army has yet to come to grips with exactly what its mobilization doctrine is or ought to be. This paper will explore some of the mobilization guidance which the Army does use, various constraints which form the bottom line of what must happen to effect successful mobilization, other thoughts about mobilization issues, and finally a critique of whether the Army should have a well defined, precise, pre-published mobilization doctrine.

Mobilization Doctrine Overview. To better understand what the Army is working with in developing mobilization and contingency plans one needs to have a knowledge of just how this planning guidance develops. This section will present background information about mobilization publications in use today. Mobilization guidance and its basis is top driven, i.e., beginning at the JCS level with the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS). In conjunction with that guidance, over time, the Army has developed the Army Mobilization Operations Planning System (AMOPS). This imposing document comes in four volumes and serves as the Army supplement to JOPS. It consolidates policies and procedures, defines responsibilities, and provides operational planning guidance related to mobilization and strategic employment of Army Forces. From this document the Major Commands of the Army have written their respective versions, e.g., TRADOC Mobilization Operation Planning System (TMOPS) for the Training and Doctrine Command and FORSCOM Mobilization Deployment System (FORMDEPS) for Forces Command. Although the guidance is top driven, no standardization exists and many supplements at lower levels of command to further define the guidance have been published. The end result is that the Army has a jumble of publications in the field to accomplish mobilization but it does not appear to have a precisely defined doctrine to pull the effort totally together. Within these many publications and allied papers are found some operating

definitions which help us to appreciate the enormous task of "doctrinizing" the mobilization process. The JCS defines mobilization as "the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. The process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and material for active military service." Former Chief of Staff of the Army General Edward C. Meyer said, "mobilization potential and sustainability are critical elements of strategic deterrence." General Meyer expands on that statement; "the current and projected growth and readiness improvements of potential adversaries have narrowed the gap between warning and attack times. This places enormous requirements on the Army's capacity to mobilize rapidly, deploy, and sustain the land battle. The active force is dependent on a responsive reserve component which is dependent on a ready mobilization base; additionally, we must have national preparedness capability to sustain the services."

In comparing the JCS definition to General Meyer's statement, which expresses a view widely held by military personnel, one can see the expansion of "mobilization" to "mobilize/deploy/employ." If we chose to look at the narrow JCS definition, mobilization is not particularly complex. However, almost everyone chooses to address mobilization from General Meyer's view, i.e., the mobilization process includes readiness

enhancements, deployment, and arrival in theater. This author takes the expanded view expressed by General Meyer that mobilization is a multi-faceted, relatively long-term process which begins long before a unit is alerted and ends only when it is in theater. Mobilization of course, will probably happen in waves with units deploying to their assigned theaters on a time-sequenced basis. Thus, units will arrive in theater before others have been alerted. It is within this extremely complex framework that the Army (and other services) must work to make mobilization successful.

Critical Constraint Factors. Current Army mobilization planning is predicted on the expanded definition of mobilization as expressed above. AMOPS states "Army mobilization must satisfy the requirements for forces and resources defined in joint operations planning (JOPS)." The thrust of rapidly moving a unit from a reserve role to one as part of the approved (theater) force has no historical precedence. Prior mobilizations have been a relatively slow, deliberate process, whereas mobilizing in response to JOPS requires much more accelerated action. Current OPLANS require early deployment of reserve component units; indeed, many RC units are required to deploy before some active units. Although many people question the feasibility of those requirements, mobilization must be addressed from this perspective. Unfortunately much mobilization planning guidance is based on unrealistic OPLAN

requirements. Most Mob Planners realize that the critical constraint is Strategic Lift. The Army Guard and Reserve feel very comfortable that they can mobilize; but once mobilized, the problems begin. First, there is not a secure feeling that the active component can adequately accommodate the Reserve Components at mobilization station installations and activities. And, once at mob station, these units fear that they won't meet deployment schedules because of insufficient lift capability. In addition to constraints imposed by the inability to move units on schedule there exist so many different ways by which mobilization occurs that development of doctrine is difficult and impractical. Units designated as early deployers "may report directly to a port of embarkation, others go rapidly to a mob station, still others mobilize at home station and remain there for some time; other units, such as senior headquarters units, may never actually leave home station--their's is a peacetime, not a wartime, mission. Creative doctrine which does not hamper ability to respond rapidly and capably in such diverse circumstances is about impossible to develop.

The "bottom line" for an effective mobilization is to deliver the right force to the right place at the right time. The right force means a mission capable, specific unit that has been "flagged" on the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) to meet the supported commander's requirement. "Mission

capable" is the key. Unfortunately, not all units (AC as well as RC) are mission capable. Resource shortfall and training are, and will continue to be, the inhibitors for units to perform their wartime mission. The cost to fill the current force structure with equipment and personnel is prohibitive. This country has neither the inclination nor the economy to support such an action. Logically, units without adequate people and supplies cannot fully train. In the RC this is exacerbated by geography, i.e., the wide dispersion of like-type units precludes using common equipment. Being able to deliver the right force to the right place at the right time is a strategic lift problem which is really not an area over which the Reserve Components can exercise much influence. Movement to the mobilization station and further movement to the port of embarkation are of course, part of the delivery, but these are not the main inhibitors. The Active Components' questionable ability to move these units to their ultimate destination rapidly and intact is the single most critical constraint driving the mobilization train today.

Other Essential Factors. Many other considerations exist which compound the extreme complexity of establishing mobilization doctrine, if indeed such is a desirable goal. Listed below in a very abbreviated form are just a few of these considerations to give an idea of exactly how many threads will need to be perfectly woven into a flawless fabric to make mobilization doctrine a blessing not a curse.

o Numerous divergent circumstances exist relating to the mobilization process; some examples: separate detachments and companies of 10 to 15 to 100 or more personnel with no wartime higher headquarters immediately available to guide and assist; separate battalions with varying wartime and peacetime associations; groups, Armored Cavalry Regiments Bdes and divisions some are round-out units, others have no stated side affiliation. How to plan for all such contingencies?

o Short distance to mob stations vs long distances requiring various modes of transportation for both personnel and equipment. How to specify such different requirements?

o CAPSTONE relationship considerations, i.e., round-out units vs augmentation vs affiliation. How to maintain a doctrinal guidance integrity of relationship of all such units?

o Direct deployment vs intermediate stops at mobilization stations vs mobilization at home station with no specified mobilization stations.

o Deploying unit vs employing unit.

o Partial mobilization vs full mobilization vs total mobilization.

Conclusion. What all this leads to is that in the Army too many circumstances and situations exist to make the writing of doctrine a feasible endeavor. The Army has not yet charged full tilt into defining "mobilization doctrine" and, in the author's view, that is as it should be. Specific, detailed mobilization planning should be, and is, an on-going project. Resolving some of the constraints, chiefly lift capability, is a first priority. And indeed in some areas, doctrinal requirements may be helpful and desirable. Certainly, a few mobilization events and processes are standard enough to be covered by doctrine, but the flexibility to meet changing OPLAN requirements precludes the use of much more than short term guidance. By necessity, as supported commanders change their battle plans, force structure adjustments are implemented and resource shortfalls are filled, mobilization guidance must also change. Thus, readiness enhancement, i.e., training, becomes the one area that can be covered by doctrine.

There are some draw backs to not having definitive doctrinal guidance. There is not an easy reference or document that lays out for everyone what must be done, when, how, can what sequence and, who is in charge. In fact, that last item is extremely important. Command and control lines are fuzzy on anything less than a full mobilization, and even then many are unclear. Present CONUS Command and Control procedures do not enhance mobilization. Peacetime command is not wartime command. In

fact, as has already been stated, many major headquarters in the Guard and Reserve have no formal wartime mission. There are many reasons for this, some practical and some political. Probably the bottom line has to do with General Officer slots much coveted by all components but too overlapping in a mobilization setting.

I would suggest that the Army does not need copious doctrine to effect mobilization. This could actually be counter-productive. So what does the Army need? Mobilization education. It is that simple. With the current system design of the Army and other services it appears that there should not be formal doctrine designed to cover every contingency. There are too many varying circumstances, both in conditions calling for differing degrees of mobilization, and in the structure and procedures, command differences and complications of all the units subject to mobilization. However, what doctrine there is should be taught in service schools so that more of the active forces know and understand the requirements, procedures and complexities. Currently the Guard and Reserve units which must one day mobilize and a handful of active component mobilization planners, (mostly at the highest command levels) are the only ones with any knowledge of mobilization. The active component installation is where everything ultimately happens and that unfortunately, is our weakest link. One will find only a few AC

personnel or DA civilians who know and understand the process. Thanks to the active duty tour program (Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)) for selected Guard and Reserve personnel some professional mobilization planners are out there, and that's a beginning. But the Active Component is still weak in knowledge and ability to support the mobilization effort. This weakness must be corrected. The pressure on the RC to be ready to go to war at high levels of readiness is causing the Reserve Component member to become soldier-citizen vis-a-vis citizen-soldier.

The Reserve Components stand ready to mobilize and deploy on short notice. They train for deployment within the equipment and funding constraints which exist in the real world. They must realistically put their faith in the ability of the Active Forces--not just the Army--to fully support their mobilization efforts and to effectively meet their needs in a very compressed time frame. The lack of mobilization knowledge of most active component members is a matter of great concern to the Guard and Reserve. The on-going educational process of every military professional must include a depth of understanding of the complex nature of any mobilization. Finite mobilization doctrine may hamper effectiveness in a rapidly changing scenario. Mobilization education can only enhance it.

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THE GUARD AND RESERVE:
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

by

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This paper was prepared solely for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component.. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are completed.

THE GUARD AND RESERVE:
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides facts and figures which illustrate the significant contributions of the Guard and Reserve to America's overall military strength. The paper highlights the strong readiness posture of the Guard and Reserve, enumerating several problems which must be solved to enable these components to realize their full potential in contributing to National Defense. The article concludes by presenting examples of actions which members of both the Active and Reserve components can take to utilize more fully the capabilities residing in the reserves.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Fundamental to the steady evolution of Guard and Reserve capabilities, and to the increased national defense responsibilities assigned the reserves, lies the citizen-soldier concept. In the colonial era, citizen-soldiers constituted the only military force. When nascent Colonies came under attack, farmers and townspeople would lay down the tools of their trade

and pick up muskets. The citizen-soldiers soon organized a militia, and before the Revolutionary War, they constituted the single prepared military force in Colonial America. Members were called "Minuteman," citizen-soldiers ready for duty at a minute's notice. As early as 1635, the first militia units, the Old North and East Regiments, were established in what is now the State of Massachusetts. Soon, additional units were created throughout the Colonies, and almost all fought in the War of Independence.

The militia eventually became known as the "National Guard," a name inspired by the French military hero, the Marquis de Lafayette. In 1824, Lafayette referred to New York State units constituting his Honor Guard as the "National Guard," a term derived from his previous command, the "Garde Nationale" of the French Army. The name "National Guard" gained wide acceptance and was soon adopted nationally.

In 1908, another organization of citizen-soldiers emerged. On April 23rd of that year, the modern Reserve Component came into being when the Medical Corps Reserve of the United States Army was created. Subsequently, each of the Military Services created a Reserve Component. Today, America's reserve forces comprise two National Guard Components, the Army and Air Guard; and five Reserve Components: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

Until promulgation of the Total Force Policy in 1973, the citizen-soldier was regarded by many military leaders as primarily a citizen and only secondarily a soldier. This attitude produced several consequences which limited the defense contributions expected from the Guard and Reserve.

The Guard and Reserve were viewed as forces to be held in reserve and when committed, designed to serve in a subordinate role carrying out missions of secondary importance. Their mobilization was expected to occur only in the later and more desperate stages of a national military crisis. Guard and Reserve personnel were almost never consulted regarding their ideas of how reserve forces could best support national defense programs, either in peacetime or wartime.

Another detrimental consequence of the secondary role assumed for the Guard and Reserve was consistent failure to adequately man, equip, and train reserve forces. Resources made available to the reserves were extremely limited and were often provided begrudgingly at best. In certain quarters, there prevailed the notion that every dollar furnished the reserves was a dollar unwisely -- and unfairly -- denied the active force.

Members of the Guard and Reserve were all too frequently deprecated as "weekend-warriors" lacking dedication, military professionalism and the commitment to report to duty if mobilized. The most prejudicial variant of this view held reservists to be

amateurs who, having proven unable to measure up to active duty standards, continued on in the reserve to enjoy the best of two worlds: safe and undemanding military duty combined with a lucrative civilian career.

Because Total Force Policy enabled reservists to work side-by-side with their active force colleagues, this biased misconception has been largely replaced by the realization that citizen-soldiers^{are} first-rate soldiers, as well as successful citizens. Where residual biases still exist, they are concentrated among individuals who have not had the opportunity to train or conduct military operations with the reserves.

Negative views of reserve capabilities frequently evolved into poor management and, in some instances, mismanagement. Many ineffectual structures, a few of which are still being eliminated or improved upon, were created to manage and fund the Reserve Components. Opportunities for creating structures and procedures to improve combat readiness of the Guard and Reserve were often bypassed.

Fortunately, these impediments to an effective reserve were outweighed by several factors which led eventually to creation of the Total Force Policy. That policy recognized the full range of peacetime and wartime contributions to national defense which can be made by citizen-soldiers.

First, Americans sustained their belief that a large share of the responsibility for defending a democratic nation must be assigned to citizen-soldiers. An extension of this premise dictates that missions assigned to the Guard and Reserve must be consistent with current military strategy and technology, and promote the most efficient possible use of defense resources.

Second, Congress committed itself to a principal role for the Guard and Reserve by providing adequate funding to man, equip, and train units to meet increased mission responsibilities. This commitment included assigning to the Guard and Reserve its own leadership, and establishing in 1968, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense specifically responsible for instituting and promoting policy for the development and full utilization of Reserve Components. To further strengthen this policy role, the office was elevated by Congress, in 1983, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense level.

Promulgation of Total Force Policy, by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1973, increased significantly America's defense preparedness by making more effective use of Guard and Reserve components. Total Force Policy provided that "Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active Forces." Each of the Service Secretary's was ordered to "provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment time and

readiness required by contingency plans." Secretary Schlesinger went on to say: "Total Force Policy integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve Forces into a homogeneous whole."

By making Guard and Reserve Forces integral elements of the nation's military establishment, Total Force Policy had a fundamental and irreversible impact upon the manner in which the Defense Department plans for, finances, and operates the Armed Forces of the United States. Moreover, the military and mobilization capabilities which, as a result of Total Force Policy, now reside in the Guard and Reserve, have made these components essential elements of the nation's overall deterrent, defense, and war fighting posture. In peacetime, Guard and Reserve forces contribute routinely to the daily operations of the active force; in contingencies short of war, they assist the active force to increase operational readiness and to mount and sustain crisis operations; in wartime, the Guard and Reserve would provide the augmentation of manpower, and equipped military units without which active forces could not carry out major wartime missions.

The fundamental importance of the Guard and Reserve was highlighted in Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's welcoming remarks to the Congress of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Office^{rs} held in Washington, D.C., in August 1982. In his address to the delegates, the Secretary delivered a statement

which will stand as a major milestone in the evolution of the Total Force Policy:

"We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in reserve. . . . Instead, they have to be an integral part of the Total Force, both within the United States and within NATO. They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier. Only in that way can we achieve the military strength that is necessary to defend our freedom."

This policy statement constituted a logical and timely extension of Total Force thinking. It layed to rest forever the notion that the citizen-soldier is only secondarily a soldier. And, most significantly, it set the stage for further evolution of the citizen-soldier concept, one which calls for the citizen-soldier to contribute the full measure of civilian skills -- as well as military skills -- to the nation's peacetime and wartime defense.

III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL FORCE BY THE GUARD AND RESERVE

As a result of this historical development, and of the full realization of Total Force Policy, the military capabilities which now reside in the Guard and Reserve are so significant that contingency plans for meeting the most important military challenges to the United States include Guard and Reserve forces.

Half of the Nation's combat power, and two-thirds of its combat support capability, are in these two Components.

Just how essential are the Guard and Reserve to the nation's military strength? It might first be noted that certain specialized military capabilities reside predominantly in the Guard and Reserve. For example, 90 percent of the Navy's minesweeping capability is in the US Naval Reserve. All of the Army's Infantry Scout Groups are in the National Guard. Both light and heavy equipment maintenance companies are primarily in the Guard and Reserve. All of the Army's training divisions are in the US Army Reserve, which means that the Army must mobilize these units for any large scale expansion of its training base. Two-thirds of the CONUS air defense forces are in the Air National Guard, which performs this mission on a day-to-day basis. Air Reserve Forces constitute two-thirds of the Air Force's tactical airlift. Half of the Marine Corps tank battalions are in the 4th Marine Division, a major reserve command. The Coast Guard Reserve provides 75 percent of that Service's port safety and security forces, including 100 percent of explosives loading details.

In terms of units with wartime missions, the Guard and Reserve provide essential portions of the military structure in every Service. They include combat divisions, brigades and battalions, and combat service support units in the Army; carrier air wings, construction battalions and minesweepers in the Navy; a

full division-wing team in the Marine Corps; and air defense interceptors, tactical fighters, special operations forces, tankers, and strategic and tactical airlift in the Air Force

The following table summarize representatives contributions made by Guard and Reserve Forces to the Total Force:

ARMY

65% Medical Units
62% Special Forces Groups
59% Artillery Battalions
57% Armored Cavalry Regiments
33% Combat Divisions

NAVY

88% Minesweepers
68% Mobile Construction
Battalions
60% Military Sealift Command
Personnel
35% Maritime Patrol Squadrons
14% Carrier Air Wings

MARINE CORPS

40% of Tanks
34% Light Attack Aircraft
33% Anti-Aircraft Missile
Battalions
29% Observation Aircraft

AIR FORCE

66% Tactical Airlift
65% Air Defense Interceptors
57% Tactical Reconnaissance
56% Aerial Port Resources
45% Strategic Airlift Crews

25% of Division/Wing Strength

37% Tactical Fighters



COAST GUARD



75% of Port Safety and Security

(including 100% of explosives loading details)

26% of Remaining Coast Guard Forces

The balance among Active, Guard and Reserve Component contributions to selected military specialties is shown graphically in the following tables:





At the end of FY 1983, the strength of the Selected Reserve Components of the Department of Defense was 963,700. The Coast Guard Reserve, which is part of the Department of Transportation in peacetime and is transferred to the Navy after mobilization, contains 26,000 members. In addition, another 396,000 personnel were in the Individual Ready Reserve or Inactive National Guard, a pool of trained personnel available for mobilization to fill vacancies in active or reserve units or to replace losses. And approximately 20,000 Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) provide essential staff, technical, and medical support in more than forty professional fields including intelligence, operations research, automated data handling, law and flight medicine.

Rounding out this picture, there are 44,000 individuals in the Standby Reserve, and 469,000 in the Retired Reserve of the National Guard and Reserve Components. In total, then, the Guard and Reserve contain nearly two million individuals who, in time of war, can be mobilized in support of the nation's defense.

The Guard and Reserve are first and foremost wartime mobilization assets. Nevertheless, they are vitally involved in the day-to day operations of all the Military Services. For example, two Air Force Reserve Aircraft Control and Warning Radar Squadrons provide 24 hour air defense surveillance in Hawaii. Air Reserve Forces maintain interceptors and aerial refueling tankers on an around-the-clock alert status. They also maintain

a contingent of fighters, and a C-130 squadron, at all times in Panama on a rotational basis. Members of the Air Force Intelligence Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program routinely staff Air Force Intelligence and Indications and Warning Centers at SAC, MAC, TAC, and in Air Force Headquarters. Army Reserve maintenance units perform support missions in Europe during annual training. The work they do materially reduces depot workload backlogs at U.S. installations. And, it is not unusual for Reserve personnel to provide specialized training to active force personnel.

Well known is the continuous emergency response of National Guard units, under state control, in natural disasters and civil disturbances. In 1982, nearly 10,000 Army and Air Guard personnel were placed on emergency active duty to assist civil authorities in 450 emergency operations. A new mission being assigned reserve forces is day-to-day interdiction of drug traffic. Guard and Reserve individuals and units provide essential support to the mobilization and logistics exercises conducted by the Department of Defense.

IV. MISSION READINESS

Statistics alone do not convey the fundamental importance of Guard and Reserve forces. These forces are highly mission-capable, and they are constantly improving all aspects of readiness.

In the broadest sense, readiness involves establishment of at least the following basic conditions:

1. Personnel, equipment and training which is commensurate with the wartime mission assigned;

2. Effective mobilization plans and procedures which have been exercised and tested;

3. A coordinated and integrated relationship between Guard and Reserve units and individuals with gaining commands which establish direction and guidance for training and all aspects of preparedness;

4. Individual and unit proficiency consistent with the wartime mission;

5. Possession by the reserve unit of: (a) detailed wartime mission plans, and logistical and administrative documents and procedures of the gaining unit to assure consistency of reserve unit preparedness with gaining unit mission; and (b) specific proficiency requirements for individuals and units based on the wartime mission.

6. Physical and mental preparedness by reserve personnel for the realities of mobilization, deployment and mission operations;

7. Sustaining support systems to fully supply and resupply mobilized forces;

8. An effective Defense Department capability to provide immediate benefits and entitlements to the dependents of mobilized Guard and Reserve personnel.

All of these conditions must be assured for each reserve unit and individual consistent with mission and deployment time requirements. While much remains to be done, recent improvements in readiness have been substantial, a fact attributed by the Reserve Forces Policy Board to developments in five critical areas: "initiatives and incentives authorized to attract and retain personnel; increases in Active Component interest, participation, and support in Reserve Component training; increased exercise participation; increased funding directed toward training efforts; and the continued addition of fulltime manning positions at unit level dedicated to unit training and proficiency."

Readiness can be examined in relationship to three principal elements: manpower, equipment and training. These elements are so closely interrelated that any change in one immediately

affects the others, e.g., recruiting large numbers of non-prior service personnel adds to the training requirement, and shortages of personnel or equipment impede training.

A. MANPOWER

Looking first at the manpower component of readiness, it is evident that the Total Force Policy has had a salutary impact on Guard and Reserve recruitment and retention. During the last five years of Total Force Policy, the manpower picture in the Reserve Components has shown steady growth. Dramatic improvements began in 1978, when recruiting incentives similar to those which have been successful in the Active Force were adopted for the Selected Reserve. Manpower strength has continued to increase since then, and two additional factors have contributed to this development. First, the significance and value of the peacetime and wartime missions performed by the Guard and Reserve have become more widely known. As a consequence, duty in the reserve components is increasingly perceived by those eligible for military service as important to national defense, and as a form of patriotic national service. Second, as the range of missions assigned to the reserve components has expanded opportunities for ~~challenging~~^{has} and interesting assignments, duty in the reserves ^Abecome more attractive. Meaningful work, and the personal and professional satisfaction derived from making essential contribution to daily mission operations, are among the

6. Physical and mental preparedness by reserve personnel for the realities of mobilization, deployment and mission operations;

7. Sustaining support systems to fully supply and resupply mobilized forces;

8. An effective Defense Department capability to provide immediate benefits and entitlements to the dependents of mobilized Guard and Reserve personnel.

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most powerful incentives for joining and remaining a member of the reserves.

Despite the increased strength achieved in the last five years, manpower shortfalls continue to exist in certain limited but vital areas.

B. EQUIPMENT

Of the manpower-equipment-training triad, equipment is the most critical. Even in an extreme military emergency, manpower shortages can be compensated for far more quickly than equipment shortages. In a crisis a warplane, a missile, or a tank not already in the hands of troops cannot be arrayed against a foe. It must be produced, and that requires time, the commodity least available in military emergencies.

A particularly ominous facet of the equipment problem is the impending obsolescence of entire generations and models of weapons systems. Because they have too long operated with outmoded equipment handed down by active units, many Guard and Reserve units possess weapons which are outdated for modern warfare. This equipment is frequently non-deployable due to age, and non-sustainable in combat due to shortages in replacement parts. It is also operationally incompatible with the more modern equipment possessed by the active force.

Another equipment problem facing the Services and reserve components to varying degrees is that of equipment incompatibility, e.g. radios which cannot "talk" to one another. Furthermore, maintenance equipment required for various weapons systems are often in short supply, and present additional incompatibility problems. Finally, special tool sets and test equipment are not always available as necessary to reserve units.

For the reserves, equipment problems bring debilitating deficiencies in their wake. They often degrade training, cripple readiness and combat effectiveness, and increase maintenance costs. They undermine recruitment and retention. And, in the most extreme of circumstances, they subject reservists to unwarranted safety hazards -- in training as well as in combat.

The strategy for solving equipment problems must be based on the integrated approach inherent in Total Force Policy. Equipment acquisition and distribution must reflect the deployment times and missions assigned both active and reserve units. Forces which deploy and fight first must be equipped first, irrespective of component. Clearly unacceptable are any procurement procedures which force Active and Reserve Components to compete as adversaries for the equipment needed to train and fight effectively. On June 21, 1982, Secretary Weinberger provided explicit direction on this issue:

"Active and Reserve units deploying at the same time should have equal claim on modern equipment inventories... Our defense program (must) produce compatible, responsive and sustainable combat, combat support, and combat service support forces throughout the active, Guard and Reserve force and support structure."

C. TRAINING

Training for mission requirements is perhaps the single most important input to establishing readiness. Historically, training has been based on doctrine, regulations, and training manuals, augmented by field exercises. However, lack of specifics regarding wartime missions imparted both vagueness and a lack of reality to training activities. These have been replaced by the demands of concrete mission requirements imposed by the Total Force Policy and, more precisely, by active-reserve unit alignments such as the Army's CAPSTONE program.

Significant improvements in training have resulted from joint participation of Active and Reserve Components in exercises. This has established the working relationships necessary for effective integrated force action. Too often in the past, reserve units have trained alone, failing to develop the coordination linkages and skills which are required when a reserve unit is mobilized and becomes part of a large military organization.

In another key area, training has been improved by more rigorous testing and evaluation of reserve unit performance and mobilization readiness. Reserve units train to active force standards and are evaluated by the active force. Uniform standards for measuring performance and capability are applied without distinction between active and reserve component. Total Force Policy in fact allows no room for distinction. The morale and esprit de corps of the reserve cannot be maintained by anything less than performance equivalency throughout the Total Force.

In order to accelerate the improvements being made in readiness, funding for manpower, equipment and training must be sufficient to support each of these readiness elements adequately. Concurrently, management strategies must keep all of them in relative balance. The Guard and Reserve are ready: adequate funds and good management will make them more ready.

V. MOBILIZATION

Total Force Policy recognizes that combat ready reserve forces, supported by an effective mobilization system, are essential components of America's deterrent and war fighting capability. The significance of effective mobilization procedures has, in the past, been overlooked. This occurred despite the fact that military assets residing in the reserve can be of only marginal value in a conflict unless they are

mobilized, that is, brought from a peacetime status in which they train and conduct routine mission operations , to a wartime status in which they become an integral part of operational forces.

The importance of effective mobilization procedures is no longer underestimated. Beginning in 1978, a series of mobilization exercises, conducted jointly by the Office of the Secretary of Defense , the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments, has focused on testing the planning and execution of mobilization. These exercises have identified both strengths and weaknesses in mobilization procedures. The weaknesses are being diagnosed and remedied on a priority basis. In both theoretical and practical terms, a more systematic approach to mobilization has been achieved. The Colloquium for which this paper was prepared is symbolic of this encouraging development.

The value of the Guard and Reserve to both deterrent and war capabilities is increasing in direct proportion to the significant improvements being made in the mobilization system.

VI. MAKING MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF GUARD AND RESERVE ASSETS

Precisely because they have become full and essential partners in the Total Force, members of the Guard and Reserve should -- and must -- make the maximum contribution to national

defense of which they are capable. The concluding portion of this paper will examine innovations in defense management procedures, within both Active and Reserve Components, which can promote that objective.

The responsibility for innovation rests heavily with active force staff organizations and military commands. They establish procedures whereby the Department of Defense manages its daily business and its manpower resources. Those procedures shape the options available to reservists for contributing their expertise to defense operations. A review of those procedures suggests that by making selected modifications, or by extending applications of existing practices, citizen-soldiers can more effectively support America's defense programs.

There are numerous options under study, or actually currently being used. From the perspective of administrative procedures, greater flexibility in adjusting drill requirements to reservists' civilian career demands is a promising option. Some reservists, such as physicians and highly specialized technical consultants, cannot readily meet routine training requirements. Procedures which permit, in certain critically essential skills, a lower rate of participation can enable such individuals to participate in the reserve. Participation of this type can be particularly appropriate when the reservist is a fully qualified professional in his military specialty, in which case peacetime duties constitute, in essence, proficiency and

skill maintenance rather than training. Such skill maintenance assignments contribute directly and substantially to the daily mission operations of the active component.

Extended applications of existing procedures would also enable the Defense Department to make better use of reservists during periods of rising military tension. Much of the increased utilization could in fact be achieved by volunteers, that is, reservists who serve in a voluntary, paid status prior to mobilization. The pre-hostility phase of a period of rising tension provides the opportunity to ready the Total Force. Particularly important are incremental readiness enhancement measures which improve deterrence and crisis management capabilities, while concurrent^{ly} posturing the force for rapid mobilization should deterrence and crisis containment fail.

Individual Mobilization Augmentees can support a wide variety of missions and functions while in voluntary duty status. They can (1) augment intelligence indications and warning and crisis management center operations; (2) assist planning staffs to review and update mobilization and operations plans; and (3) work with logistics planners whose workloads will increase significantly as pre-mobilization readiness measures are taken in vital support areas.

Likewise, unit members can make important contributions during periods of crisis management to enhance force readiness.

They can perform accelerated maintenance, make last-minute reviews of transportation and deployment plans, ready the personnel system to support expeditious mobilization, help prepare active installations for a rapid influx of mobilized Guard and Reserve units, and assist active units to expedite deployment preparations. These activities serve the dual purpose of helping contain the crisis while laying the foundation for mobilization should that become necessary.

Mechanisms exist for employing Guard and Reserve personnel in a voluntary status during certain contingencies. Scheduled drill dates can be modified so reservists can perform emergency duty with active forces impacted by the crisis, or take readiness enhancement measures within their own units. Extra duty days can be scheduled and funded through active or reserve personnel funding accounts. Additional duty can be performed for reserve retirement points only.

Despite constraints imposed by civilian job responsibilities, Guard and Reserve personnel can often arrange their schedules to accommodate voluntary duty workloads. And, because many reservists have already served voluntarily in numerous contingencies, the precedent for such employment is well established.

Opportunities abound for more extensive employment of reservists in normal peacetime periods. For example, at the

staff level, a member of an intelligence reserve program who is a ^{member} corporate planner, and who would serve in wartime in intelligence plans, can perform required active duty during the period each year when planning inputs are developed for budget submissions. Such work would allow the reservist to make a meaningful contribution to an important task during a peak load period. It would also provide an opportunity for the reservist to inform active force colleagues of major advances in planning techniques which may have occurred in the private sector.

In addition to annual active duty, the reservist can also work with the active force four or eight hours during a normal work day. Reserve pay is based on four-hour increments. Therefore, considerable flexibility exists to structure tasks and work schedules to accommodate active force business hours and citizen-soldier job constraints. Following the highly successful precedent established by the Air Force Associate Program, both staffs and units could develop a larger array of opportunities for reservists to support daily staff work and mission operations.

Another option available to the active force is to develop mechanisms which enable reserve personnel to perform weekend duty in active force organizations which normally do not operate on weekends. Certain military commands focus much of their work on highly specialized technical and scientific fields. They pursue complex scientific and technical research in fields wherein many

reservists possess considerable civilian expertise. These reservists are available on Saturdays and Sundays to support the research effort.

To employ this valuable asset, one active force staff member could supervise the weekend work of ten reservists possessing the highly specialized technical and research skills needed to compete high priority projects. The staff member could be compensated for weekend duty by time off during the normal work week. Even if that compensatory time included an extra day because the conventional weekend respite had been relinquished, the command would have exchanged eight hours of the staff member's normal duty time for 160 hours of extra support from the reserve community, an obvious bargain.

Other enduring advantages would ensue from such innovative working arrangements: Reservists would obtain broader insights into defense research interests and priorities, thereby increasing their potential for supporting defense research programs; permanent staff and reservists would establish collaborative professional and cordial personal relationships, thereby promoting the "One Force" concept; defense officials would eventually come to know many highly qualified reservists able to provide specialized support through active duty tours, weekend work, and 4 to 8 hour duty increments during normal work days; and both civilian employees and Active Component officers

would develop a better understanding of the extensive and varied professional talent available in the reserve community.

The non-paid voluntary training units existing in some of the Reserve Components constitute another example of a resource which could be more productively utilized to the mutual advantage of both the active force and participating reservists. Composed of citizen-soldiers who are highly seasoned civilian and military professionals, these units can produce staff studies, analyses, and reports which contribute to the Department's work.

More flexible active force management procedures, relatively inexpensive and easy to implement, could capitalize on this valuable resource. A staff officer in selected agencies could identify important projects compatible with skills available in a unit, prepare the projects for assignment to reservists, and transmit them to the training facility; or, the staff member could bring the prepared projects to the facility, devote a few weekend hours to explaining them and, if necessary, assist in their completion. Assistance could also be provided by phone.

In addition to steps which could be taken by the active force to better utilize citizen-soldiers, ample opportunities for innovation also exist within the Reserve Component. Reservists must devise new and innovative ways for supporting the Active Component. For example, reservists who are foreign area specialists could sponsor seminars on the politico-military

affairs of nations or regions of special interest to defense officials, civilian and military. The seminars could be held at universities or military facilities, and could be held on a one-time or continuing basis. And, they could be timed to coincide with recurring staff actions so that the presentation would be of specific value to the Active Component for the mission at hand. Bibliographies, summaries of research in progress, and outlines of major topics addressed would add further value to the presentations.

Reservists who are research scholars have the opportunity to pursue topics which meet the dual criteria of scholarly relevance and utility to the defense community. Manpower management, financial analysis, organizational and human resource development, physics, area studies, medicine, and information science are but a few of many fields in which scholars and defense officials share overlapping concerns.

The reservist employed as a senior executive in a plant producing military equipment, such as missiles, could, with relatively little difficulty, develop orientation programs for active force counterparts whose job knowledge would be enhanced by greater familiarity with missile production techniques. Missile crew members are obvious candidates for visits to missile production plants. But so are intelligence officers who monitor missile deployments of potentially hostile forces.

Many reservists are teachers and university professors who can, from time to time, devote an entire summer or sabbatical leave to an extended tour of active duty. That is more than enough time to make a significant contribution to an important defense project.

Willingness to contribute more extensively to the nation's defense effort is widespread among reservists. With a fine sense of cooperation and mutual understanding, they must play a leadership role in expanding the ways in which the Guard and Reserve support active force staff and field operations.

VII. CONCLUSION

Total Force Policy, and the milestone in its evolution marked by the concept that reserve forces are not merely forces in reserve, provide the opportunity to achieve optimum employment of reserve forces during peacetime, during periods of military tension, and in wartime. The advances being made in equipping the Total Force, coupled with sustained improvements in mobilization plans and procedures, reinforce those opportunities. With full acceptance of the "One Force" concept, and skillful innovation within both the Active and Reserve Components, the Guard and Reserve can and will contribute in full measure to the nation's defense. Moreover it will be understood fully that the citizen-soldier is just as surely a military professional as he or she is a civilian professional. Properly trained, adequately

equipped, and effectively integrated into the daily business of national defense, citizen-soldiers have become distinguishable from active force comrades-in-arms solely by the fact that in peacetime, they serve on a part-time basis.

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

A survey and Analysis of Selected
PME Service Schools to Determine the
Extent to Which Guard and Reserve
Component Education is Included in
Their Academic Programs.

Prepared by

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Naval War College

This paper was prepared in support of
Panel V: The Guard and Reserve and
Their Mobilization: Instruction,
Research, and Doctrine.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report includes a survey of eight of the nine major PME service schools, and is focused on the similarities and differences in their approach to providing education on the guard and reserve. In general, the findings support the contention that more could be done in the areas of reserve force education and emphasis within the service schools, and that some schools are doing much more than others. The report also suggests the types of reserve force issues that might be included to a greater extent in the PME curricula.

In an effort to investigate and evaluate more closely the allegation that guard and reserve component mobilization has been, and is being generally neglected as a subject of significant academic study and applied research, an informal survey was initiated for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the current curricula offered at our major service schools in regard to guard and reserve component education. In addition, an effort was made to gauge the general school philosophy towards involving and educating its resident students in guard and reserve component matters. Presumably, the collection of this information represents an initial step in evaluating, and possibly altering our graduate-level efforts at presenting and analyzing the guard and reserve contributions both in peacetime and war. This in turn, could lead to a greater understanding, appreciation, and utilization of our guard and reserve in various defense-related areas such as mobilization, strategic deterrence, mission integration, and peacetime operations, among others.

The evaluation of any subject area within an institution of higher learning involves and requires an analysis of the overall educational objectives and priorities of the school, as well as an assessment of the underlying rationale for the education of its students. Within the Department of Defense, there exists the requirement for the development and maintenance of a highly professional, well educated, and specially trained officer corps capable of leading our country's military forces. Among the many programs designed to achieve this end are those included under the

general rubric of professional military education (PME), a DOD-wide effort described in Air Force regulations as the "systematic acquisition of theoretical and applied knowledge of the profession of arms." This effort for all the military services is generally aimed at broadening the perspective and knowledge of military officers about the use, function and value of military force, as well as increasing their awareness about its integrative nature. PME is frequently considered to be a sequentially organized, graduate-level effort aimed at preparing military officers for increasing levels of responsibility and decision-making. It often involves inter-service ("Total Force") considerations and implications which allow for a wide diversity of educational license at each DOD institution charged with providing PME. Moreover, each military branch places a different interpretation and perspective on professional military education as a process. As a result, PME content, emphasis, and importance varies within each service, and its effectiveness in channeling officer development becomes a function of service traditions, needs, and characteristics.

These factors all significantly influence the structure of our service schools' missions and curricula, and they have a direct bearing on the desirability, relevance, and integration of guard and reserve considerations into their core courses. Clearly, each service has a different degree of peacetime and wartime dependence upon guard and reserve components in carrying out its assigned missions. The extent of these largely inherent differences creates and calls for variances in the approach to training, using, and teaching about the guard and reserve. It would not be at all surprising, for instance, to find a greater emphasis on guard and

College than at the Naval War College simply because of the heavy Army reliance upon reservists to support deployment in the event of mobilization. In any event, the curricula of the service schools are shaped by interpretations of service missions and priorities, officer educational requirements, traditions, and other institutional pressures. The treatment of guard and reserve matters within each school, just like all other subject areas, can be expected to be influenced by these same factors. (At this point, a review of Appendices I through X is suggested to the reader prior to continuing).

FINDINGS

A review of Appendices (I) through (X) supports some of the themes stated or implied in the preceding introduction. Our service schools do have different missions; their degree of academic emphasis varies considerably among many, similar-sounding subject-areas; their programs are dynamic, yet somewhat institutionalized by their traditions and bias; and while their educational methodologies are very similar, the scope of their academic programs and their approach to PME varies widely.

Among the schools surveyed, the most common practice for incorporating guard and reserve component information into the core curricula is to take an integrative approach. That is, considerations of guard and reserve force issues and information are contained most frequently within broader functional headings, as opposed to being separately highlighted and studied. Whereas each of the schools presents small curriculum segments on guard and

reserve mechanics (organization, mission, equipment, etc), the utilization and exploitation of reserve force assets tends to be subsumed under broader areas of political/military concern, including among others, considerations of the "Total Force" and mobilization. The Total Force concept, as generally interpreted by each school, is a conceptual device for considering their active and reserve components as the common source through which the service mission can be accomplished. In contrast, and not surprisingly, the DOD service schools surveyed (ICAF and AFSC) take a broader view of the total force by including all services, as well as the civilian sector and our Allies. This difference in perspective influences the approach taken by each school in integrating guard and reserve component matters into their academic programs. In general, the result is that the information given out about reserve forces is usually service-specific and includes very little, if any, consideration of the other services' reserve force capabilities and organization. Despite the extensive and impressive array of electives programs offered at our service schools to enable students to gain greater insight into various subjects of interest, there are only two elective courses (of the more than 300 offered) which focus on reserve force issues or information.

Finally, the extent to which guard and reserve officers are included as participants in the service school programs is considerable. Each school has National Guard or reserve component members included within its resident student body (some have many more than others); each school has separate guard and reserve

have reserve or National Guard officers on active duty as staff and faculty members. The net effect of these efforts is to insure that reserve force perspectives, issues, and information is included as part of the experience of all service school students. This Reserve presence in the classroom, however, does not guarantee that all the appropriate active/reserve force issues are identified, discussed, or exploited.

In summary, all the service schools surveyed included some discussion of guard and reserve forces and their various mobilization roles. Generally speaking, however, the extent and depth of the academic discussion is rather narrowly focused on certain elements of the reserve force picture, and is often more informational than analytic in nature. Overall, the findings of this survey support the general contention that guard and reserve force issues, and mobilization as a national and international process - though not neglected - are treated less comprehensively than many other subject areas taught at our PME schools.

A FINAL ANALYSIS

The service schools surveyed for this report offer a wide variety of graduate-level educational programs in order to achieve their various objectives. Ostensibly, the professional military education provided by these schools will make our military forces stronger and smarter². In accomplishing this mission, it's necessary to decide what's important and what isn't, and then incorporate as many of the important issues and concepts as possible into a curriculum usually lasting less than a year. Goals must

be set; priorities established; and trade-offs are inevitable. By any reasonable yardstick reserve force issues are important, and they have become increasingly so over the past ten years as the U.S. military organization and presence have evolved in response to national and international pressures.

When properly organized and utilized, reserve forces unquestionably add a significant and impressive dimension to our nation's military strength and preparedness. In this sense, our reserve forces act as a strategic deterrent and force multiplier equal in effectiveness to active duty forces. Awareness and acceptance of this fact gives rise to the following types of questions for curriculum planners and researchers: What information about reserve forces is important? How should it be presented? To what extent should reserve force information be presented in isolation from active forces, and to what extent should it be integrated? Can important perspectives and synergies be found from the study and analysis of reserve forces as a whole, or should each component be separately considered? What are the relationships between active and reserve forces, and which ones are critical? Can reserve forces be more fully utilized, exploited, or integrated into our country's military effort? How can we maximize the potential of our country's reserve components? What relationships exist between reserve forces and concepts like mobilization; strategic deterrence; long wars and short wars; defense economics; military readiness, etc.?

Clearly, there are many significant areas of academic interest to consider in the general field of mobilization and reserve force utilization. The graduate-level PME curricula currently set up in our service schools are impressive in their scope, organization, and depth. Their academic programs include a great deal of guard

and reserve force interface with active duty members, and a significant amount of information transfer is occurring. If it is determined that mobilization and reserve force issues need more emphasis at our PME institutions, the mechanisms and capabilities are already in place to bring it about.

APPENDIX INFORMATION

The following appendices list each of the major service colleges of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, as well as two of the three joint service colleges operated by the National Defense University. A description of their operations and approaches to presenting guard and reserve education to their students is summarized, along with a brief assessment. Most of the information contained within the appendices was obtained from reviews of the school catalogs and published curricula, as well as from direct telephone liaison. Clearly, a cursory survey of the curricula of these schools, accomplished at long distance and over a short period of time can only be considered an opinion based on incomplete knowledge. Assessing an academic institution's educational approach and priorities requires considerably more familiarity and time than is represented by this report. However, the findings of this survey are presented within these appendices along with some brief assessments. They are offered in the spirit of the colloquium setting and, if for no other reason, for the purpose of stimulating discussion.



27 September 1983

From: Reserve Affairs Office, Naval War College
To: Army War College
Army Command and General Staff College
Air War College
Air Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Armed Forces Staff College

Subj: Request for information concerning Reserve Force
curriculum materials at your institution

Encl: (1) OSD memorandum for the President, Naval War College
of 22 August 1983
(2) NDU Colloquium Notice

1. Recently I was invited to attend an OSD-sponsored "colloquium" to be held at National Defense University during the first week of November. I was also asked by the conference coordinator to prepare a brief written report on graduate-level PME efforts going on at our major service schools in the general area of reserve force education currently being offered to your student body. Although the overall theme of the colloquium centers around the issues and mechanics of mobilization, a key related topic is the extent to which we educate our military officers about our reserve forces as they pass through our service schools. Enclosures (1) and (2) provide additional details.

2. If at all possible, I would like to obtain the following information/materials from you to help make the colloquium presentation:

- a. A current school catalog.
- b. A description of all your current courses being offered.
- c. A general statement from you concerning the approach your school takes towards presenting reserve force information to your resident students - i.e., an informational or analytic approach; a required or optional approach; a comprehensive or cursory approach; a peripheral or integrative approach; etc.
- d. A description of any current initiatives underway to alter your present reserve force offerings or your philosophy toward educating regular officer students about our reserve components.
- e. Any course materials relating directly to mobilization.

27 September 1983

Subj: Request for information concerning Reserve Force
curriculum materials at your institution

- f. The current school definition of "Total Force".
- g. Any other materials or information you think might be relevant or helpful.

/S/P. J. LUMIANSKI

Mission

To prepare graduates for senior leadership positions in the Army, Department of Defense, and related departments and agencies by professional military education in national security affairs with emphasis on the development and employment of military forces in land warfare.

School Size/Course Length

Approximately 250 senior U.S. and foreign officers attend a ten and one-half month course of instruction.

Academic Programs

Three phases of academic instruction are provided which include a Common Overview, and Electives Phase, and a National Security Seminar as the year's capstone activity. Within the Common Overview segment are a series of ten smaller, sequentially organized courses built around several unifying themes. Included among the course subject areas are Requirements of the Professional; War, Politics, and Strategy; Planning and Decision-Making, Leadership; and Applications of Power. A large electives program covers over fifty different subjects of interest. A research program centered on strategic studies is available to selected students.

Educational Methodology

Reading, writing, oral presentations, seminars, lectures, research. Grades and exams are not given.

Guard and Reserve Interface

* Included as a theme for the entire AWC academic year is the Total Army concept which implies that the consideration of Guard and Reserve components is an accepted and integral part of all courses. Guard and Reserve Force capabilities are discussed in detail, and a mobilization exercise is included as part of the series of Common Overview courses.

* A group of about 48 senior reserve officers are included each year for two weeks in the resident course during the Planning and Decision-Making segment.

* About twenty Guard and Reserve officers are included each year as part of the resident student body.

* Among the electives offered is one on mobilization management and another on comparative military systems, both of which consider Guard and Reserve issues.

Assessment

With over half of the U.S. Army's deployable force structure in National Guard and Army Reserve Units, it would be difficult to leave guard and reserve considerations out of the AWC course of instruction. In fact, guard and reserve issues are made an integral part of the course, and a strong effort is directed at making resident students aware of the strategic importance and value of the reserve components. The views and opinions of reservists are sought out, and mobilization as a process is considered in some detail. In addition, the Mobilization Management elective course allows for a closer, analytic view of the mobilization process, and leads to reflections on how that process might be improved. Despite the fact that the guard and reserve history and philosophy is not specifically studied, the reserve force orientation at AWC is both comprehensive and relevant.

Mission

To provide instruction worldwide, for officers of the active and reserve components and to prepare them for duty as field grade commanders and principal staff officers at brigade and higher echelons.

School Size/Course Length

Nearly 1200 students are enrolled in the ten resident courses given each year. The courses range in length from the ten-month regular course to one-week refresher courses.

Academic Programs

The core curriculum of the regular course is divided into nine sub-courses which include staff operations; command and staff analytic techniques; tactics; combat service support; national security affairs; applied military history; theater operations and planning; military exercises; and leadership. An extensive electives program is offered with over 120 subject areas listed including a number of contract courses. A number of special education and research programs are offered in strategy and history, as well as a wide range of civilian university study opportunities. A Masters of Military Art and Science degree is a congressionally authorized option for CGSC students who are accepted into the program, produce a thesis, and pass an oral exam.

Educational Methodology

Reading, writing, self-paced instruction, lectures, seminars, tactical exercises, individual and group efforts, exams, oral presentations, individual officer training reports and letter grades.

Guard and Reserve Interface

* Guard and reserve component organization, capabilities, and mobilization roles are discussed frequently throughout the regular course curriculum. Mobilization and strategic mobility planning make-up a significant portion of the combat service support phase of instruction, and reserve component National Guard considerations are included within the tactical exercises.

* For the first 19-week term, over 100 guard and reserve officers are included in the resident student body as regular seminar members.

* Among the electives offered is a ten-week course entitled "Reserve Components" which addresses in detail the missions

and organization of National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units, and describes their relationships to the active components.

- * An extensive, world-wide USAR school course is offered at 350 locations each year, and is taught by reservists serving as members of the U.S. Army Reserve schools.

- * Approximately ten guard and reserve officers are on the faculty/staff at CGSC.

- * The three month Combined Arms and Services Staff School for O-3s meets three times a year and includes 25 National Guard officers in each class.

- * Four one-week refresher courses are offered each year to nearly 600 guard and reserve officers in the areas of armored cavalry, support command operations, and instructor orientation.

Assessment

Resident students at the CGSC are exposed to a substantial amount of guard and reserve component literature and discussion which is presented within the core curriculum. Reserve forces are discussed not only in the context of the Total Army Force, but also within a wider mobilization and combined arms scenario. More guard and reserve officer participation exists at Ft. Leavenworth than at any other service school, both within the student body and on the staff/faculty. Still, despite a clear emphasis on guard and reserve considerations, an analytic study of improving and exploiting U.S. reserve force assets for peacetime and combat use is not apparent in the various course offerings.

Mission

To enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions, and to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the future employment of naval forces.

School Size/Course Length

Approximately 400 resident U.S. and foreign students enrolled in the five different courses ranging in length from six weeks to ten months, and all housed in one college complex under the direction of a single president.

Academic Programs

Three core curricula including Employment of Naval Forces, Policy and Strategy, and Defense Economics and Decision-Making. A wide ranging electives program with nearly forty different course offerings. A number of research programs concentrated on military issues involving the study and refinement of maritime strategy and tactics. A large war-gaming facility is an integral part of the War College and its academic programs.

Educational Methodology

Reading, writing, lectures, seminars, oral presentations, war gaming exercises, and graded examinations. Most activities include both individual and team efforts. Overall effort is graded. Standardized fitness reports are written.

Reserve Component Interface

- * Guard and reserve component information on roles, missions and equipment is presented during the initial week of classes, called Total Forces Week.
- * An orientation/field trip is conducted annually by the Rhode Island National Guard. The program is optional for Navy students.
- * Reserve force issues and contributions are mentioned occasionally and as appropriate in two of the core resident curricula, the Selection and Application of Naval Forces, and in the Defense Economics and Decision-Making Course.
- * About six reservists and guardsmen are included in the resident student body each year. Nearly 500 reservists perform ACDUTRA at the Naval War College annually, including 240 officers enrolled in three, two-week reserve officer courses, and 140 officers who participate in war gaming activities.

* NWC employs a full-time Reserve Affairs Officer to manage reserve activities at the college.

Assessment

The Naval War College includes appropriate information about guard and reserve forces throughout its various courses of instruction. Generally, however, guard and reserve component issues are not highlighted, but are subsumed under much broader subject headings. There is very little analytic focus on mobilization or reserve force organization and exploitation in peacetime or war. The Naval War College promotes and encourages an active involvement by reservists in all phases of its academic, research and administrative programs.

Mission

To prepare select officers for eventual assignment to key command and staff assignments where they will be tasked with responsibility for developing, managing, and employing air-power as a component of national security.

School Size/Course Length

Approximately 235 U.S. military officers and civilians and representatives from allied countries are enrolled in a ten-month course of instruction. About another 300 Air Force officer and civilian personnel attend a Combined Air Warfare Course given eight times a year in two-week and six-week time-frames.

Academic Programs

The core curriculum is divided into three sub-courses, including Military Employment, National Security Affairs, and Leadership and Management. Within the military employment course are four major phases including Military Strategy, Soviet Military, General Purpose Force Employment, and Strategic Force Employment. In addition a 30-course elective program is available from which three electives must be chosen. The AWC runs a large associate seminar program as well as a correspondence program, and has recently begun the development of a war-gaming facility.

Educational Methodology

Reading, writing, lectures, seminars, case studies, simulation exercises, research, individual training reports.

Guard and Reserve Interface

* Included within the regular curriculum are a number of sessions which detail the organizational structure and integration of the Air National Guard and Air Force reserve components into the Total Air Force team. In addition, an Air Reserve Forces "Issues" seminar is held which is led by guard and reserve officers. A rapid deployment joint exercise includes concentration on reserve and guard readiness and mobilization issues. Mobilization problems and considerations provide a major theme within the leadership and management sub-course.

* Three, two-week ANG/USAFR senior officer courses are held each year, with the 108 reservists being integrated directly into the regular student seminars. In addition two, two-week guard/reserve officer Combined Air Warfare courses are held each year.

* Ten guard and reserve officers are included in the resident course as students, and two reservists are assigned as AWC staff/faculty members.

* A full-time reserve officer is employed to manage AWC reserve programs.

Assessment

The Air War College program includes a comprehensive review of guard and reserve organization, missions, and capabilities within its regular curriculum. In addition, it makes a concerted effort to integrate reservists into its student body and highlight their participation in the Total Air Force effort. Within the instructional/reading materials are included frank discussions of current Air Reserve Force problems and misconceptions, as well as a summary of their historical roots. Very little curriculum time is devoted to the strategic value and integration of U.S. reserve components as a whole, nor to the general problems of national mobilization.

Mission

To provide intermediate level professional military education for field grade officers of the Marine Corps; other services; and foreign countries; to prepare them for command and staff duties with Marine air-ground task forces with emphasis in amphibious operations and assignments with departmental, joint, combined and high level service organizations.

School Size/Course Length

Approximately 160 resident U.S. and foreign students enrolled in a ten-month course of instruction.

Academic Programs

Three basic areas of study including Command, Landing Force Operations, and Battle Studies and Strategy. Included within the courses of instruction are a series of tactical exercises. Although an electives program is not available, time is allocated within the core curriculum to investigate selected areas of interest in greater detail.

Educational Methodology

Reading, writing, lectures, seminars, tactical exercises, exams, individual fitness reports.

Reserve Component Interface

- * The "Total Force" concept is emphasized throughout the resident curriculum and active/reserve force integration is frequently discussed. All students are exposed to the Marine Corps Reserve organization and role during the two-week "self-paced" refresher course that starts the academic year. Another look at the Marine Corps Reserve is offered later in the year with a four hour time block of instruction, seminar and lecture.
- * Reservists are employed during the course to help support and operate the large tactical exercises given as part of the curriculum.
- * Two, two-week reserve officer courses are offered each summer to about 200 Marine Corps reservists.
- * A small number of Guard and Army Reservists are included as part of the resident student body.

Assessment

An effort is made throughout the year to integrate appropriate active and reserve force concerns and priorities into the resident curriculum. Very little time is spent focusing

directly on reserve component issues, and no attempt is made at analyzing the overall guard and reserve force contribution and meaning. The Marine Corps Reserve role and organization within the total Marine Corps force is clearly laid out, however.

Mission

To prepare selected military officers and senior career civilian officers for positions of high trust in the federal government.

School Size/Course Length

Approximately 210 U.S. military officers and civilians are enrolled in a ten-month course of instruction.

Academic Programs

A five phase core curricula consisting of Executive Skills Development; National Security and Mobilization Management; Manpower Resources Management; Industrial Resources Management; and a Joint Exercise Phase. An extensive electives program of over fifty course offerings from which students must select at least six per year.

Educational Methodology

Heavy emphasis on student involvement, with reading, research papers, war gaming and mobilization exercises, lectures, seminars and case studies. Individual and team efforts stressed.

Guard and Reserve Component Interface

* Major focus of the ICAF curriculum is on the broad topic of mobilization with a capital "M". Industrial mobilization, manpower mobilization and mobilization management are key topic areas discussed throughout the academic year. Within the Phase III core curriculum is a heavy emphasis on the Total Force components, the active/reserve force interface, and the military mobilization process itself.

* Included within the Phase III segment of instruction is a ten-session manpower mobilization exercise during which time the students must formulate, analyze, and refine policy options to reduce manpower shortfalls under mobilization scenarios.

* Each year about ten guard and reserve officers are included in the resident course.

Assessment

ICAF offers a thorough and comprehensive study of national mobilization as a process from both a macro and micro perspective. The curriculum provides the student with a detailed look at all the significant issues involved with mobilization, as well as a broad appreciation of its strategic importance. Guard and reserve components are treated as a part of a much larger overall system which must be managed and organized in

response to national needs. The reserve components themselves are not looked at in great detail, but their existence and general structure is discussed and analyzed in relation to current issues. Organizational, philosophic, historic, and resource allocation perspectives about reserve forces are not considered in any great depth.

Mission

To prepare mid-career officers for joint and combined staff duty.

School Size/Course Length

Approximately 280 U.S. and foreign mid-career officers from all the military services and seven Allied countries, along with Defense Department civilians from twelve different agencies. Two, five and one-half month courses are given each year, along with five other shorter courses, ranging in length from six weeks to one week.

Academic Programs

The three principal academic programs offered at AFSC include the Joint and Combined Staff Officer Course; the Joint Command, Control and Communications Staff and Operations Course; and the Joint Electronic Warfare Staff Officer Course. The longest course, the Joint and Combined Staff Officer Course, includes segments on Joint/Combined Operations Planning; International Studies; Defense Management; Communication Arts; and U.S. military forces among others. Also included is a twenty-course electives program.

Educational Methodology

Reading, writing, speaking, lectures, seminars, written exams, officer training/effectiveness reports.

Guard and Reserve Component Interface

- * Some mention of reserve forces is integrated into the regular curriculum, particularly the U.S. military forces segment. Some reference to mobilization is made during the Joint/Combined Operations Planning phase.
- * Five guard or reserve officers are included in each resident JCSOC class.
- * Each JCSOC class includes a two-week segment which integrates about thirty reservists into the resident seminar groups.

Assessment

AFSC does not focus in any significant depth on guard and reserve forces. Modest exposure to reserve component size, organization and assigned missions is included as an integral part of the resident courses, but no analytical treatment of reserve forces or mobilization is given. AFSC is, however, actively engaged in including reservists in their academic programs.

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ACADEMIA'S CONCEPT OF RESERVE FORCES AND MOBILIZATION

BY

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Los Angeles, California

A Paper Presented as Part of Panel V's Discussion of
"The Guard and Reserves and Their Mobilization:
Instruction, Research and Doctrine"

At a Colloquium at the National Defense University
on
Guard and REserve Mobilization:
An Essential Element of Preparedness

Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.
November 3, 1983

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

G-5-1

Introduction

The foreword of College Students' Knowledge and Beliefs: A Survey of Global Understanding¹ says, "Suspensions abound that American higher education, in light of changed world circumstances does not sufficiently prepare the young for their civic roles as they enter the next century... George W. Bonham, Executive Director of the Council on Learning succinctly proffered what many of us in higher education have been certain reflects actual student learning in this area:

America's young face a set of new national and international circumstances about which they have only the faintest of notions. They are, globally speaking, blind, deaf, and dumb; and thus handicapped, they will soon determine the future directions of this nation."

It follows then, that instructors and professors in our colleges and universities must better prepare themselves to train the new generations to be leaders in all fields of endeavor -- the military, industry, private and civic.

Since I am on the administrative staff at the University of Southern California and teach part time at a community college, Colonel Gould appropriately threw me a challenge last summer when I was on a project in his office. He asked, "Are those of you in academia discussing national defense and mobilization-related topics? Do any courses have subject matter that relate to mobilization of the reserve forces? What does academia know about the Reserve and Guard? Why are there so few articles in professional journals on these topics. Are they being discussed by the Reservists?"

I gave Colonel Gould some answers from my own experience and Major Carter added some of his, but I had to admit that I did not know what my fellow academicians, nor for that matter my fellow Reservists, thought about mobilization. And thus began my safari -- full of adventure, quite few dissapointments, but also some delightful surprises, and a broadening of my own scope of mobilization.

This paper presents my findings based on a combination of interviews, discussions, and responses to a random survey with some 50 faculty, and a few graduate and undergraduate students at 30 different schools across the United States.

Recommendations are made for ways to fill the huge gap of knowledge that exists about the Guard, Reserves, and mobilization.

¹Thomas S. Barrows, The Final Report of The Golbal Understanding Project, 1981, Change Magazine Press.

APPROACH TO DETERMINING ACADEMIA'S KNOWLEDGE
ABOUT RESERVE FORCES AND MOBILIZATION

A Cursory Look at What College Students Know About The Subject

The study on global understanding of college students referred to in the Introduction found that a very small proportion of those tested had the level of knowledge necessary for an adequate understanding of global situations and processes. Other findings of interest to us are that there was a strong sense of patriotism ("I'm for my country, right or wrong") and an acceptability of militaristic strength by the participants.²

Unfortunately for my present investigation, there were no questions relating to mobilization or the maintenance of a strong reserve force. However, in a few conversations I had with students at both undergraduate and graduate levels, I found a lack of knowledge about mobilization, Guard, and Reserve. Those who are, or who know others, in the ROTC, the Reserves, or are veterans seemed to have a fairly good knowledge of mobilization and the reserves, although most admitted they really don't know what reservists do. Those students who have had no contact with the military were vague about the meaning of "mobilization," "National Guard," and "Reserves." What's more, there was only polite interest in carrying on the conversation. Examples of the impact that mobilization would have on the university, the community, and industry sparked some interest, but I have a feeling it was short-lived. While not unexpected, this was, nevertheless, disappointment No. 1.

²Op. cit., p. 135.

Long chats were had with the Commanding Officers of the Air Force, Army, and Navy ROTCs at the University of Southern California. A survey response was also received from the Army ROTC at Syracuse University.³ The CO's were in agreement (although the meetings were held separately) that the topic of mobilization was not very appropriate to their students except as the subjects of the National Guard and Reserves were presented. Since these students would be on active duty (generally) in a time of mobilization, and probably would be junior officers, any of the deeper considerations, at this stage of their schooling, would be of little interest to them.

Each of the services, however, have one lecture each semester on the Guard and Reserve Forces. Lesson plans include a discussion of the importance of the Guard and Reserves, how they fit into the overall organization, how they function, and the opportunities they afford to those getting out of service. Lesson plans were made available, together with reference material, and in the case of the Naval ROTC, slides used in the presentation. Senior-level courses are given on national security and defense policy. All CO's expressed a keen interest in the colloquium and asked to be kept informed. In fact, the NROTC asked me to give the lecture about the Reserves to their Freshman class.

Faculty's View of Mobilization and Related Matters

The thrust of my investigation was aimed at graduate faculty. If changes are to be made in the knowledge and beliefs of students, the faculty must first have a good understanding of the topics.

³This was unsolicited but the survey was sent to the ROTC for response by another addressee. Discussion on the survey follows.

A survey of all the universities and colleges in the United States was not possible because of time and budget constraints. I therefore began by interviewing professors at my own University to get a sampling of opinions and also to ask for assistance in developing a mailing list to whom I could direct a survey.

Those of us who have knowledge of the Guard, Reserve Forces, and implications of mobilization and its purposes, needs, and operations, can usually come up with a handful of good illustrations to help the civilian sector relate to the concepts. It seems to me that all it takes is a little understanding and imagination as to how these topics can apply to courses in business administration, political science, international relations, economics, etc. At USC, we have strong programs in all of these and their faculty helped me identify other schools with similarly strong departments as well as ideas for the survey. In addition, the Institute where I work has a large M.S. in Systems Management program, with some 1600 off-campus students mostly at military bases at 65 locations and taught by faculty who have experience and knowledge about manpower planning, modeling, budgeting, procurement -- all mobilization related topics.

As I began this investigation, I was hopeful that all these people would have no trouble responding to my enthusiasm and agreeing that mobilization topics were great stuff for the classroom. You guessed it -- disappointment No. 2! I found it necessary to provide far more examples of related subjects to various disciplines than I thought would be needed, and I found I had to define mobilization and explain the kinds of mobilization possible (e.g., individual, selected, limited, all-out). The discussions, however, were lively, informative, the concerns valid, and the

agreed that the topics were relevant to their classes and that they would use them as examples of possible term paper topics.

Development of the Survey

To determine the level of academic activity and courses, including topics on mobilization-related matters and the reserve forces, 106 letters and survey forms (see Appendix A) were sent to private and public accredited universities all over the United States. In five cases, multiple forms were sent to different departments at the same University. Requests were sent to 88 graduate schools of Business Administration and Economics. Another 18 were sent to a cross-section of disciplines such as political science, public administration, international relations, history, sociology, and human factors, plus senior military colleges (not the Academies).

The 39 responses (37%) were from a fairly good cross-section of this small sample. It may be that the timing of the survey prevented a better sample. Because of summer vacations, it was decided to wait until the beginning of the Fall semester to send out the surveys. Due to the demands of a new school year, the surveys may have been overlooked (disappointment No. 3!). However, the number received gave enough of a variety of responses, questions, and suggestions to indicate the reasons for interests and disinterests. They provide some rich ideas where change can be effected by those of us who care to improve academia's opinions and knowledge about the Reserve Forces and mobilization issues.

Appendix A contains the letter and survey form and schools that responded. Table A-1 groups the surveys sent and received by type of school/department. Names of respondents are available upon request.

Perhaps I will be faulted for surveying more departments and schools at my own university than at other schools. However, I had access to names of people in a number of disciplines and thus got a good cross-section of opinions. And, after all, this small survey was to sample faculty knowledge about the subject, not to be a sophisticated all-out effort.

Findings of The Survey

Fifteen of the 39 respondents said they have courses that relate directly to national defense. Nine schools have 21 graduate students writing papers on related subjects, 14 at the doctoral level, 7 at the Master's, plus an unknown number who are enrolled in the Military Arts & Sciences degree at the Army Command & General Staff College.

Some of the topics of these papers include: Navy Demographics Study; Rapid Deployment; Reserve Forces Reform in the 1950's; Women in the Army; System Reliability; Competition in Defense Contracting; Mobilization in the Nuclear Age; Personnel Management; Retention of Air Force Physicians; Effects of Retirement Benefits.

In answer to the question of whether or not the schools would encourage a thesis or dissertation on mobilization-related topics if research or fellowship money were available, 28 answered yes or maybe, 9 said no (4 do not require a thesis), 2 did not respond. The concerns for such research are quite valid and would have to be carefully addressed in the event DOD makes such funds available. These mainly were the need to have access to solid data, not assumptions, academic freedom of research, unclassified, current data, and library support. Other concerns were that such research would have to be closely related to the discipline and contribute

interests, skills, and objectives. Of course, the research would have to meet university standards with respect to openness of research and dissemination of findings, and be some kind of unrestricted grants, if not a contract. One or two respondents indicated that there were not competent faculty to read dissertations or thesis in these fields. It appears that seminars or information for faculty must be assured before this idea can be further investigated.

The reasons why students would not be encouraged to do such research is equally revealing. Here are some samples:

"Subject of mobilization doesn't directly fit into a business course." "Professors are unwilling to devote time to this subject as compared to similar efforts with business-oriented topics." "Not related to subject matter taught; not related to students' interests; low in student relevance as compared with other subjects." "Little available literature."

Schools Which Offer Courses

Several schools stand out as having courses and encouraging student papers that are directly related to mobilization and Reserve Forces: Oregon State University, Ohio State University, Texas A&M University, California State University at Los Angeles, and the University of Southern California (Economics, Public Administration, and International Relations). Perhaps the foremost among all the respondents was from Yale. Dr. Paul Bracken, Political Science Department and School of Organization and Management, has written, "Mobilization in the Nuclear Age," International Security, Winter 1978/79. This is being revised and will appear in Bissell and McCormick (eds.), Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behavior (Pergamon Press).

The other schools mentioned above have courses that directly relate to national defense, and include information on the reserves and mobilization issues. In some cases, the faculty are active or retired military. These schools and their courses can serve as guidelines for other schools or for course development.

Oregon State: Course, "Economics of National Security," contact Dean Bill Wilkins (Col., USAF-Ret).

Ohio State: Military History and Strategic Studies Program, 4 courses, 2 on national security, 2 on history of military policy. Contact Dr. Alan Millett.

Texas A&M, Dept. of Political Science, 3 courses, "Force and Violence in the Political Process," "American Civil-Military Relations," and "National Defense Policy," (including mobilization and guard/reserve forces). Contact Prof. William Snyder.

Calif State U., L.A.: Center for Armanent & Disarmament. Contact Dr. Richard Burns, USAF-Ret.

USC, School of Public Administration: Program on National Security. Contact Prof. Robert M. Carter (Maj. Gen., USAR, Dept. Chief Forces Command).

USC, College of LAS, Dept. of Economics: course, "National Security Economics. Contact Drs. John Niedercorn or Robert Shishko (Rand).

USC, School of International Relations: Defense and Strategic Studies Program. Courses on mobilization and national defense readiness. Contact Dr. William R. Van Cleave or Dr. Robin Ranger.

While significant, these few programs are not enough to thoroughly cover the research needed, nor to write enough articles to help enlighten other disciplines. My conclusion from the survey and with personal conversations, is that professors either do not know or do not have the interest in researching or are not

not to say that all is lost. The surveys and personal conversations with professors provided some interesting reasons for what might appear at first glance to be dis-interest. Their views, segregated by discipline are enlightening.

History and Political Science

Military historians and political scientists view mobilization planning as useful only for conventional warfare, and the actual call-up of any reserves as a way to counteract a show of force or a political situation that would have a hint of real confrontation. They feel that any war between super powers will involve nuclear weapons, making responses so rapid that mobilization, and especially the communication to effect mobilization, would be useless. Wars between non-nuclear powers, on a more local basis (Lebanon, Afganistan, etc.) contain a threat of nuclear weapons usage if super powers become involved. As a topic for teaching strategy, mobilization then becomes somewhat more attractive as an example, especially using historical events. The problem, as they see it, is that there are few faculty with sufficient knowlege or military experience to teach national defense courses. This was a concern echoed in all the other disciplines, and it is an area that bears more investigation to see if teachers are being prepared and being attracted to colleges. It appears that people who are experienced and have teaching credentials are being attracted to consulting and industry rather than to education, but there is no scientific proof for this statement.

Dr. Judy Steihn, Political Science Department at USC, said she realizes there is not much being written on mobilization by political scientists. However, she feels this is not due to a lack of interest, nor is the average American disinterested. Rather, it seems rooted in the fact that the model for American thought is from debate to agreement, with a series of discussions in which citizens can dissent, agree, or negotiate. "Military actions, and for that matter, discussions about military mobilization, doesn't fit with our creed as formed by this model," she said. Political Scientists don't see force as being a way of resolving a matter. War by force is not a popular topic and mobilization smacks of trying to solve an international situation by military threat or action rather than by negotiation. There is, therefore, a tendency to repress the subject rather than discuss it.

International Relations

This same thought was echoed by a PhD candidate in International Relations, who said that some students and scholars seem to have this fear that if they talk about war and mobilization it is likely to happen. A faculty comment in the survey was that most graduate students have other interests at this time but this may have to do with poor library material on the subject and inadequate monetary resources needed to support serious research in any of the topic areas.

Although speaking for himself, another faculty member said he felt he knows the International Relations professional (academic) field well enough to say that subjects of mobilization are part of most curricula, but are not addressed in separate lesson plans. If they need to be more aware of mobilization matters they need to know why.

For example, they need to be shown how the issues of mobilization and the Reserve Forces would affect national security and defense policy, both from the military and/or economic standpoint to include force structures and defense budgets.

Although students in International Relations would like to do some articles on our topics, there is a minimum market for articles on mobilization. One faculty member said that perhaps one of the major academic journals might publish an article if it had an unusual twist to it, but so far there was not enough information available on an unclassified level to provide a different approach. Right now, no one seems to be making a reputation as a writer, instructor, or student in the areas of mobilization, so there is no following.

Those in International Relations, as in the other disciplines, felt that mobilization was not a concern of theirs for any in-depth research. Whatever situation might arise that would call for mobilization, they feel, would be handled by programs already in place and not subject to civilian influence.

Economics and Public Administration

Economists and Public Administration faculty are quite aware of the implications of mobilization and the use of Guard and Reserve Forces. They tend to focus on their own areas of expertise rather than an expanded study of national defense economics, but this would vary depending on funding available and student interest.

A concern expressed by several faculty is the employability of students. This must be a consideration in guiding a student toward a thesis or dissertation. Research in an area, such as cost of security systems (cost/benefit ratios), administration of resources

and public systems in a crisis situation, manpower planning, etc., if studied from a civilian viewpoint might make a student's chances of being hired better than if the research were concentrated on a military approach. Encouragement of theses and research on mobilization-related topics (unless emphasizing civilian sectors) would be influenced by these and similar concerns.

Business Administration/Systems Management

Many graduate degree programs in these disciplines are intensive in nature, with specific requirements for courses in an area of emphasis. This leaves little opportunity for extra courses or research that might be devoted to mobilization related topics.

What seems to be overlooked is that these topics pervade all business areas and need not be lumped into a separate course. Examples about how mobilization would affect every aspect of the business community, and of the management that would be required in any kind of mobilization, are needed.

The most common statement in the surveys was that the topics had little relationship to business or management or that they do not appear to have high relevance to the courses offered. One respondent added, "I'm sure there are interesting organizational or communicative and human resource management issues (in mobilization), but I, like most of my colleagues, know so little about this area that it is difficult to discuss what they are."

Another concern in these fields is that for research to be encouraged, better source material would be needed than at present and the topics would have to be relevant to the student's course of study. About the only area where there seem to be a recognition of relevance and also available materials is in the area of transportation and logistics, and to some extent the industrial base.

Findings in General

Although this investigation of what academia knows about the Guard, Reserve Forces, and mobilization was of short duration and rather narrowly focused, it confirmed what those of us who are reservists and who are part of academia suspected -- academia (both students and faculty) in general have little interest in these subjects. Or, because of a lack of data, do not rate them of prime importance in their areas of study. Perhaps this is due to another perception, and that is that there is little expectation in academia that the US would get into a situation which would require mobilization. Mobilization is really not taken seriously. The opinion is that world affairs revolve around NATO and that they and our regular forces would take care of whatever situation arises. Mobilization, like civil defense, gets passive treatment.


Respondents to the survey, even those who said there was little interest of students in their field, provided many excellent suggestions on how to make the topics of Guard, Reserve Forces, and mobilization of more interest to academia. Highest on the list was a need for more data, not only of the public relations type, but of good, in-depth research material which would preclude using a lot of assumptions. Next was a request for clarification: where do you classify mobilization, that is, who should be addressing it? What specifically needs to be talked, written, about, or studies, and why are these important? These suggestions, as follows, give us a rich menu for further discussion and action.

Suggestions on How to Improve Academic Interest in Our Topics

- o Provide funding for research, non-restricted rather than contract.
- o Show relationship of topics to college courses -- "Briefing Book." Give examples of how the Guard and Reserves contribute to the local economy and how they fit into the overall defense plan. What are advantages of Guard/Reserve participation?
(Author's comment: There are excellent examples in the ICAF Abstracts, Mobilization Studies Program, which contains annotated bibliographies of selected student reports. Also, indexes of theses from the Army Command & General Staff College and from the Naval Postgraduate School are loaded with examples.)
- o Explain the issues about mobilization.
- o Provide access to good, unclassified information and data banks.
- o Somehow encourage journals and other publications (including newspapers) to accept professional and student articles on the importance of the Guard/Reserve Forces and mobilization issues.
- o Make fellowship awards available to young faculty to do research and writing in appropriate fields of study.
- o If funding can be made available, publish this widely and include provision for publication of results with academic freedom in mind.
- o Have scholars who are in the military visit companies and schools and give workshops/colloquia on the work they are doing. This would stimulate interest by other students and give needed information to faculty.
- o Encourage ROTC student participation in other courses.
- o Provide concrete ways in which skills from civilian economy contribute to performance of Guard/Reserve and vice versa.
- o Show theoretical concepts of mobilization, and issues that affect national security.
- o Explain in the broad context when mobilization would be a useful thing to do. Then give topical areas needing study.
- o Provide documentation on guard and reserve force. DOD publications such as Annual Posture Statements make only passing reference to reserve forces. Need something comparable to Doebling and Hutzler's compilation of data on manpower.
- o Help interested colleges obtain material for library support and references.
- o Develop simulation or exercises that could be used in classes. Especially needed are those that would not need complicated equipment or props, and of a nature that could be used in a variety of classes.

SURVEY SENT TO 106 SCHOOLS

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
INSTITUTE OF SAFETY AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT



September 9, 1983

Dear Colleague:

National defense is a concern to all of us in academia. There is a great deal of information available on the active duty forces which we can use to keep ourselves and our students up-to-date, but very little is being written about the Reserve forces. Did you know, for example, that half of the nation's combat power and two-thirds of its support capability are in Reserve components? Or, that the National Guard and Reserve are the only immediate source of trained personnel to augment the active forces in the event of national emergency or other contingencies? Have we who are teachers thought about the impact on the civilian sector in the event of partial or all-out mobilization of these reserve forces?

To determine the amount of awareness and interest in colleges and universities about the Guard and Reserve Forces and their important role in national defense, I have been asked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to survey a number of schools on these matters. I was selected for this study because I am not only a part of academia but am also active in the Naval Reserve. Your inputs will assure that the civilian, academic sector's comments, ideas, and concerns are part of a study. I would therefore greatly appreciate your answering the attached survey. Additional comments are welcome. If you feel the questions do not apply to your area, would you please give it to someone else who can answer it?

The results of the survey and some representative interviews will be the basis of a paper I will present at a colloquium at the National Defense University on November 2, in Washington, D.C. This colloquium, entitled, "Guard and Reserve Mobilization: An Essential Element of National Preparedness," is being sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Participants will be from government, military and colleges and universities. The proceedings should give us some rich material for further discussion in the classroom and among ourselves.

In addition to determining the amount of awareness and interest by academia in these areas, I am also attempting to learn if your curriculum includes topics on national defense, reserve forces, and matters relating to the economics and political implications of mobilization. If any research is being done or papers being written by your students or faculty, I would be pleased to have copies, or at least bibliographies.

The attached survey should take you only 15 or 20 minutes to complete. Items 1 and 2 take only seconds. Items 3, 4, and 5 will take longer. An addressed envelope is included for your reply. No postage is needed. May I have your response by October 7?

Cordially,

Harriett E. Porch

Harriett E. Porch
Asst. Director, Degree Program Services
(Captain, USNR)

G-5-17

UNIVERSITY

, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90089-0021

APPENDIX A

NAME OF UNIVERSITY OR COLLEGE _____

SCHOOL OR INSTITUTE _____

DEPARTMENT _____

NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON COMPLETING THIS SURVEY _____

Daytime Telephone No. _____ Evening _____ Best time: _____

1. Do any of your courses include topics related to:

____ Mobilization

____ National defense readiness

____ National Guard and Reserve Forces

If yes, please attach course descriptions and outlines.

2. A. Are any of your graduate students doing research or writing papers on any of the above topics? ____yes ____no

- B. If the answer to A was "Yes," please answer the following:

How many students? _____

What level? Masters _____ PhD _____

Titles of paper, thesis, or dissertation (if more than 2, attach bibliography):

3. If research or fellowship money were made available to your school, would you encourage your students to do a thesis or dissertation on mobilization-related topics?

____ Yes ____ No ____ Maybe

If you have answered Yes or Maybe, what would be your concerns for such research?

4. If you would not encourage a thesis or dissertation, would you encourage or assign national defense or mobilization-related topics as a term paper or team project in any of your classes? If not, why not?

5. In what ways could the topics of Guard and Reserve Forces and mobilization be made of more interest to universities and colleges?

Appendix A

SCHOOLS RESPONDING TO SURVEY

<u>University and School/College/Institute</u>	<u>Department</u>
Arizona, Univ. of, College of Business & Public. Admin.	Mgmt. & Policy
Calif. State Polytechnic Univ., Pomona, School of Bus.	Dean's Office
Calif. State Univ., Los Angeles, Center for Armament and Disarmament	History
College of Charleston, Institute for Public Affairs & Political Studies	Public Admin.
Connecticut, Univ. of, College of Lib. Arts & Sciences	Economics
Connecticut, Univ. of, School of Business Admin.	Finance
Denver, Univ. of, College of Bus. Admin.	Finance
Drexel Univ., College of Bus. & Admin.	Dean's Office
Duke Univ., Fuqua School of Business	Bus. Admin.
Georgia, Univ. of, College of Bus. Admin.	Grad. School, Bus. Admin.
Idaho State Univ., College of Business	Bus. Admin.
Illinois, Univ. of, at Chicago, Col. of Bus. Admin.	Marketing
Kansas, Univ. of, School of Business	Bus. Admin.
Kentucky, Univ. of, College of Business	Economics
Louisville, Univ. of, School of Business	Bus. Admin.
Michigan State Univ., Grad. School of Business	Bus. Admin.
Minnesota, Univ. of, School of Management	Management
Minnesota, Univ. of, School of Management	Industrial Relations
Missouri, Univ. of at Kansas City, Inst. Public Affairs	Public Affairs
Nebraska, Univ. of at Lincoln, Col. of Bus. Admin.	Econ, Finance
Nebraska, Univ. of at Lincoln, Col. of Bus. Admin.	Mgmt., Marketing
Notre Dame, Univ. of, Col. of Bus. Admin.	Dean's Office
North Carolina, Univ. of at Chapel Hill, Sch. of Bus.	Bus. Admin.
Ohio State Univ., Mushon Center	History
Old Dominion Univ., School of Bus. Admin.	Dean's Office
Oregon State Univ., College of Liberal Arts	Economics
Rand Graduate Institute	Dean's Office
Syracuse Univ., College of Arts & Sciences	Mil. Science
Texas A&M Univ., College of Liberal Arts	Political Science
Tulane Univ., School of Business	Bus. Admin.
Southern Calif., Univ. of, Sch. Ltrs, Arts, Sciences	Economics
Southern Calif., Univ. of, School of Business	Mgmt. & Organization
Southern Calif., Univ. of, School of Public Admin.	Public Admin.
Southern Calif., Univ. of, Grad. School. Int'l. Rel.	Defense & Strategic Studies
Southern Calif., Univ. of, Inst. Safety & Syst. Mgmt.	Human Factors
Yale Univ., School of Organization & Mgmt.	Pol. Science
Yale Univ., School of Ltrs, Arts & Sciences	Economics
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College	Operations
Maryland, Univ. of	Economids

Table A-1

CATEGORIES OF SCHOOLS SURVEYED

<u>SCHOOLS/DEPARTMENTS CATEGORIES</u>	<u>No. Sent</u>	<u>No. Rec'd.</u>
Business Administration/Industrial Relations	71	19
Economics, Finance	17	8
History	3	2
Political Science	3	3
Public Administration	3	3
International Relations	2	2
Sociology	2	0
Human Factors	2	1
Senior Military-type Schools		
Air Force Institute of Technology	1	0
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College	1	1
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School	1	0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	106	39 (37%)

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

Total Force And The U.S. Service Academies

Lt Col James Peterschmidt, Reserve Forces Advisor
HQ USAF Academy

Introduction

Total Force is a reality today. The Defense 83 Almanac in the September issue graphically highlighted how critical the United States Reserve and Air National Guard forces are to our national defense planning and strategic deterrence. For example, if we focus our attention on the United States Air Force we find that air reserve force components comprise:

- 65% of Conus Air Defense Interceptions
- 43% of Strategic Airlift Crews
- 65% of Tactical Airlift
- 52% of Tactical Reconnaissance

Similar statistics hold for the other services. Although the United States Reserve and Air National Guard forces are obviously vital to both national and alliance security, the attention accorded these forces has not always been commensurate with their fundamental military significance. This paper illustrates the extent to which the total force concept is taught at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO; the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD; and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, New London, CT. These service academies are among the most important educational institutions in the defense establishment and the first three objectives of this colloquium are entirely applicable to them. Namely:

1. Promote dialogue and the free exchange of ideas regarding mobilization among the active, guard and reserve components; among the mobilization practitioner and researcher; among the manpower and industrial planning communities; and among defense authorities within NATO and its member countries;

2. Foster an integrating approach to mobilization theory and practice;
3. Identify practical applications for improving mobilization planning and execution which can be derived from systematic study of, and research and publication on, mobilization of reserve forces;

Yet, the attention and significance given total force and mobilization is minimal, at best.

The future leaders of our military forces are attending these academies today. It is essential for these men and women to thoroughly understand the nature and capabilities of Reserve and National Guard forces.

Reserve Component Instruction At The United States Air Force Academy

Professional Military Studies (PMS) 330 is the sole course taught at the Academy, through the Military Instruction Department, concerning Reserve Forces. It is a 42-lesson course designed to instruct secondclass cadets (juniors) on U.S. force employment. The course does not address reserve forces in any depth and there are no formal lessons entirely dedicated to the reserve forces. The reserve forces are discussed tangentially during the various blocks of instruction.

PMS 330 covers the following topics:

- Doctrine
- The U.S. Army
 - Total Force Concept is mentioned
 - Active Forces
 - Reserve
 - National Guard
 - Emphasis is on the numbers of divisions and combat service support functions.
- The U.S. Air Force
 - Emphasis is on squadrons augmenting the active force
 - Current modernization of reserve units
 - Contact is made with Reserve and Air National Guard units for patches and unit histories for heritage purposes.
- The U.S. Navy
 - USMC Reserve Division with it's Air Wing
 - Ready Reserve Fleet

- Sealift
 - Mine/Counter Mine Operations
- Theater Warfare
 - Total Force Concept is mentioned
 - Sealift
 - Airlift
 - Combat Service Support
 - RDJTF Support
- Tactical Employment Exercise
 - Overall reserve emphasis is on support, logistics and movement
 - Reserve function is to assist in combat and theater operations

The cadets have a reading on the reserve forces from the U.S. War Machine. Consultant: Dr. James E. Doran, Jr., Cown Publishers, Inc., New York 1978. In addition, when the opportunity arises, senior representatives from the U.S. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard are invited to address the Cadet Wing. For example, Maj Gen Sloan R. Gill, Chief, USAF Reserve, will address some cadets when he visits the USAFA in November.

Reserve Component Instruction At The United States Military Academy

The Department of Military Instruction provides formal reserve component instruction in two Military Science (MS) courses: MS 101, Readings in Military Heritage/Standards of Professional Behavior and MS 300, Army Systems Management.

MS 101

Initial Reserve Component Instruction is taught during the cadet's first semester as a fourthclass cadet (freshman). A major portion of MS 101, approximately five hours of this forty hour course, traces the evolution of the reserve component from the colonial militias to the present "total army." The current role of the reserve component is a specific focus during the final lessons of this course.

MS 300

Cadets receive their second appreciation for the reserve component as a second-class cadet (junior) during MS 300. This course has one lesson (one hour) addressing the reserve component interface with active units through the affiliation program. The mobilization of reserve components is taught during a one hour "readiness lesson."

Reserve Component Instruction At The United States Naval Academy

Five courses at the Naval Academy address the role of the reserve component within the Department of Defense. Two courses, presented by the Division of Professional Development are required courses for all midshipmen and taught in the first and third years of instruction. The remaining three courses are presented by the Department of Political Science as electives.

The two required courses, NL 102 Leadership I: Fundamentals, and NL 303 Leadership III: Applications, address the reserve component as follows:

- NL 102 provides an introduction to the reserve component and highlights data on strength, the total force policy, mobilization and training. One chapter of the Naval Officer's Guide and approximately one classroom hour of instruction are devoted to this topic.

- NL 303 briefly discusses the reserve component only in terms of how it fits administratively into the command structure of the Navy.

The political science courses peripherally touch on the topic of the reserve component. These courses, FP 421, National Security Policy; FP 355, Civil Military Relations and FP 230, U.S. Government and Constitutional Development do not specifically devote classroom hours to the subject.

Tactical employment of the reserve component is not studied at the Naval Academy.

Reserve Component Instruction At The United States Coast Guard Academy

The U.S. Coast Guard Academy does not sponsor any formal instruction on the Coast Guard Reserve, mobilization or total force. An informal course under the auspices of "Operation Spotlight" is presented by a Reserve Coast Guard Captain only when requested by the cadets. It addresses the following areas:

I. Introduction

- A. What is the Coast Guard Reserve?
- B. Its importance to the Coast Guard

II. Duties

- A. Routine
- B. Emergency

III. Organization

- A. Inactive vs Active Reserve
- B. Training
- C. Pay and benefits

Summation

The courses of instruction provided by the four military service academies relating to the reserve components of their individual service, mobilization and total force are schematic. The nature and capabilities of reserve forces and the process by which they are mobilized are equally underrepresented in the curricula of all the service academies. The graduates of these academies are destined to be the future leaders of their service components but are not afforded the opportunity to receive and investigate the necessary instruction relating to the reserve forces.

There are specific areas in which the exchange of ideas and information would fill the obvious gaps which exist in current instructional programs. These include but are not limited to those addressed in the memorandum for members of the National Reserve Forces Committee from the OASD (RA) dated 24 Jan 83:

1. Effective mobilization planning and execution procedures.
2. Expenditious decision making and execution in crisis environments.
3. The method of rapidly processing reserve personnel through the system which brings them from reserve to active status.
4. Adequate mobilization training for reservists.
5. Logistics and equipment availability and interoperability.
6. Transportation and deployment under adverse conditions (post-attack situation, refugee movement, panic in the civilian population, sabotage of lines of communication and transportation facilities).
7. Linkages between national mobilization systems and the alliance alert system.

8. Accession of mobilizing units and individuals by gaining active force commands.
9. Possible battlefield interfaces between mobilized reserves of one country with mobilized reserves of another.

Without attention to areas of study such as these, graduates from the U.S. service academies, at the time of entering active duty, cannot be expected to appreciate nor understand the important role and missions of the U.S. Reserve Forces.

BULLET BACKGROUND PAPER

ON

THE AIR FORCE RESERVE STORY AS
INCLUDED IN AIR FORCE NCO PME CURRICULA

THE AIR FORCE RESERVE STORY AS PRESENTED IN AIR FORCE PME COURSES TODAY R
THE GAMUT - - ALMOST NON-EXISTENT TO COMPLETE COVERAGE. THE AIR FORCE
RESERVE STORY MUST BE TOLD TO PME STUDENTS SO THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE
TREMENDOUS CONTRIBUTION THE AIR FORCE RESERVE IS MAKING TO THE TOTAL
AIR FORCE EFFORT.

- A RECENT SURVEY CONDUCTED OF ALL OF THE COMMAND NCO ACADEMIES, THE AF
SENIOR NCO ACADEMY, OTS, AND BASIC MILITARY TRAINING REVEALED A MIX ON
THE AF RESERVE STORY IS TOLD:

-- BASIC MILITARY TRAINING - 4 SHORT PARAGRAPHS OF A STUDENT HANDOUT
BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE FUNCTION OF THE AF RESERVE. ALSO, APPROXIMATELY
TEN MINUTES CLASS TIME IS DEVOTED TO THE SUBJECT.

--- SENIOR NCO ACADEMY - LECTURES ARE GIVEN BY BOTH AN AF RESERVE AND AN
ANG GENERAL OFFICER. THESE LECTURES EMPHASIZE FORCE STRUCTURE, WEAP
SYSTEMS EMPLOYED AND MISSION. ONE HOUR IS DEVOTED TO EACH OF THESE
LECTURES. ADDITIONALLY, A COMPREHENSIVE ARTICLE OF TEN PAGES, TITLED
"EMPLOYMENT OF THE AIR RESERVE FORCES IN THE TOTAL FORCE AIRPOWER

CMSGT SCOTT/AFRES/CMS/5298/jm/Oct 83

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal

STRUCTURE" IS MADE REQUIRED READING FOR THE STUDENT. THE SENIOR NCO ACADEMY HAD THE BEST COVERAGE OF THE AIR RESERVE FORCES OF ALL THOSE SCHOOLS RESPONDING TO THE SURVEY.

-- AFROTC - COLLEGE FRESHMAN ROTC STUDENTS ARE GIVEN A ONE-HOUR INFORMAL LECTURE ON THE MISSION, FORCE SIZE AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS EMPLOYED BY THE AIR RESERVE FORCES. DURING THIS HOUR AN 88-SLIDE PRESENTATION IS MADE USING A SCRIPT PROVIDED BY THE AIR FORCE RESERVE. THE SLIDE PRESENTATION IS COMPREHENSIVE AND, FOR THE MOST PART, CURRENT. INCLUDED IN THE SLIDE PRESENTATION ARE:

--- HERITAGE

--- UNIT CALL-UPS DURING KOREA AND OTHER TIMES OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

--- ORGANIZATION OF AFRES HEADQUARTERS AND ASSIGNED UNITS.

--- THE VARIOUS AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO THE AF RESERVE ALONG WITH THE USE OF THESE AIRCRAFT. THIS SLIDE ALSO SHOWS THE AUGMENTATION OF THE VARIOUS AF RESERVE UNITS TO THEIR GAINING MAJOR AIR COMMANDS.

--- THE IMA PROGRAM

--- THE AIR RESERVE TECHNICIAN PROGRAM

--- COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AF RESERVE

--- % OF THE AIR FORCE MISSION PROVIDED BY AF RESERVE UNITS (50% OF THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT CREWS, 50% OF THE AC-130 GUNSHIP MISSION, ETC.)

LOCAL AF RESERVISTS ARE ASKED TO COME OUT AND TALK ABOUT THEIR UNITS DURING THIS BLOCK.

-- OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOL (OTS) - STUDENTS ARE REQUIRED TO READ A THREE PAGE ARTICLE ON THE ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE AF RESERVE. THIS ARTICLE HAD BEEN COPIED FROM THE AIR FORCE MAGAZINE.

-- COMMAND NCO ACADEMIES - FIVE OF THE 11 COMMAND NCO ACADEMIES RESPONDED TO THE SURVEY. TAC'S NCO ACADEMY AT BERGSTROM PRETTY WELL CHARACTERIZED THE OTHER RESPONSES, "AT PRESENT, LITTLE OF OUR CURRICULUM CONSISTS OF MATERIAL ON THE RESERVE AND THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT.

WE INCLUDE SOME DISCUSSION OF OUR RESERVE FORCES AS ADDITIONAL MILITARY RESOURCES TO BE USED IN COUNTERING AN AGGRESSOR'S THREAT TO THIS NATION'S SECURITY. RESERVE ROLE, MISSION, ORGANIZATION, ETC., ARE NOT FULLY ADDRESSED, HOWEVER."

- I BELIEVE YOU'LL AGREE, AFTER HEARING WHAT OUR PME SHCOOLS ARE OFFERING TODAY, INCREASED COVERAGE OF THE RESERVE STORY IS NEEDED.

THE INSTRUCTION WOULD BE ENHANCED IF AF RESERVE SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISORS WERE BROUGHT IN TO PRESENT THE LESSON OR AT LEAST BE AVAILABLE TO FIELD QUESTIONS FROM THE STUDENTS. ALSO, THE AFRES FILM "RESERVE FOR THE 80'S" WHICH TELLS THE AF RESERVE STORY SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE AND USED BY THE ACADEMIES DURING THIS BLOCK OF INSTRUCTION.

- I BELIEVE THAT THESE CHANGES NEED TO BE MADE TO THE ACADEMIES' CURRICULA AND I INTEND TO MAKE THIS RECOMMENDATION AFTER MY RETURN TO AFRES.

- WITH THE EMPHASIS ON TOTAL FORCE TODAY AND WITH THE RESERVE FORCES NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH A LARGE PART OF THE OVERALL AIR FORCE MISSION OUR NCO'S NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF AFRES TO THE AIR FORCE MISSION. OUR NCO'S NEED TO KNOW THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF AF RESERVE PERSONNEL (OVER 70% OF OUR MECHANICS HAVE PRIOR MILITARY SERVICE), THE MOST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE, AF RESERVE AUGMENTATION TO THE MAJCOMS AND THE FULL-TIME MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE AF RESERVE.

- I THINK THAT WE HAVE TO NOW SET OUT EXACTLY WHAT WE WANT INCLUDED IN OUR PME SCHOOL CURRICULUM AND MAKE OUR REQUEST TO THE SENIOR NCO ACADEMY AND COMMAND NCO ACADEMY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS. OUR REQUEST SHOULD BE FOR A TWO HOUR BLOCK OF INSTRUCTION COVERING THE FULL AIR FORCE RESERVE STORY.

-- MISSION

-- ORGANIZATION

-- MOBILIZATION

-- AUGMENTATION OF USAF

-- RESPONSIVENESS AND COMBAT READINESS

-- PERSONNEL UTILIZATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF AF RESERVE FORCES AND

-- AF RESERVE FORCES PARTICIPATION WITH AND SUPPORT OF ACTIVE FORCES



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY
FORT BLISS, TEXAS 79918

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATSS-S-LN


7 October 1983

SUBJECT: PME Curriculum

Commander
HQ, AF Res/CMS
ATTN: CMSgt Harry J. Scott
Robbins AFB, GA 31098

1. Please forgive the delay in responding to your request on what we teach at the Sergeants Major Academy on the Reserves, the total force and mobilization.
2. This information is basically covered in a six hour block of instruction. The first three hours consist of a one hour presentation by the Chief, Army Reserves or his designate and a one hour presentation by the Director, Army National Guard or his designate. These two general officers usually present the missions, make-up, mobilization plans, history, and problems that are inherent to these components of the Army. The third hour is a question and answer period with the two general officers and the entire class. Hours four through six are covered in the classroom and in more detail the characteristics of the Reserve Components, their role in the total force, their missions, compositions, training and mobilization are studied.
3. Out of the 707 hours taught here, six hours devoted to the Reserve Components does not seem like much, and I would like to see it increased because "the Reserves are no longer a force in reserve." However, the importance of the Reserves and its role is reinforced by many of our other guest speakers such as the Chief of Staff of the Army and the commander of the Rapid Deployment Force which relies heavily of Reserve Forces.
4. I am enclosing a copy of our POI and our lesson packet on Reserve Components. I hope it arrives in time to be of value to you. Please let me know if I can further assist you.

2 Encl
as


JOHN J. TERRANOVA
SGM USAR
Reserve Advisor

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

MILITARY RETIREES:

A TRUE MOBILIZATION ASSET

COLONEL ROBERT R. RUMPH, USA

and

COMMANDER RICHARD T. POKRYKFA, USNR

Prepared for: Colloquium on Mobilization with
special emphasis on Guard and
Reserve forces 1-4 Nov 1983
National Defense University

MILITARY RETIREES: A TRUE MOBILIZATION ASSET

INTRODUCTION

Retired military personnel constitute a pool of individuals who are not currently members of either the active force or the Selected Reserve and who have prior military experience. Pretrained individuals are important military assets and a potential source of military manpower which would be available to reinforce our force structure during the early stages of a major conflict. In the event of mobilization, retirees could be recalled to active duty to be used as fillers to bring non-tactical units to wartime strength and to expand the continental United States (CONUS) support base.¹ In recent years, wartime manpower planning has shown that the supply of pretrained individual manpower might not be sufficient to meet the early needs of the military services; therefore, the retiree pool constitutes immediately available assets to meet time-phased wartime requirements.² The Department of Defense has recognized the need to seek better utilization of this source of wartime manpower and has placed increasing emphasis on the retired community as a viable mobilization asset.³

The present non-disability military retirement system is an outgrowth of a law enacted in 1870, and in the intervening one hundred-odd years, has been modified repeatedly to attract and retain qualified personnel and provide a socially acceptable means to separate personnel in the interest of a youthful and vigorous military establishment. However, the military retirement system is a complex subject, when taken in the broader context of availability for

recall as a mobilization asset. The relatively large increase in the retired population experienced in the past decades, and more especially during the Vietnam timeframe, has begun to abate somewhat but the direct cost of retired individuals as a function of the military budget has been rising sharply. The critical fact is that the current projections on the growth of the retired population, and its attendant cost under the present system, may well be acceptable only if justified in terms of the national need to maintain these assets readily available in a crisis or national emergency.⁴

RETIREE ASSETS

The military retirement system can basically be characterized by three separate and distinct components: disability retirement, non-disability Regular retirement and non-disability Reserve retirement. Of the total numbers of individuals who retire each year, the retired disabled and the non-disability retired Reserves account for a negligible number in comparison to the far larger non-disability retired Regular component, thus the focus should remain on this latter group. Although the original intent underlying non-disability retirement was to compensate an individual for service extending beyond 30 years, eligibility for retirement came to be set at 20 years of active service. Studies indicate that well over half of all retirees leave the service before completing 25 years of active duty and are under 45 years of age.⁵ Additionally, most are usually retired less than 5 years on average. Thus, they would be reasonably competent, healthy and available for recall with an acceptable yield rate.⁶

According to data available in the Department of Defense, long-term retired military strength projections through the year 2000 increase steadily over the period with the total number of retirees approaching 1.5 million, inclusive of the officer ranks leveling at half a million strong.⁷ Each Service includes projection of the total retired military strength in its annual Program Objective. Memorandum (POM), by category for Regular and Reserve (officer and enlisted) and determines the number of retirees considered to be mobilization assets by the following categories: Class I -- Under age 60 and retired less than 5 years; and, Class II -- Under age 60 and retired 5 to 10 years, with the notable exception of the Army which had no upper limit on years since retirement. All other personnel, including disabled retirees and retirees who have been retired more than 10 years or are 60 years and older, are excluded (de facto Class III); however, they constitute considerable potential in their individual areas of expertise for use in an extreme national emergency involving "total" mobilization.⁸

Retiree data analysis is particularly troublesome in that pay and personnel files are for the most part inconsistent, combined with the fact that current reports do not adequately portray the various categorizations of retirees to allow yearly reconciliation. Development of improved sources of data and projection methodology is currently being vigorously pursued. Service projection methodology varies considerably and estimates of the retired rolls are tempered by socioeconomic conditions and actuarial factors. Because the Services have inadequate personnel management data on the Reserve retiree population, inventory changes are approximated in retiree inventory forecasts. The growth of the total retiree population has averaged around 45,000 per year from 1977 to the reported FY81-82 total of 1,426,000.⁹

Indicated below in Table I is the most current "estimate" of retirees who are considered to be mobilization assets as of 30 September 1982.

TABLE I
RETIREE INVENTORY

<u>Service</u>	<u>Regular Retirees</u> (Classes I & II) 1982	<u>Reserve Retirees</u> (Classes I & II) 1982
o Army	216,900	27,500
o Navy	205,700	19,300
o Marine Corps	42,500	3,400
o Air Force	314,000	19,200
o DoD Total	779,100	69,400

(Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board)

As shown, the 1982 grand total of both Regular and Reserve retirees in Classes I and II was reported at 848,500. This figure represents a large overall increase in the number of available retirees from data reported in the previous year, with a significant rise in each service of Regular retiree mobilization assets and an overall mixed-service readjustment in Reserve retiree mobilization assets.¹⁰ Although not easily explained, the statistics lend credence to the belief that factual data on retirees is often inconsistent and highlights the necessity for standardizing the reporting format so that information can be tracked successively each year. Indeed, relying on retiree strength projections and inventory of questionable accuracy could possibly result in an adverse impact on future management decisions regarding retirees; hence, an increased effort to purify current and projected asset lists will considerably enhance the overall thrust of retiree mobilization planning.

RETIREEE RECALL

The ultimate proof of military retirees as a mobilization asset is based upon their availability for call-up during peace, and vulnerability to involuntary recall in time of war or national emergency. Numerous sections of Title 10 United States Code (USC) provide the authority to order to active duty different categories of retired personnel.¹¹ The wide range and scope of pertinent legislative authorities for each services are shown in Table II below.

TABLE II
LEGAL AUTHORITIES

<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy/Marine Corps</u>
o 10 U.S.C. 672	o 10 U.S.C. 672	o 10 U.S.C. 672
o 10 U.S.C. 675	o 10 U.S.C. 675	o 10 U.S.C. 675
o 10 U.S.C. 688	o 10 U.S.C. 688	o 10 U.S.C. 688
o 10 U.S.C. 8504	o 10 U.S.C. 1331	o 10 U.S.C. 6321
o 10 U.S.C. 8911	o 10 U.S.C. 1332	o 10 U.S.C. 6322
o 10 U.S.C. 8914	o 10 U.S.C. 3504	o 10 U.S.C. 6323
o 10 U.S.C. 9817	o 10 U.S.C. 3911	o 10 U.S.C. 6326
	o 10 U.S.C. 3914	o 10 U.S.C. 6330
<u>Coast Guard</u> * Note 1	o 10 U.S.C. 3917	o 10 U.S.C. 6331
o 14 U.S.C. 331	o 10 U.S.C. 3925	o 10 U.S.C. 6481
o 14 U.S.C. 359	o 10 U.S.C. 3966	o 10 U.S.C. 6482
o 10 U.S.C. 675		o 10 U.S.C. 6485

* Note 1 - In the event that the President directs the Coast Guard to become an element of the Navy under provisions of 14 U.S.C. 3

Source: Digest of war and Emergency legislation affecting the Department of Defense

In addressing these legislative statutes and their applicability the following broad categories of retiree recall assets are provided for discussion:

- o Regular officers who retire with 20 or more years of active service are immediately placed and permanently retained on the Regular Officer Retired List maintained by the respective Service Secretary. Under the provisions of 10 USC 688, Retired Regular officers of all services may be recalled to active duty by the Service Secretary at anytime under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. This would appear to be a delegated action to the Service Secretary from the broader provisions of 10 USC 3504 for the Army, and 10 USC 8504 for the Air Force, which authorizes recall to active duty by the President at any time without legal restrictions in the interest of national defense. Confusion exists in the application of 10 USC 688 when applied to the other services. 10 USC 6485 authorizes officers of the Regular Navy and Regular Marine Corps who request retirement after 20 or more years of service and at least 10 years of commissioned service to be available for recall without consent to active duty at sea or on shore in a state of war or national emergency declared by the President and ordered by the Secretary of the Navy. They can be recalled at any other time, only with their consent.

o Reserve officers who retire after 20 or more years of active service or with 20 or more years credit for "various types of service" are transferred to the Retired Reserve. They can be recalled only with their consent, or in a state of war or national emergency declared by Congress, without their consent, under the provisions of 10 USC 675 -- with the proviso under 10 USC 672, that involuntary recall will be made only upon determination by the Service Secretary with the approval of the Secretary of Defense that there are no other reserve personnel readily available.

o Regular enlisted members who have completed 20 years of service, and are between their 20th and 30th service anniversaries, by law can be retired (in the case of the Army and Air Force) and, by request (in the case of the Navy and Marine Corps.), are transferred to the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve respectively until their 30th service anniversary. Retired enlisted members in this category deserve special attention because of their status: for the Army and Air Force they are in dual status as both Retired Regulars and Reservists (separate legal opinions by the services for the most part classify the latter in the Retired Reserve category as a matter of course); and, for the Fleet Reservists of the Navy and Marine Corps, although not formally retired, they enjoy a status similar to retirees in that they receive retainer pay and may be called up for not more than two months of training every four years. A certain amount of confusion exists, inasmuch as availability for recall depends upon the

determination of the status selected and authority by which it is invoked. For members of the Army and Air Force, there could possibly be three alternatives for recall to active duty, because of their status: under the general authority of 10 USC 672 during a state of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the President and ordered by the Service Secretary at his determination; under authority of 10 USC 688, 10 USC 3504 and 10 USC 8504 at the discretion of the President at any time in the interest of national defense by the Service Secretary; or under authority of 10 USC 675 during a state of war or national emergency declared by Congress. On the other hand, for members in the Navy and Marine Corps, there could possibly be two alternatives for recall to active duty because of their status: as Fleet Reserve under the authority of 10 USC 6485 in a state of war or national emergency by the Service Secretary; or, under the authority of 10 USC 6482 in a state of war or national emergency declared by Congress or the President.

- o Regular enlisted members who retire with 30 or more years of active service may retire directly at their discretion, or after completion of a combined total of 30 years of service and/or Reserve duty, and are transferred to the Regular Retired list maintained by the Service Secretary. Army and Air Force Regular enlisted retirees are available for recall at any time by the President in the interest of national defense under provisions of 10 USC 688, 10 USC 3504 and 10 USC 8504. However, in the Navy and Marine Corps, they may be ordered to active duty in a state of war or national emergency by the Secretary of the Navy under provisions of 10 USC 6482.

- o Reserve enlisted members who retire with 20 or more years of active service on a "varied basis" (Army and Air Force), or when active service and Reserve time equals 30 years (Navy and Marine Corps), are transferred to the Retired Reserve. They can be recalled only with their consent or in a state of war or national emergency declared by Congress, without their consent, under the provisions of 10 USC 675 -- with the proviso under 10 USC 672, that involuntary recall will be made only upon determination by the Service Secretary with the approval of the Secretary of Defense that there are no other reserve personnel readily available.

Indicated at Table III is a matrix of recall vulnerabilities which further highlights the variegated legislative basis for ordering retirees to active duty.

As is readily apparent, there is considerable difference between service components concerning liability for recall.¹² As a general observation: Regular retirees are more readily available than Reserve retirees; Army and Air Force Regular retirees are more readily available than Navy and Marine Corps; and retired Regular officers are more readily available than retired Reserve officers. Of all the retired categories, the mobilization vulnerability of retired Regular enlisted members to involuntary recall is the least clearly delineated, since between their 20th and 30th service anniversary and upon transfer to the Army, Air Force, Fleet or Fleet Marine Corps Reserve respectively, they essentially enjoy a special status thus requiring a legal determination on the most appropriate recall authority to

use. In the absence of a state of war or declaration of national emergency, Regular retirees of the Army and Air Force could be selectively recalled to strengthen the armed forces quickly with available trained assets. Additionally, Regular enlisted retirees in the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve can be called up for training (up to two months every four years) and precedent exists for the Army and Air Force to execute similar periodic mobilization training duties, if desired, to immediately augment active duty forces for a limited period in the interest of national defense under conditions of "partial" and "full" mobilization.

TABLE III

RETIRED CATEGORY (BY SERVICE) AND METHOD OF RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY

Retired Category	Armed Service	Recall during Peacetime		Recall during War or National Emergency	
		Consent	Involuntary	Consent	Involuntary
Regular Officers	Air Force	Yes	Yes	Yes	Note 2
	Army	Yes	Yes	Yes	Note 2
	Marine Corps	Yes	No	Yes	Note 3
	Navy	Yes	No	Yes	Note 3
Regular Enlisted	Air Force	Yes	No	Yes	Note 2
	Army	Yes	No	Yes	Note 2
	Marine Corps	Yes	Note 1	Yes	Note 3
	Navy	Yes	Note 1	Yes	Note 3
Reserve Officers	Air Force	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
	Army	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
	Marine Corps	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
	Navy	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
Reserve Enlisted	Air Force	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
	Army	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
	Marine Corps	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4
	Navy	Yes	No	Yes	Note 4

- Notes: 1 - Up to 2 months training every 4 years
2 - Anytime by the President
3 - National emergency declared by the President
4 - National emergency declared by the Congress

RETIREE MOBILIZATION FROM HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Retired military members have historically been called upon to reenter active duty only in times of war or armed conflict. Notwithstanding this, the true significance of the total numbers involved and the degree of volunteerism exercised are subject to continued debate. An analysis of the use of retirees from a historical perspective reveals some insights into their utilization as mobilization assets.

World War II

In discussions concerning past manpower mobilization by the armed forces, it becomes apparent that there were no realistic or practical plans for addressing manpower utilization prior to World War II. Mobilization requirements even today, are characterized by disagreements over the best means of identifying skills and apportioning available manpower for optimum utilization.¹³ It is pertinent to consider quantity when addressing requirements for the armed forces in light of World War II experiences. The United States mobilized a little over twelve million men from which there were formed approximately one hundred divisional-sized or equivalent units.¹⁴ By the end of the war, there was no strategic reserve uncommitted in any theater; either remarkably accurate planning for minimum required forces or a fairly narrow margin of victory. This startling fact must be considered in any future global war. During the war, the number of fighting men required by the Armed Forces was dependent upon, among other factors, the number and types of equipment supported in the inventory. Considering this, it becomes apparent

that a portion of the required increase should be attributed to the support roles necessary for sustaining combat units. It is in this area that retired personnel become vitally important assets.

By way of example, to augment the active forces during the period from 1940-1941, the National Guard was mobilized and increased from 200,000 to 302,000, of which 127,000 were in combat service support functions. In 1940, total Army Reserves numbered only 43,000 and the Army National Guard stood at just over half that figure. With the Army National Guard and Reserve mobilization, by June 1941, more than 55,000 Reserve officers had been ordered to active duty. Between 1940 and 1944, the Army National Guard increased 350% to 60,000 strong. Army historical record indicate that from 1941-1945, peaking in 1943, a total of 1,042 retired officers were recalled to active duty.¹⁵ Considerable manpower was assigned to the Zone of Interior and when the demand for combat troops was critical, about 600,000 Army enlisted men who were qualified for overseas duty were serving in fixed installation in jobs that would never take them outside the United States. Eventually, this number was reduced by one-half toward the end of 1944.

By 1944, it became evident that there was a shortage of manpower in uniform. In July 1944, the President authorized a strength ceiling of 3,384,000 for the Navy to be reached by June 1945.¹⁶ This was considerably more personnel than the pre-Pearl Harbor estimate of a yearly increase of 160,000, then thought to be necessary for the building of a two-ocean fleet. The combined sea services had recalled about 17,500 retired enlisted men in 1942, however, the vast majority were voluntary. By June 1945, the Navy

experienced a 20-fold increase from the 150,997 personnel initially on active duty when the Naval Expansion Act of 1940 became law. This figure included the recall of 5,700 retired active duty enlisted personnel and 3,010,293 Reserves. To reach this strength, the Navy procured personnel at an average rate of 14,200 per week. The high point was reached during fiscal year 1943-44 when the rate of 25,000 per week was equivalent to manning a Navy of the 1940's every seven weeks. Training and processing this manpower source in the face of changing requirements both as to types of skills and numbers was a challenging mission. New programs and technological improvements in equipment required approximately half a million specifically trained officers and men. The task of transforming large numbers of civilian personnel into technically trained Navy men required careful selection and classification on the basis of natural abilities and prior education. When manpower became critical and it became evident that many billets could be filled by women, legislation was enacted in July 1942 to admit them to the officer and enlisted ranks of the Navy.¹⁷ Three years later, more than 82,000 women were serving in the continental United States and certain bases overseas.

The broad scope of amphibious warfare in the Pacific brought about a 16-fold expansion of Marine Corps personnel over a five-year period. The over-all strength of the Marine Corps expanded from 28,364 personnel in July 1940 to 476,709 personnel in June 1945. Approximately 185,000 men comprised mostly of ground units of the Fleet Marine Forces were shipped overseas. The aviation branch of the Fleet Marine Forces consisted of 80,000 men and the Marine Corps women's reserve was organized and brought to its maximum strength of 18,000.

The United States Coast Guard was placed under the operational control of the Navy in November 1941. During the war years, its normal functions were greatly expanded, and its operations were enlarged to include naval duties especially suited to its personnel, requiring an increase from 13,776 in July 1940 to 171,192 in June 1945. This figure includes 136 retired personnel recalled, 52,845 Temporary Reservists and Coast Guard Auxiliary, along with 143,523 Reserves. Early in 1942, the Coast Guard was given responsibilities for the protection of ports against sabotage and other contingencies as well as handling explosives and other dangerous cargoes which entailed a maximum of 31,000 personnel ashore and 10,400 afloat. Coastal protection also involved approximately 23,500 men. Additionally, an air-sea rescue service was established in 1944, and the Coast Guard had 33,000 men operating and maintaining the long-range aids to navigation, to include supporting weather and hydrographic functions.

For the most part, during these exigent times the call-up of the enlisted Reserve was subject to criticism due to the fact that in many cases the services laid claim to personnel whose skills would have been better utilized in areas unrelated to their Reserve assignment. It should be recognized that in December 1942, the voluntary enlistment of men between the inclusive ages of 18 and 37 years was ordered terminated as of February 1943. From that date on, manpower requirements with requisite skills available to the services were supplied by the Selective Service System which inducted an enlisted total equivalent to the services peacetime strength for each month of recruiting.

Throughout the period, the pressure of organizing, recruiting and mobilizing manpower assets while simultaneously conducting wartime operations did not permit each service the luxury of studying the possible use of smaller and less demanding assets, such as the retired military community. Quite possibly, however, some retirees may have chosen immediate enlistment and others may have volunteered for induction through the Selective Service System. In any case, it can be assumed that better planning on the part of each service would have improved policies and controls governing use of resource talents, thereby releasing substantial numbers of personnel qualified for duty in combat areas through the substitution of limited service personnel. By a careful process of selection and placement, it is probable that thousands more retired personnel possessing sufficient health, intelligence and ability to work at the required degree of efficiency could have been found and used to good advantage.

Korean War

During the interim period prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, mobilization planning was based upon the assumption that the next war would be a "total" effort in the mold of World War II. There were no provisions for a "partial" mobilization, which ultimately led to an ill-prepared and chaotic military call-up for the Korean War. Lessons learned from the confused Korean mobilization led to the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 489) and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.¹⁸ This legislation created more clearly defined categories of reservists. Up until that time, there were 2,500,000 personnel in the Active Reserve which included one quarter in the Organized Reserve and the remainder in the Volunteer Reserve. Additionally, there was

an Inactive Reserve, sometimes included as part of the Volunteer Reserve by some Services, but for the most part, these were personnel age 60 with no military commitment who were awaiting retirement and pension under Public Law 810. Reviewing the principal problems which arose out of the necessity for "partial" mobilization reveals the following: the manner in which the reserves were organized apparently did not lend itself to calling portions to active duty; officers not in organized units, whether Volunteer or Inactive, were just as important as those in units; and, the essentiality of maintaining the integrity of organized reserve units in event of "total" mobilization was not addressed.

Active forces required for the Korean War demanded a fifty percent strength increase, up from two million personnel. At that time, the number of Reserve units had increased dramatically until the assigned strength of the Army Reserve, in particular, stood at 600,000 in June 1950. More than 165,000 individual Reservists were ordered to active duty in numerous recalls. The Army individually recalled almost 100,000 enlisted Inactive and Volunteer Reserve.¹⁹ By July 1950, the Presidential authorization under Public Law 599 involuntarily recalled all Reserve and retired personnel to meet the strength requirement of 971,000 for the Air Force. It is interesting to note that of 100,000 Air Force Reserves called up, over 24,000 requested deferment, including sixty percent for hardship reasons. Additionally the Air Force Reserve, numbering 56,000 officers and 90,000 enlisted (which included Air National Guard) constituted seventy-one percent of the Air Force on active duty. Approximately 19,000 Volunteer Reserve airman plus Inactive Reserve airman totaling approximately 46,750 were ordered to active duty. In the

Organized Reserve of the Navy, some 1,300 officers and 10,000 enlisted volunteered and were ordered to active duty, as was the case with 8,000 officers in the Volunteer Reserve. Officer members of the Organized Reserve in the Navy ordered involuntarily to active duty numbered 6,500 out of 26,000 on the rolls; likewise, Volunteer Reserve recalls numbered 2,100 out of 250,000 on the rolls. Petty officers of the Organized Reserve in the Navy ordered involuntarily to active duty numbered 39,000 out of 68,000; likewise, Volunteer Reserve recalls, numbered 47,000 out of 310,000. Navy enlisted members of the Organized Reserve in non-rated status who were involuntarily ordered to active duty numbered 19,000 out of 93,000 likewise, Volunteer Reservists numbered 23,000 out of 320,000. From the beginning of the Korean action until May 1952, 4646 Fleet Reservists were ordered to active duty, as well as 5,500 enlisted retirees.²⁰ By June 1950, the Volunteer Reserve was by far the largest component of the Marine Corps Reserve, with 87,655 reservists on inactive duty, thereby exceeding the active duty strength by 13,382.²¹ At the end of March 1951, 51,942 of the 84,821 Reservists on active duty were Volunteer Reservists.

By 1953, our newly instituted Ready Reserve stood at 1.8 million. In January 1954, recognizing the personnel problems during the Korean outbreak, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization submitted a report to the President concerning the availability of manpower to operate a military training program, to supply military personnel for active service, and to simultaneously meet the needs of the civilian economy.²² This report recognized the benefits of maintaining a strong reserve while decreasing the numbers in a total active duty military force. It also pointed out the

importance of new technology to national security, in that there was an increasing military requirement for manpower with technical skills to maintain and operate modern weapon systems, which provided an incentive to the armed forces to make long-term career service attractive and placed heavy emphasis on activities to promote enlistments and reenlistments. The report also contained a section relating to the Reserve Act noting that the terms "Ready Reserve" and "Standby Reserve" represented arbitrarily established categories and therefore did not indicate the degree of readiness for military operations. Further, it included the observation that the Ready Reserve, at that time, could not be considered in a high state of training or availability for service; whereas, the Standby Reserve was deemed to be in a suitable state of readiness for active duty. In conclusion, the Office of Defense Mobilization suggested that the Retired Reserve would also be utilized as a resource for mobilization in any extended conflict.

Berlin Crisis and Vietnam War

The Army Reserve was just beginning to feel the beneficial effects of the 1952 and 1955 Acts when more than 400 Army Reserve units and 40,000 Individual Reservists were mobilized for the 1961 Berlin Crisis, not including an involuntary recall of retirees. The President ordered Reservists to active duty to demonstrate America's national resolve by reinforcing the country's non-nuclear capability. Correspondingly, the Vietnam era is of insignificant value to assess retired mobilization issues, because in 1965, the President decided not to recall to active duty either Reservists or retirees. The limited number of retirees that did in fact serve did so on a voluntary basis.

In sum, it can be argued that the vast majority of the retired population -- even after 30 years of service -- do not suddenly wish to be non-contributors in a national mobilization effort.²³ There is a psychological and sociological cast to military members and their families that goes well beyond the obligation of the average citizen. For most not in uniform, patriotism and national interests are often abstracts that are brought to light in a true national crisis; however, by contrast, military members live with the visible elements of this abstract and are aware that they constitute a public symbol in recognition of these ideals. A retirees' career experience provides him with a strong allegiance to service and country. To promote the belief that the Retired community is not a mobilization asset in time of crisis ignores these basic tenets. The limited experiences of World War II, Korea, and to some degree Vietnam, point out that proper planning and administration can --and will-- make the retired community a viable mobilization asset.

SUMMARY

During the remainder of this decade, the total pool of military non-disability retirees constitute viable mobilization assets in considerable numbers that represent about seventy percent of the present active duty contingent of our armed forces. Although the overall quantity of retirees considered to be mobilization assets under current DoD guidance (Classes I and II) does vary considerably by data source, the most current estimate of active force and reserve retirees represents over fifty percent of the total retired population. The total retired population in each service can be expected to experience a slow but steady growth; however, for the most part, that portion of the retired population considered to be mobilization assets (Classes I and II) will probably not change significantly. It is doubtful that, except in special cases, any other category of retired persons would be considered as mobilization assets. These strength figures are based primarily upon retiree personnel data files maintained by the respective services, and until recently, factual data on the availability and utilization of retirees was rather sketchy and retiree strength projection methodology was not particularly uniform. However, reconciliation of data is continuing between the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Office of the DoD Actuary and the respective service FY84-88 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

Military retirees of all services, particularly the Regular retirees capable of performing duty, should be considered for mobilization assignments.²⁴ Skill deterioration in utilization of retirees for support functions can be considered a factor of minor concern, given the vast

experience and knowledge gained over a military career and the proven competency for service. At a minimum, these retirees could reasonably be available to relieve active duty military manpower now assigned to the support activities category of the armed forces, consisting of a little under 650,000 projected requirements in FY84.²⁵ This would permit about thirty percent of the total active duty forces dedicated to those functions to be reassigned to combat-related elements or aervice (support) units where shortages will occur. This does not include Reserve component military manpower also assigned to support activities, nor does it include comprehensive consideration of the entire spectrum of CONUS-based positions that could be filled by retirees making more youthful and efficient military personnel available for deployment. With the lack of effective legislative authority to recall unobligated veterans, the retiree pool is particularly valuable as a "mobilization asset" in the truest sense of the term.²⁶

A new DoD Directive entitled "Management and Mobilization of Regular and Reserve Retired Military Personnel" is currently in the staffing process. This document, when published, will no doubt improve uniformity among the services in establishing mobilization categories for all retirees, tracking and screening procedures, and obtaining changes in personnel information which affect mobilization availability. The document includes general guidance to the respective services regarding what portion of the retiree pool can and should be used, and what type positions are appropriate for fill. This should enhance the thrust, impetus and credibility of the retiree recall program considerably.

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TRANSFER VALUE OF CIVILIAN SKILLS TO GUARD AND RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS

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IS A FAMILAR NURSERY RHYME BUT IT TRULY IS INDICATIVE OF THE VAST ARRAY OF CIVILIAN SKILLS HELD BY MEMBERS OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE. TAKEN AS A WHOLE OR INDIVIDUALLY THESE SKILLS REPRESENT A MASSIVE PRETRAINED RESOURCE. MOST MEMBERS, OTHER THAN NEW RECRUITS, ARE WELL ESTABLISHED IN THEIR CIVILIAN CAREERS AND ARE "PROFESSIONALS" IN WHAT THEY DO. AS THEIR CAREERS PROGRESS THEY BECOME MORE AND MORE PROFICIENT. THEY REACH THIS STATUS THROUGH ON-THE-JOB TRAINING, INDIVIDUAL OFF-DUTY STUDY, AND EMPLOYER SPONSORED TRAINING PROGRAMS AND FORMAL SCHOOLING. A COMPARISON OF A LISTING OF THESE SKILLS AGAINST THE NEEDS OF THE SERVICES WILL INDICATE THAT NEARLY ALL HAVE APPLICATION. MANY ARE CONSISTENT WITHIN NORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL MILITARY ELEMENTS BUT UNFORTUNATELY MANY ARE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE INDIVIDUAL ASSIGNMENTS. ONE IS REMINDED OF THE JOKE ABOUT THE MILITARY - "JONES IS A COOK? ASSIGN HIM TO THE MOTOR POOL." IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THIS "MISALIGNMENT" MUST BE MINIMIZED.

AS AN INDIVIDUAL GAINS EXPERIENCE MANY OF THE SKILLS PERIPHEKAL TO THE BASIC "TECHNICAL" SKILL DEVELOP SIMULTANEOUSLY - LEADERSHIP, SUPERVISION, RESPONSIBILITY, MANAGEMENT, BUDGETING, PLANNING, ETC. THESE, OF COURSE, HAVE VALUE IN NORMAL ASSIGNMENTS BUT OFTEN THERE IS NEED FOR THESE SKILLS COUPLED WITH THE

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BASIC TECHNICAL CIVILIAN SKILLS IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL. AS THE INDIVIDUAL BECOMES MORE SENIOR, TRAINING IS LESS THE MODE THAN SKILL MAINTENANCE. THIS IS THE CASE WITHIN THE MILITARY SYSTEM AND THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY. IT IS AT THIS STAGE THAT THE REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT CAN GAIN THE MOST FROM THE CIVILIAN SKILL POOL. ASSIGNMENTS CAN BE SKILL MAINTENANCE, THAT IS, DOING THE JOB FOR WHICH TRAINED AND BECOMING MORE PROFICIENT BY ITS DOING. DOING THIS IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS A CRITICAL NEED WHICH ISN'T BEING MET WOULD BE OF IMMENSE VALUE TO THE REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT AND WOULD ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUARD AND RESERVE AS WELL. HOW BEST CAN THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS BE CAPTURED TO ADVANTAGE?

THERE IS A CRYING NEED BY ALL SERVICES TO RETAIN TRAINED PERSONNEL. AN EQUALLY VEXING PROBLEM IS TRAINING LARGE NUMBERS QUICKLY. THIS APPLIES TO THE GUARD AND RESERVE AS WELL AS THE ACTIVE ESTABLISHMENT. IT IS A GIVEN THAT THE BUDGET SQUEEZE WILL CONTINUE INTO THE FUTURE AND THAT WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND LOGISTICS WILL BECOME EVEN MORE COMPLEX. STAFFING AND PLANNING PROBLEMS WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE. WAYS NEED TO BE FOUND TO IDENTIFY AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND APPLY THEM TO THE BEST ADVANTAGE. HOW DOES ONE DO THIS? TRANSFER OF THE VAST RESERVOIR OF CIVILIAN SKILLS OF GUARD AND RESERVE MEMBERS TO MILITARY ASSIGNMENTS IN A MORE ORGANIZED, PREPLANNED MANNER IS ONE WAY.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TRAINING PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE MINIMIZED NOR SHOULD THE VAST POTENTIAL TALENT AVAILABLE TO BE TAPPED. THE FOLLOWING MANPOWER ESTIMATES ARE OFFERED TO GIVE A SENSE OF THE NEED AS WELL AS AN INDICATION OF THE NUMBER OF GUARD AND RESERVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE AND THE RESPECTIVE CIVILIAN SKILL POOL SIZE.

TABLE I
ESTIMATED DOD ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1981 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1982 <u>FY 1983 Budget</u>	FY 1983 <u>Budget</u>
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>92.4</u>	<u>96.5</u>	<u>97.0</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	71.5	75.1	75.6
Defensive Strategic Forces	8.0	8.0	7.4
Strategic Control and Surveillance	13.0	13.4	14.0
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>956.8</u>	<u>994.6</u>	<u>1,007.1</u>
Land Forces	562.6	566.2	567.9
Tactical Air Forces	174.6	191.2	197.3
Naval Forces	182.0	198.3	201.9
Mobility Forces	37.5	39.0	40.0
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>93.3</u>	<u>99.3</u>	<u>100.6</u>
Intelligence	30.0	31.7	33.2
Centrally Managed Communications	31.6	33.7	33.5
Research and Development	21.9	23.8	23.7
Geophysical Activities	9.9	10.1	10.3
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>624.0</u>	<u>630.6</u>	<u>635.2</u>
Base Operating Support	305.3	303.6	300.7
Medical Support	42.6	42.3	42.7
Personnel Support	32.2	31.9	32.4
Individual Training	96.5	100.1	103.8
Force Support Training	43.0	45.8	47.9
Central Logistics	19.0	20.6	21.0
Centralized Support Activities	44.6	44.2	44.8
Management Headquarters	38.3	39.2	39.2
Federal Agency Support	2.5	2.8	2.8
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>1,766.6</u>	<u>1,821.1</u>	<u>1,839.9</u>
<u>Undermanning</u>		-22.1	-16.6
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>315.6</u>	<u>311.3</u>	<u>324.3</u>
Transients	76.4	76.8	84.1
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	17.0	15.1	12.7
Students, Trainees	208.8	206.1	214.1
Cadets	13.5	13.4	13.4
<u>Total</u>	<u>2,082.2</u>	<u>2,110.3</u>	<u>2,147.6</u>

TABLE II
ESTIMATED DOD SELECTED RESERVE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
(IN THOUSANDS)

	FY 1981 Actual	FY 1982 FY 1983 Budget	FY 1983 Budget
<u>Strategic</u>	<u>24.2</u>	<u>23.5</u>	<u>23.6</u>
Offensive Strategic Forces	13.2	13.1	13.2
Defensive Strategic Forces	10.2	9.6	9.6
Strategic Control and Surveillance	0.7	0.7	0.7
<u>Tactical/Mobility</u>	<u>687.3</u>	<u>707.1</u>	<u>745.6</u>
Land Forces	519.5	531.8	565.0
Tactical Air Forces	63.6	68.0	70.7
Naval Forces	51.3	56.8	57.8
Mobility Forces	52.8	50.4	52.2
<u>Auxiliary Activities</u>	<u>17.9</u>	<u>18.2</u>	<u>18.8</u>
Intelligence	4.2	4.7	4.4
Centrally Managed Communications	12.3	12.1	12.9
Research and Development	0.3	0.1	0.3
Geophysical Activities	1.2	1.3	1.2
<u>Support Activities</u>	<u>127.1</u>	<u>135.6</u>	<u>144.4</u>
Base Operating Support	37.5	35.0	43.4
Medical Support	11.5	13.6	18.1
Personnel Support	5.0	5.5	6.0
Individual Training	48.8	54.1	54.8
Force Support Training	0.8	0.6	0.6
Central Logistics	4.0	4.9	4.6
Centralized Support Activities	15.5	18.0	13.3
Management Headquarters	3.7	3.6	3.6
Federal Agency Support	0.2	0.2	0.2
<u>Subtotal-Force Structure</u>	<u>856.5</u>	<u>884.3</u>	<u>932.4</u>
<u>Individual Mobilization Augmentees</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>20.0</u>	<u>20.9</u>
<u>Active Guard/Reserve (Navy)</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.2</u>
<u>Individuals</u>	<u>33.2</u>	<u>41.8</u>	<u>45.9</u>
Transients	-	-	-
Patients, Prisoners, and Holders	-	-	-
Students, Trainees	33.2	41.8	45.9
Cadets	-	-	-
<u>Total</u>	<u>899.0</u>	<u>946.2</u>	<u>999.5</u>

TABLE III
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER TRENDS
(IN THOUSANDS)

	Actual				FY 83 Budget	
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Military						
Active	2,687	3,547	2,050	2,082	2,110	2,148
Selected Reserve	953	922	851	899	946	1,000
Civilian	1,176	1,393	990	1,019	1,034	1,035

TO MAKE BETTER USE OF THE CIVILIAN SKILL POOL WILL REQUIRE CHANGES IN HOW WE ALL DO BUSINESS. THE ACTIVE FORCES, THE RESERVE/GUARD PROGRAM ADMINISTRATORS AND THE INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS WILL HAVE TO RETHINK THEIR ROLE IN THE USE OF RESERVE/GUARD MANPOWER. IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY JOB AND MANY "BUT THAT'S THE WAY WE HAVE ALWAYS DONE IT" ATTITUDES WILL HAVE TO BE OVERCOME. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, SOME ESSENTIAL BEDROCK PREMISES WILL HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED. THESE INCLUDE:

PIPELINE TRAINING WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED FOR ALL NEW RECRUITS
NEEDED MANDATORY SPECIAL "MILITARY" SKILLS WILL HAVE TO BE ACQUIRED
SELECTED RESERVISTS WILL NEED TO DRILL IN THEIR MOBILIZATION CODES
THE NEEDS OF THE BASIC COMBAT UNITS AND COMBAT SUPPORT MUST BE MET

AREAS WHERE THERE IS POTENTIAL FOR PAYOFF INCLUDE:

INCREASED USE OF GUARD/RESERVE IN MANAGERIAL AND PLANNING ASSIGNMENTS

USE OF GUARD/RESERVE IN TRAINING ASSIGNMENTS AND RESERVE PERSONNEL AS
DIRECT RELIEF OF ACTIVE DUTY COUNTERPARTS WHEN IN LEAVE AND TAD STATUS

INCREASE USE OF INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES PERFORMING DUTIES BASED ON THEIR
CIVILIAN SKILLS

DEVELOPMENT OF MORE PLANNING AND STAFF UNITS TO AUGMENT PLANNING STAFFS
OF REGULAR UNITS AND SENIOR COMMANDS

DEVELOPMENT OF ACTIVE GUARD/RESERVE AUGMENTATION OF REGULAR COMMANDS BY
INDIVIDUALS OR UNITS

IN MANY CASES SOME POLICY CHANGES WOULD BE NECESSARY OR REALIGNMENTS OF MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE NECESSARY. IN ALL CASES, A RATHER AGGRESSIVE EDUCATION PROGRAM WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ASSURE AN OPTIMUM USE OF RESERVE/GUARD WITHOUT LOSS TO INDIVIDUAL TRAINING NEEDS OR THE ULTIMATE NEEDS OF THE ACTIVE SERVICE. IT CAN BE DONE AND NEEDS DOING.

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A National Manpower Inventory

Aline Quester

Center for Naval Analyses

OVERVIEW

The purpose of the National Manpower Inventory (NMI) is to identify military skills in the civilian population, to inventory those skills, and, as resources permit, to project the inventory into the future. To do this, the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) established an NMI Working Group with representatives from the Department of Defense and each of the service research institutes. Several efforts were initiated to support the overall project; in addition to analytic efforts, they include large scale tabulations from the 1980 decennial census and a new matching of civilian and military jobs.

The Center for Naval Analyses has received a contract to build on these data, developing a model which inventories and locates militarily-relevant skills in the general population. This report outlines, in general terms, our planned approach for developing the NMI. Although the basic model design has been reasonably well formulated, refinements are still being determined. Therefore, the discussion here concentrates on the basic model construction.

The basic model requires three steps. First, to maximize the usefulness of available 1980 census data, we will segment the population that is not in the active military into 3 major groups: Ready Reservists (Selres and IRR), veterans who left the active force within the five previous years, and everyone else. For Ready Reservists and recent veterans, relevant military skills are described by their MOS's. For the remaining civilian population, any militarily relevant skills will be those learned in their civilian occupation. Thus, we need to crosswalk (match) civilian occupations to military occupations on the basis of job skills.

After such a match is completed and we have identified the civilian occupations with militarily relevant dimensions, we need to develop a way to inventory and locate persons with these skills. The method should enable a user to determine the number of civilians with skills comparable to a particular MOS, the locations of these civilians, and their demographic characteristics.

Third, our proposal calls for projecting the skill inventory forward. Where possible, we will also augment the census based civilian inventory and the future estimates with non-census based data on

individuals in vocational training programs and in a second job.* Let us discuss each of these steps in turn.

SEGMENTING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Segmenting the civilian population involves separating reservists and unaffiliated recent veterans from the broader civilian population. The 1980 Census contains information on whether persons left the active force within the last five years, so it should be reasonably straightforward to distinguish recent veterans from the overall civilian population. It will not be so easy to separately identify reservists: the Census contains no information on reserve status, and DoD reserve records contain little information on reservists' civilian occupations.** Moreover, some reservists are veterans of the active forces and some are not.

Our basic procedure for separating reservists from the civilian population and the recent veteran population is a statistical one.

First we will empirically derive demographic distributions from re-

* Our plan also calls for augmenting census data on the occupations of civilians. In particular, we plan to examine occupations in a second job and the occupational aspirations of individuals still in training. While the importance of vocational trainees is obvious in both the long run and the short run, we relegate the census classification file augmentations to a later stage of the project because some of the necessary data will not be available until mid-1984. At a minimum, the project will explore, document, and construct files and models that allow for subsequent inclusions of information on individuals in training programs.

** We understand that a request is being made for the 1990 Decennial Census to include questions on Reserve status as well as on branch of military service.

servist's records, then we will use those distributions and information on the fraction of reservists who are veterans to remove reservists from the broader population.

Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) maintains personnel files for all reservists. From their Reserve Component Personnel Data system, we will construct a distribution of reservists (by age, race, sex, education, and geographic location). With this count of reservists by their characteristics, we can statistically remove reservists from our 1980 census count of individuals by their characteristics. It should be noted that this procedure assumes that the civilian occupational distribution of reservists of a given age, education etc. mirrors that of non-reservists. As a check on the robustness of this assumption, we will explore the sensitivity of the results to other methodologies.

In particular, Navy and Air Force IMAFMIS (Inactive Master Files) records of reservists' civilian occupations will be used as a check on the validity of establishing civilian occupations by the statistical procedure. Unfortunately, a nontrivial number of civilian occupational codes are missing on these files, and we will need to assign some civilian occupations to individuals.* The most straightforward assumption is that the distribution of missing civilian occupations mirrors the distribution of reported occupations.

* There are reasons to believe that reservists who do not report their occupations are more likely to have civilian occupations that, if known, would disqualify them from reserve participation. (In particular, they may be in civilian occupations deemed critical and thus not mobilizable in the event of war.) We understand the services are attempting to improve the accuracy and the reporting of civilian occupations for their reserve personnel records.

Given the civilian occupational distribution of reservists (as well as their ages, educations, etc), and our knowledge of recent veterans, we can then treat them separately from other civilians. Both recent veterans and reservists have military skills acquired in the military and will be counted in the inventory on the basis of their military specialities.

THE MILITARY/CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONAL CROSSWALK

The remaining part of the project will be to assess the military applicability of the civilian occupations of individuals who are neither recent veterans nor Ready Reservists.

Project Crosswalk, headed by Dr. Anita Lancaster (OSD, MRA&L), has related each military specialty to a civilian specialty at the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) level and at the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) level.* Since the SOC is quite comparable to the

* The actual matching of military and civilian occupations was done at the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) level. Ideally one could construct D.O.T. occupational weights for each census occupation, e.g., for each civilian occupation the number of individuals with militarily relevant skill is equal to

$$\frac{\text{Number of individuals in D.O.T. classifications that are militarily relevant for this census occupation}}{\text{Total number of individuals in this census occupation}}$$

Unfortunately, there is no employment (occupational incumbent) information at the D.O.T. level of disaggregation. The basic model will abstract from the problem of weights, and count civilians with militarily relevant skills as all individuals in an occupation with any militarily relevant D.O.T.'s. As a refinement to the basic model, we hope to use occupation by industry matrices to more precisely identify the fraction of individuals in each census category who have militarily relevant skills.

occupational breakdown in the 1980 census, the crosswalk provides us with a set of military occupations that can be matched to particular civilian occupations identified in the census.

The first step is to take (or construct) from the crosswalk tape the 504 Census occupations and their military matches. They will then be added to a matrix of civilian occupational incumbent characteristics built from the 1980 census. To review what the output will be at this stage in the analysis, we can use the example of civilian airplane mechanics. We will have a count (by Census region, age, education, disability status, veteran status, etc.) of the number of airplane mechanics in 1980. Additionally, we will know (because of the crosswalk) the correspondence between Navy, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard jobs and the civilian job, airplane mechanic.

With this information, we anticipate building two files. One file would be organized by civilian Census occupation, the other by DoD occupation. Although the two files would contain the same information (including occupational projections, discussed later in this proposal), it will be easier to access a file organized by military occupation for some purposes, and one by civilian occupation for others.

Critical Occupations: Civilian and Military

In the event of war, certain occupations, both for the military and for the civilian sector, are more critical than others, and it may be

desirable to pay special attention to these occupations. Although it is outside the scope of this effort to formulate such a list, should one be provided to us we would want to do the following:

- (1) Exclude individuals in occupations that are critical in the civilian sector (individuals who must stay in those jobs in the event of war) from the occupational inventory of civilians who could be inducted into the military.
- (2) Devote extra attention to validating the military/civilian crosswalk for occupations the military deems especially important. In particular, we can use occupation by industry matrices to more precisely define the civilian-military job matches.

PROJECTIONS

We intend to build a model that can be easily updated as circumstances change. While we will provide a national manpower inventory for 1980 and rough projections of that inventory to the year 2000, the model should be manipulable by future users. Although projections for the civilian population (by race, sex, etc.) probably cannot be improved until the 1990 Census is available, projections of reserve end-strength and the separations of individuals from the active military can be updated annually.

It is our firm belief that projection models should be updatable as more information becomes available. For example, our estimates of reserve end-strength in the nineties will be based upon a 1983-4 perspective. By the late eighties, however, reserve end-strength projections for the nineties may look very different, particularly given the current debate on active/reserve force mixes. The model will therefore be constructed to enable users to enter the revised projections.

Reserve End-Strength and Recent Veterans

These projections are necessary if one is to have the segmented inventory (reservists, recent veterans, true civilians) that we propose. For reserve end-strength we can employ POM projections. For recent veterans we will have to build a small projection model for separations from the active military.

Future distributions of military occupations can be projected on the basis of the 1983 military occupational distributions as well as on the basis of the military's projections of changes in these distributions. We anticipate projecting reservists' and recent veterans' military occupational specialties on the basis of several scenarios. If projection data, by military occupational specialties, are available from the services, we will use them. Otherwise, we will use our own projections for one military occupational structure that mirrors the current force, a second structure that is oriented a bit more toward technical occupations, and a third that is substantially more technical.

Civilian Occupational Inventory

Here we need to develop a methodology to project the civilian occupational inventory to the year 2000. Moreover, the model we build should be sufficiently flexible to enable users to modify parameters or add newer data. We anticipate first carefully examining the occupational employment projections made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Office of Economic Growth, Division of Occupational Outlook). BLS classifies 1600-1700 occupations by industry; they currently have projections until the year 1990.* This fall the machine-readable data should be available to 1995. Since these projections are regularly updated, it would be advantageous to use them as a base, thereby making it easier for future users to update the model. Assuming we pursue this strategy, the procedural steps we would follow for the projection procedure are to:

- (1) Establish the demographic characteristics of the civilian occupation and match these to the military occupations (sections I and II of this report);
- (2) Project the characteristics of occupational incumbents. This step provides a distribution of the future incumbents in the occupations by race, age, sex, etc.;

* The National Science Foundation and Data Resources, Incorporated, also produce occupational projections. We will explore the usefulness of these data for the NMI.

- (3) Crosswalk the BLS occupational taxonomy to the SOC codes (this has been done) and input BLS projections of aggregate numbers of incumbents by civilian occupations;
- (4) Merge the BLS aggregate occupational projections and distribute them by the characteristics of incumbents derived in step 2 above.

The second step is the most difficult, since there are no projections available which characterize occupations by more than the number of jobs.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

At the conclusion of this study the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) will be provided a model which inventories military skills for the civilian, recent veteran, and selected reserve populations. The inventory will be by occupation and by the Census categories requested by the NMI working group. Additionally, the inventory will be forecast into the future. Although we are still in the initial stages of developing the projection model, we see it being useful for both mobilization and recruiting purposes.

Army Reserve Component Status and Potential

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Introduction

The Army's reliance upon the Reserve Components for execution of war plans is significant. From a total force structure perspective, approximately 50% of combat forces are Reserve Component. Over 2/3 of non-divisional combat support and combat service support units are Reserve Component (RC). Through FY 84, Active Component (AC) end strength will be relatively constant, while RC strength will increase significantly. By FY 89 all CONUS AC divisions will be "rounded out" by RC brigades or battalions.

Not surprisingly, missions assigned to RC units reflect the growing percentage of RC in the total force structure. The preponderance of units assigned to OPLANs are RC, and a significant and increasing number are designated as early deployers. The degree of reliance upon the RC is such that the Army cannot execute major OPLANs without RC participation. The need for a ready, capable RC force is real. The following paragraphs will assess RC current status and potential, and outline areas needing study.

Definitions

To insure discussion from a common plane, the following paragraphs rather arbitrarily define terms. Readiness, generally

speaking, is a measure of resource fill, training achieved, and the ability of a unit to mobilize and deploy. The current tool which purports to measure readiness is the Unit Status Report (USR) of the JCS Unit Identity and Status Reporting System. The USR reports personnel and equipment on-hand relative to wartime requirements, includes a subjective evaluation of training by the unit commander, but does not address ability to mobilize or deploy. Capability, on the other hand, is a measure of a unit's ability to warfight, or to support units which are warfighting. Potential is the upper limit or the maximum capability a unit properly resourced and trained could achieve. Currently, no system exists to adequately measure capability or potential. To illustrate the terms, an M48A5 tank battalion fully resourced and trained to M48A5 unit standards would equal the readiness of an M-1 tank battalion fully resourced and trained to M-1 unit standards. However, potential and capability of the two units would be vastly different. Additionally, a unit reporting low readiness may have a substantial warfighting capability. This dichotomy exists in the Army today because new authorization documents for modernization items are issued to units prior to equipment being fielded, generating an immediate decrease in measured readiness. This occurs even though the same equipment remains on-hand as before the document change and unit capability and potential remain constant.

Current Status

Turning to current RC readiness, there has been an upward trend in the thirty-seven major combat units (chiefly, Army National Guard). Overall status has improved slightly with significant improvement in personnel and training; however, there has been a slight negative change in equipment on-hand and equipment readiness. The equipment on-hand rating is to a great degree a victim of equipment authorization changes discussed previously. USAR trends are similar to Army National Guard major combat unit trends. Personnel and training status have improved significantly, but areas of equipment shortages exist, chiefly in communication/electronic, medical, NBC, engineer, and tactical vehicles.

Personnel

The major personnel detractors from readiness are degraded MOS qualification, caused by assigned personnel awaiting or undergoing initial active duty training, and MOS mismatch. To correct the problem, the Army has shortened the time between date of enlistment of non-prior service personnel and date of reporting for initial active duty training. This has served both to reduce the time a member serves in an untrained status and improve the use of training space allocations. It should be noted, however, that although manning and quality levels are up in the RC, they fall short of wartime strengths, with the majority of the shortfall in the Individual Ready Reserve.

Equipment

Equipment shortages are a result of years of austere defense budgets. The Army is playing catch-up. Separate appropriations by Congress/OSD of \$25 million in FY 81, \$135 million in FY 82, and \$15 million in FY 83 for Rapid Deployment Force-Army and other early deploying RC units have been or will be applied to equipment shortfalls. Additionally, the Army FY 84 budget provides \$1.1 billion of new procurement to the RC. The Army's priority system allocates resources to units according to the principle of first to fight, first resourced. Many RC early deploying units are placed higher in priority than active units with later deploying dates. The result is better equipment resourcing of RC units in both common and modernization items. Early deploying RC units are receiving modernized equipment such as M-1 and M60A3 tanks, improved TOW vehicles, and cavalry fighting vehicles. In addition to new procurement, later deploying RC units will receive a substantial amount of equipment through displacement by fielding modernization items to early deploying units.

Training

The CAPSTONE program has allowed peacetime mission-oriented training based upon wartime missions. RC units are allowed to train with and develop standard operating procedures with those AC and RC units with which they will operate with upon OPLAN execution. During FY 83 more than 400 RC units or cells participated in overseas training opportunities in the theater where they would be employed. At home an RC tank battalion recently

completed training at the National Training Center. A mechanized battalion will complete the training in FY 84; in FY 85 five RC battalions will be cycled through.

Full-Time Manning

The program with the most potential for pay-off is full-time manning. Full-time manning, or that program where soldiers are full-time active duty in RC units in training, operations, maintenance, administrative, and supply positions, will be increased from 10,000 to 55,000 spaces by the end of FY 89. The Army's goal is to achieve approximately 10% of the RC force as full-time personnel. Early deploying RC units will have a higher percentage of FTM than later deploying units. While pay-off for FTM's might not be visible in reports which measure unit resource fill, such as the Unit Status Report, warfighting capability of units should be significantly enhanced.

Reserve Component Potential

Having looked briefly at current readiness of the RC and initiatives to improve readiness, the central issues remain, "How capable is the RC, and what is the potential of the RC relative to that of the AC?" As we place more and more reliance upon the RC for roundout and early deploying missions, the question is central to our ability to execute war plans. A fundamental premise to the discussion is that RC forces should be less costly than AC. An RC force with costs similar to

the AC provides no economic advantage. A cheaper RC force which jeopardizes national security is too costly. The issue then becomes one of balance, "What is the maximum warfighting capability which can be achieved at "reasonable" costs?" Assuming that resources were made available to procure like equipment for AC and RC units, and that sufficient funds were available to recruit manpower in the proper skills, a case could be made that AC and RC potential are equal. Then the maximum feasible capability that could be achieved is limited by training. Currently an average AC battalion spends on the order of 160 days training per year. The average RC unit trains 38 days per year. Arguments exists as to whether AC or RC units are more turbulent and which makes better use of training days available. However, AC units are generally trained to the level to which they will be employed, while RC units are trained to lower levels, generally company and below. Traditionally, the Army has relied upon a post mobilization training period to integrate and train RC units "up" to the level to be employed. The general conclusion reached is that upon mobilization, AC units can be ready to deploy in hours or days, while RC units need days or weeks. Logic then states that most AC units are best suited for forward deployed, rapid deployment missions, while most RC units are best suited for follow-on, sustainment missions. Questions may arise as to why the Army has assigned so many RC units as early deployers. The answer includes the

fact that sufficient AC units are not available to satisfy all requirements. There is heavy reliance on the RC to offset AC combat service support shortfalls, particularly in the early days of conflict. Fortunately, these RC units rely more on individual than collective skills and are, therefore, less prone to deployment delays for additional training. It is also important to note that there are certain types of units that exist only in the RC, such as graves registration.

The Army is feeling growing pressure from within and without to save money by increasing the RC role. Arguments have been made to reduce AC end strength and replace AC units with RC. Reduction of AC end strength could result in inactivation of forward deployed units and early deploying AC units. Since RC units cannot be forward deployed, more RC units must be deployed early to meet NATO commitments. The result places a greater burden on the Army to insure RC readiness, and aggravates already strained strategic lift.

Current thoughts on increasing RC training readiness run from increased use of training simulators and expanding the number of pre-stocked equipment pools at mobilization sites to increased numbers of active duty training days per year. However, the proposal considered to have the most potential pay-off is that of the full-time manning increase discussed earlier. Those very early deploying units would have a high percentage of full-time personnel with percentages quoted by some for very early

deployers as high as 75%. Although the payoff might be realized, the expense may be great. The majority of savings between AC and RC are in operation and support costs and military pay. Increasing full-time manning can only be done at the expense of all three savings, which was what the Army set out to achieve.

Conclusions

Readiness and capability of the RC are inextricably linked to training. Unfortunately that is precisely the area in which the Army has had least success in measuring. When the RC is assigned a later deploying mission, we instinctively feel better, relying on an external post mobilization time to cure all woes. But if we were to go to war today, extended time may not be available, as many units will load equipment shortly after arriving at mobilization stations and will depart at the level of training achieved at that point. To counter this problem innovative means of training are needed, as is a reliable and credible method of measuring training status. Potential of AC and RC units from an equipping and manning perspective can be made equal; however, the central issue remains, "Are there significant capability differences between AC and RC units caused by an inability to achieve acceptable training readiness within reasonable costs?" There is a need to develop more sophisticated means of measuring training readiness and capability. Failure to do so may result in unwarranted optimism in RC capability and may jepordize national security.

This paper was prepared for purposes of discussion at a scholarly conference and it represents solely the views of the author. Statements contained in the paper do not constitute policy, nor do they necessarily reflect the official views of the Defense Department or any agency thereof, including in particular the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; the National Defense University; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or any Military Department or Component. The paper is not intended for release or publication until formal clearance procedures are complied with.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE ADDRESS VERIFICATION

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INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE ADDRESS VERIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) manpower assets are vital to the mobilization success of the United States Marine Corps Reserve as 45 - 55% of the IRR will receive mailgram orders prior to or on M-Day and will join a gaining command by M+30. The primary need of this initial IRR surge is to fill out Tables of Organization and initially sustain early deploying Fleet Marine Force unit manpower requirements. Accurate and timely personnel data verification and updating of the IRR file during peacetime are critical elements for mobilization. It is imperative that address data be accurate to ensure that IRR can be efficiently notified, ordered to active duty, and joined to early deploying Marine Corps units. Maintaining accurate IRR addresses is an important issue to all Military Services. The inaccurate IRR address issue has been highlighted by many mobilization exercise after action reports. DOD attempts to gain access into non-military Federal agency data files for address verification purposes have been unsuccessful up to this point. With the various time critical contingencies tasked to the Marine Corps, maintaining accurate IRR addresses is of paramount importance.

DISCUSSION

In preparation EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83, the Marine Corps identified an IRR inaccurate addresse rate of approximately 30%, well below the Department of Defense goal of 10% or less. This percentage does not include show rates, since show rates will only be known after mobilization. An address was considered inaccurate if one of the following items occurred:

- Missing zip code, box number or any other element from the data base.
- Questionable items challenging the validity of the address.
- Blank address data fields on the data file.
- Forwarded to a new address by the Postal Service
- Returned as undeliverable by the Postal Service

This high inaccurate address rate caused concern as the Marine Corps relies heavily on the IRR early-on in the mobilization process. Several corrective actions internal to the Marine Corps were subsequently taken. These actions which lowered the inaccurate address rate to approximately 18% included:

- Ensuring better quality control of data entered into the IRR data base
- Decreasing the administrative transaction time for an individual released from active duty into the IRR data base.
- Sending questionnaires annually to each IRR (with an address on file) requesting verification of current as well as other details.
- Educating the IRR as to their legal responsibilities to the six year military obligation and associated administrative requirements.
- Notifying the Marine Corps Reserve Support Center of any address changes of IRRs contacted by Reserve Component Recruiters.

Since sufficient time has not lapsed, the total effect of these corrective actions is unknown. An inaccurate address rate of approximately 13% is expected; however, this rate is unacceptable. In order to understand the difficulties involved in maintaining accurate and timely IRR address data, one must realize that the young IRR population is a very mobile asset. Mobile not only in the number entering and leaving the IRR

population (Approximately 4,000 per month), but also in the high incidence of residence changes, typical of the young population base of the United States. Approximately 93% of the Marine Corps IRR are Sergeants or below in their early twenties. Additionally, the individual may not be aware of or have a desire to comply with the legal obligation of notifying the Marine Corps Reserve Support Center of address changes.

As depicted, corrective action has reduced the address inaccuracy rate; however those remedies are still insufficient towards achieving less than a 10% error rate. Therefore, the Marine Corps has investigated and tested a procedure dedicating manpower to research the data available within the Marine Corps by telephonically contacting and verifying/updating known bad IRR addresses. This test was done on a small scale and may not be all inclusive; however the results are valid. The methodology for the test is as follows:

- Test sample was limited to 876 enlisted IRR with valid IRR obligations.
- The preparation, research and telephone calls were conducted by a Lance Corporal (E-3) Reservist with civilian experience in telephone skiptracing techniques.
- Preparation and research was accomplished from data in Service Record Books i.e., Records of Emergency data,

Service Group-Life Insurance, leave papers and DD-214. The only external asset used was telephone operator assistance.

The test results demonstrated that 129 valid addresses were telephonically acquired from the test sample 876. This represents a verification rate of 14.5%. To attain these results, 123.5 manhours and 2,190 telephone calls were required. Of the 123.5 man hours expected, 72.5 hours (58.7%) were devoted to research and preparation, while 51 hours (41.3%) were spent making telephone calls.

Direct manpower costs to obtain valid addresses in the test were approximately \$4.25 per verified address at a rate of less than 15% proficiency. Overhead costs such as telephone, facilities, and equipment were not considered since no additional costs to the government were incurred.

If the test were performed by a civilian employee (GS-4) using the same internal Marine Corps assets, the corresponding direct manpower costs would be \$6.95 per verified address. The proficiency rate would remain approximately the same.

Dedicating manpower of higher rank and more military experience may slightly increase the proficiency rate; however, a corresponding increased cost per verification will occur.

Contracting civilian agencies to varify and update addresses was also investigated. Estimated costs ranged from \$15.00 to \$20.00 per verified or updated address.

Increased proficiency of obtaining valid addresses can be directly correlated to increasing the training level of manpower and to increasing the skiptracing tools available such as the Metropolitan Polk Library, the Nationwide Coles Library, Metropolitan telephone/ Street Criss Cross Directories, as well as a nationwide collection of telephone directories. The use of skiptracing tools increases the proficiency of obtaining valid addresses into 60% to 75% range but also significantly increases overhead as well as manpower costs. These skiptracing tools not only cost thousands of dollars to purchase but also require additional manpower for update and maintenance.

CONCLUSION

Although valid, the test results are quite disappointing when considering the number of man-hours involved for such a low address verification rate. From the test results and associated research conducted, it is concluded that:

- Regardless of the Marine Corps' application of present internal assets of manpower, time, and data bases towards verifying bad IRR addresses, attainment of valid IRR

addresses will be significantly less than 100%.

- Dedicating military/civil service personnel to telephonically verify and update inaccurate IRR addresses is inefficient and ineffective.
- Contracting civilian agencies to verify and update inaccurate IRR addresses is too costly.
- Access into existing data bases within the Federal government will provide the most accurate data available with little or no additional cost in manpower or overhead.

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The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program:

A View from Inside

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"The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization public or private. The purpose of this paper is to disseminate information and opinion on issues of importance to those concerned with various aspects of mobilization, especially of the Guard and Reserve Components."

"Individual Mobilization Augmentee" or IMA, is a very descriptive term for the category of the Reserves to which it is applied. As an IMA a Reservist can never complain his individuality or initiative is imperiled -- in fact, he or she must maintain these attributes to meaningfully participate in this category of the Ready Reserves. For the most part, an IMA is "on his own" or at least feels that way. Yes, there's the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) in Denver with its 800 number to help you, but it's in Denver and the number frequently is busy. When paper work is incorrectly prepared by either the Reservist or ARPC, it's not just a matter of passing it across a counter or desk to fix.

It's the IMA's responsibility to ensure his or her participation in training weekends, and annual active duty tour is scheduled to meet the criteria for a "good year". Likewise, only an individual's initiative will determine whether he or she enrolls in and completes Professional Military Education courses. Arranging time away from one's civilian employment for physicals and other miscellaneous requirements is the individual's responsibility to arrange. Being on IMA is like being a Squadron Commander or First Sergeant for a one-man organization.

The purpose of the IMA program is summed up in the word Augmentee. Woody Allen said showing up is 80% of life; that seems to apply to the Ready Reserves. But showing up on time isn't enough. IMA's are expected to show up prepared, ready to function as an integral member of the active duty unit to which he or she is assigned. The IMA is

civilian, my day-to-day activities are dominated by my job and family much the same as an individual in the military. The primary difference is that I am fundamentally a civilian, but underlying my status as a civilian is a significant commitment to the military. I am prepared to drop everything, get my business and personal affairs in order, and within three days of notification be on active duty. There will be a negative financial impact to my family, my civilian career will be interrupted and likely suffer -- so why do I do it?

There are many reasons why an individual is motivated to voluntarily maintain an association with the Reserves. For some it is patriotism and dedication to the Air Force. For others, it is financial considerations and preservation of an equity built-up over years of active duty, and there are those who find a greater sense of purpose and belonging in their Reserve role than in their status as a civilian. Personally, I usually derive a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment after a Training Weekend (TW) or annual active duty tour. During a recent TW, all personnel participated in an American Red Cross basic life support course in cardiopulmonary resuscitation. I walked away from that TW with a new skill that will be useful to both my civilian community and the Air Force. I believe the Reserves are of utmost importance to our national defense -- my presence here is indicative of the importance I attach to mobilization. I hope we never have to be mobilized, but if it comes down to that, it is my conviction we should be able to mobilize as quickly and orderly as possible.

filling a wartime position -- when mobilized there will be no time to acquire basic job skills or even on-the-job training. Therefore annual tours are normally performed with the active duty unit to which the IMA is assigned for mobilization. IMA's are acutely aware of the necessity to make a good impression on the personnel in the active duty unit -- if for no other reason than a letter of evaluation rendered following the annual tour. The IMA arrives at his Mobilization Day or "M-Day" Command motivated to jump into the thick of it--unfortunately, it seems more often than not the first time around, the active duty unit has either not received word the IMA is coming or they are not prepared to put him or her to work. However, once a Reservist has pulled a tour or two with his active duty unit and has been calibrated as competent, it is not unusual for the IMA to find his presence represents an opportunity for an active duty officer or NCO to take leave. Many IMA's maintain contact throughout the year with their active duty units to solicit projects that can be worked on during training weekends and to determine optimum times for annual tours or additional man-days.

At a recent social affair, I had an active duty Army officer tell me he wasn't betting on the Reserves to show-up in a crisis. I felt compelled to inform him that he should expect to get good odds if he ever makes such a bet. Mobilization of the Ready Reserve is something the President, Congress, and Department of Defense (DOD) are betting on in the event of war.

The DoD periodically screens Reservists and Guardsmen to determine if they hold key civilian jobs in government and essential positions in industry that would preclude their being mobilized. Last year, only

153 federal employees (.005% of the federal work force) were determined to be key civilian employees and were removed from the Ready Reserve. Also, during 1982 the aerospace industry was studied -- three major defense contractors with nearly a quarter million employees were screened. Over 4,200 employees who were Ready Reservists could be mobilized from General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Boeing. The notation that Reservists will not be available for mobilization because of essential positions in government or industry is simply not true. The National Policy is clear: in any future mobilization, no deferment of reservists will be granted because of civilian employment.

The Total Force Policy has been in effect for 10 years and the Air Force has truly embraced this policy and implemented it throughout its force structure. For example, if you are an air crew member flying a transport or air refueling mission, chances are 50-50 you're a Reservist.

IMA's and particularly members of the Air Force Intelligence Reserve (AFIR) Program (of which I have first hand knowledge) develop a clear understanding of their role as an individual in the Total Force -- specifically where and when they fit in as well as what is expected of them. It has been my experience that IMA's develop a strong sense of identity with both their Reserve Program and the active duty unit with which they perform their annual two week tours.

But basically, we're civilians and for lack of a better description, our Reserve commitment can represent a constant dilemma. As a

Probably the most recurring theme of being an IMA is preparation for mobilization. You know you're an IMA everyday when you open your wallet and see your red I.D. card and tightly folded-up copy of an alert notification roster. We receive mobilization kits from ARPC, discuss mobilization readiness at training weekends, practice telephone alerts several times a year, and notify our Reserve Unit Commanders of our business and private travel plans and how to maintain contact with us. The effectiveness of the telephone alert recall system used by AFIR was demonstrated last year when a 93% contact rate was achieved. Preparation for mobilization also includes planning for the impact on one's family and job, especially if the Reservist is the proprietor of his own business. These are non-trivial concerns; the family as well as the Reservist is going to be required to adjust to a new style of life. Mobilization for the Reservist who would even remain in CONUS would likely mean living apart from his family.

Let me tell you a little about the AFIR Program and why I think it works as well as it does. First, it's relatively small with only about 1300 IMA's managed by a staff of 33 personnel within Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS). There is a great deal of "personalized" service with three different 800 numbers the IMA can call on for assistance on virtually all matters pertaining to the Reserve Program. Second, AFIR IMA's are usually experienced intelligence specialists who realize the degree of reliance the active force has placed upon them. In FY83, of the 16,651 manpower billets authorized for Air Force Intelligence, 25% existed in the Guard and Reserve; and of those nearly 3/4's (3117) authorizations were IMA resources. An IMA is not only expected to productively contribute to an active duty unit during his

annual two week tour but also during periodic Training Weekends throughout the year. TW's are conducted at nearly 60 field locations called Detached Training Sites (DTS's) in the Continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, Germany, United Kingdom, and Panama Canal Zone.

At TW's there is a substantial amount of time devoted to work on projects supporting local active duty organizations or remotely tasked projects by national agencies. My observations are that for most individuals, about 10 of the 16 hours during a TW can be devoted to substantive intelligence production. The balance of the weekend is normally consumed with administrative and ancillary training activities.

A very attractive quality of the AFIR program is its flexibility. Weekend training periods are scheduled throughout the year to allow individuals maximum flexibility to plan to meet minimum Reserve participation requirements or maximize participation for "points only". The incentive for participation beyond the minimum required weekends is frequently self-motivation based on an individual's interest in a project or on-going task in support of an active duty organization. A few additional points can be credited for retirement purposes but beyond that participation points have non-monetary value. Such "extra" points do help identify those individuals whose promotion potential is enhanced by a willingness to volunteer their time and energy beyond minimum requirements.

I don't know if it was by design or chance, but the AFIR program seems tailored to fit the demands of our mobile society. Many professions (especially those in the Aerospace Industry) require an individual to periodically relocate. In my own case, it was a move

from Southern California to Central Florida a couple of years ago; a few phone calls to AFIS/RE and ARPC followed-up by a little paper work facilitated my transfer from DTS-7 at March AFB to DTS-10 at MacDill AFB. I wasn't required to "find" a new unit with a vacancy or lose a "good" year of reserve participation as a result of the move. As you are all well aware, relocating with a family is stressful enough without having to worry about whether or not one will be able to continue his or her participation in the Reserves.

A very appealing feature of the AFIR program is the people. Most of us evolve a social life around a fairly fixed set of local friends and acquaintances. Periodic TW's bring together a group of individuals with widely varying professions from many different communities. We obviously share some fundamental common values and while more frequently than not we only see each other at TW's, I believe the sense of purpose we share results in a sense of camaraderie and mutual trust that can be even stronger than our good civilian friendships. After duty hours on a Saturday, it is almost an institutional practice to go out to dinner as a group. We don't do this because of any organizational pressure, but because we enjoy each other's company. AFIR people are for the most part a well informed group when it comes to current issues, whether international, national, or local. Some of us are fairly active in community affairs and play key roles in business, government, and political organizations. I personally like being with a category or people that I would characterize as the "movers and shakers" of a community -- AFIR seems to have more than its fair share of such individuals.

I'm going to conclude on the subject of pay -- I've seen advertising on television referring to the Guard and Reserves as the most important part-time job in America. Well, it may also be one of the best paying part-time jobs. As a Major, I am remunerated at a rate of over \$22.00 per hour for the 16 hours of activity scheduled during a Training Weekend. One of my Staff Sergeant's advised me that he earns in excess of \$9.00 per hour. Now, couple the pay with the fact the Internal Revenue Service allows a Reservist to deduct the expenses incurred with his or her participation, and you have a pretty good deal by most standards. While we're on the subject of pay -- there is another side to the coin. If I were employing someone on a part-time basis paying what IMA's earn, I'd expect maximum productivity. Active duty organizations that can task IMA's for support during training weekends should have high expectations, both in terms of the quantity and quality of the projects they assign. The Government is paying a lot of money to keep IMA's around. They represent a manpower resource even in peacetime that active duty officers must recognize can be effectively utilized in support of their missions.

This brings me back to why people are motivated to stay in the Reserves. The Reservist who is challenged and believes his work is important to an active duty unit feels he or she is truly a part of the Total Force. Major General Gill (Chief of the Air Force Reserve) summed it up nicely in an article I recently read: "We give our people good training and job satisfaction. They feel they're really accomplishing something -- that's the real secret to our retention."

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THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE PROGRAM

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THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE PROGRAM

The United States Air Force has elected to place a significant percentage of its combat capability in the Air Reserve Forces (ARF), the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contribute to nearly 25% of all Air Force flying and support missions. In some areas they provide more than half the total mission capability. The Air Force Reserve has two separate Selected Reserve programs - A unit program and an individual program called the Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program or IMA. There are nearly 55,00 personnel in Reserve units and 11,000 personnel in the IMA Program. The Air National Guard consists totally of units.

Within the Air Force Reserve there are significant differences in the unit program and the IMA program. Units are assigned to HQ Air Force Reserve (AFRES) which is a separate operating activity of the Air Force. The Chief of Air Force Reserve, Major General Sloan R. Gill, is also the Commander of AFRES. He is an Air Force Reservist as are all AFRES numbered Air Force and unit commanders. The unit program is managed by Reservists who train to Air Force and gaining major command standards. Unit Reservists train one weekend a month plus a two week active duty tour.

In the unit program various factors are considered before a decision is made to assign missions and the necessary equipment and personnel to the Reserve. ARF missions focus primarily on forces needed to augment to meet surge and sustained high level of operations. Assigning missions to the ARF enables the Air Force to take advantage of previous active duty training and experience. This together with

lower peacetime activity rates and lower costs of part-time personnel provide cost benefits to the Air Force. When force structure decisions are made after careful evaluation, these decisions are reflected in the Air Force program objective memorandum submitted to the Department of Defense and finally in the Air Force budget for manpower and equipment which projects through the five year defense plan.

Planning for the Air Force Individual Mobilization Augmentee program which consists of individual Reserve members assigned to wartime only authorizations in active duty organizations, is quite different.

Requirements or authorizations for Individual Mobilization Augmentees or IMAs result from the Air Force Wartime Manpower Planning and Programming system. Wartime manpower planning is based on the premise that the manpower required to accomplish a specific workload in wartime does not necessarily equal the current active and ARF funded manpower authorizations. Changes in threat, concept of operation, warplans, and equipment occur more rapidly than the reaction time of the programming and budgeting system. Each year the Air Force wartime manpower planning system compares the total manpower required to execute JCS operational tasking and to sustain the force in the CONUS with the funded active and ARF unit manpower levels. The process identifies Air Force manpower shortfalls that are likely to occur in the event of full mobilization. The skills and number by time needed are identified. When there is a shortage at M-Day, the Air Force identifies Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentee positions and allocates these positions to specific active duty organizations where the shortfall exists. This process is conducted annually. Thus IMA authorizations are subject to annual change. In addition the Air Force permits commands to identify additional IMA wartime positions where there is little or no peacetime tasking but specific training in the positions is necessary in order to perform in wartime. These IMA

positions may be established even when the Air Force does not have an overall shortfall in the specialty involved.

While there has been a growth of over 5000 authorizations in the past few years, it has not been uniform in all skills. In some skills the requirements have decreased while others have increased. Because of this, one of the primary concerns of personnel managers has been to dampen the impact of these changes on individual reservists by permitting retraining, overgrade manning, flexibility in training locations etc., so that an individual is not impacted unnecessarily by fluctuating wartime requirements.

IMAs assigned to these positions train to perform in the positions at mobilization. Supervision is provided by the active force, and IMAs normally perform inactive duty training during active duty working hours. They normally train only one day a month rather than two as in the unit program. All IMAs are experienced prior service personnel who have spent four or more years on active duty. They are able to maintain proficiency in their specialties by training one day a month plus a two week annual tour.

Management of the IMA Program is a shared active and Reserve responsibility. Within the Air Force the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel has overall responsibility for the IMA program. He establishes the personnel policies for the program and, in conjunction with other Air Staff functional managers, approves all the IMA authorizations in the Air Force. In addition he establishes personnel mobilization and sustainment policy to support combat or contingencies.

The Chief of Air Force Reserve, operating within broad policy guidelines, has responsibility for programming and budgeting, for establishing assignment, training and separation procedures, and for providing guidance to the Commander of the Air Reserve Personnel Center.

The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) is charged with responsibility to oversee and assess IMA program compliance by Air Force commands and outside agencies. It provides centralized personnel support to IMAs including assignments, orders, pay records maintenance and career counseling. ARPC also acts as the single manager for Reserve chaplain, legal and medical personnel.

From this point IMAs are managed by active duty commanders and supervisors who identify training requirements, schedule training, monitor participation, and evaluate IMA performance. Commanders and supervisors are also charged with ensuring the mobilization readiness of IMAs including testing of recall procedures.

Much of the success of the IMA program, however, rests with the dedication and high experience level of assigned IMAs. The Air Force specifies responsibilities of IMAs - who are all prior service members - and the IMAs accept these responsibilities willingly. Among these are:

1. Maintain proficiency in assigned specialty and mobilization tasking.
2. Maintain readiness for recall and ability to travel within 24 hours of notification.
3. Report changes in physical status, address, and telephone numbers.
4. Maintain physical fitness and weight control.

5. Comply with standards of dress and appearance.
6. Ensure personal affairs planning, including provisions for dependent care is accomplished.
7. Possess all needed uniforms and equipment.

IMAs also make contributions to the Air Force in peacetime. The Air Force uses the term "training" in conjunction with the inactive duty and active duty time performed by reservists, but this training most often consists of performing active duty missions. Intelligence IMAs augment active duty staffs, perform studies and analyses, support exercises and deployments, and provide translation support. Medical IMAs help in the staffing of active duty hospitals. Special agents research police records, perform surveillance, and assist in counter-intelligence efforts. Engineers are assigned projects and studies and they often provide engineering expertise which is not available on active duty. Weather forecasters man active duty detachments. The range of specialties in the IMA Program supports nearly all Air Force support activity. However, there are no IMA rated crew members and only a small number of non-rated crew members.

Until 1979 the focus of the IMA program was on retaining qualified personnel in the Reserve and on peacetime use. In 1979 and 1980 the Air Force began to focus on wartime use and to develop rapid mobilization procedures. Starting with Air Force Reserve exercises in 1980 and 1981, active force commands participated in recall tests for IMAs. This recall testing continued in JCS sponsored exercise PROUD SABER in 1982 and will be included in the 1983 exercise.

During tests and exercises commands are tasked with identifying the need for recall of IMAs as the exercise scenario develops. They must seek approval from HQ USAF for recall of specific numbers of IMAs as well as ARF units. The Air Staff response to these requests is based on exercise progress and the level of mobilization that has been approved at the time. Commands then initiate recall for the IMAs selected. In addition commands test their telephone notification system for all assigned IMAs. IMAs report based on telephone notification and receive confirming orders later.

For IMAs selected for recall, commands have three options when they mobilize IMAs. First they can input a code into the Air Force personnel data system which will result in recall of all assigned IMAs. The system will convert the IMAs from Reserve to active duty status including transferring pay to the active duty pay system (JUMPS). They also have the option of inputting a code plus specific personnel needed when they do not need all IMAs. If it is faster they can select a code which will recall all IMAs except specific individuals whom they identify.

Once the data system receives requests for recall of IMAs, it creates a tape of recalled IMAs and an orders format based on the authority for recall. The tape is then converted into mailgram orders which are sent to the IMA and his unit. The unit of assignment is also notified through the automated system.

IMAs are aware that the Air Force plans no formal in-processing period. Their personal affairs must be in order, IMAs report directly to their work station and mobilization processing is done on a "catch as catch can" basis.

This process has been tested and works well. During the 1982 JCS exercise PROUD SABER the Air Force also tested recall under section 6738. This section permits the President to recall up to 100,000 Reservists for 90 days. When recalled under this section, IMAs are not gained to active duty strength. They remain assigned to the Reserve. Therefore it is not possible to use the automated recall system. Commands must dispatch messages to the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) in Denver, Colorado. ARPC personnel must then manually process these requests and dispatch messages. ARPC estimates it could manually process up to 1000 orders in a 24 hour period.

The PROUD SABER exercise also tested ARPC capability to transition from a manually supported, non-EAD tour (Section 673B) to mobilization and an EAD tour with accession to the active duty force. Except for minor administrative errors the personnel system initiated the active duty orders and Section 673B orders were rescinded.

The Air Force now conducts quarterly tests of its IMA and other pretrained individual reservists mobilization systems. This insures that changes to the personnel data system have not inadvertently adversely affected the mobilization system. This testing is in addition to telephone notification tests and participation in mobilization tests during exercises.

In conjunction with improvement in identifying wartime augmentation requirements and improvements in IMA readiness and recall procedures, the Air Force recognized that additional full-time support for IMAs and their supervisors was required. A test of 10 bases was conducted in 1980. A Reserve NCO was assigned to the base personnel office at 10 bases. The primary job was to educate active duty supervisors and IMAs on the purpose and procedures of the program, to

assist in maintaining accountability and to perform personnel actions. Because the results were so positive, the Air Force Base IMA Administrator program was made permanent and 51 positions will be funded by 1985.

While the Air Force IMA Program has been successful, it is tailored to the Air Force. Therefore all Air Force policies and procedures are not easily transferred to other nations or services. Based on Air Force experience there are aspects of the program which should be considered. The following "keys" to a successful program are suggested. The IMA positions or authorizations must be based on a projected wartime need. Active duty leaders must see a need in order to support funding for the training costs for IMAs. IMAs must be prior service personnel. Training can then be focused on specific positions because training time is limited. Training policies must be flexible to permit commands to tailor training to their particular missions both in wartime and peacetime. Further, they must provide options for assigned IMAs to train at alternate locations and to select mutually convenient times for training. This training flexibility generates support for the programs by commanders and by IMAs.

The combination of known wartime need and training flexibility in peacetime is essential for successful competition for funding with other programs. When peacetime training of IMAs enables commands to complete needed peacetime tasks, active duty commanders are much more likely to support the program.

To be a valuable wartime asset IMAs must have their personal affairs in order at all times. They must be trained and equipped. Recall procedures must be developed and tested. This testing not only improves readiness, but also it serves to highlight the primary purpose of the program for commanders, supervisors and IMAs.

Finally, there must be some form of full-time support at locations with large

numbers of IMAs assigned. (The Air Force uses one NCO for every 100 IMAs) This support frees IMAs and supervisors from expending valuable training time on routine administrative matters.

The IMA program fulfills a need in the United States Air Force for rapid augmentation by trained personnel in time of war. It also provides valuable peacetime support. Because of its success and its flexibility, it can serve as a model for other services and other nations.

GAMING MOBILIZATION: THE TCRP

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Given the military's recent experience with mobilization exercises it comes as no surprise that the myriad of real and perceived problems associated with mobilization have been discussed, examined, reviewed, analyzed and documented by virtually every agency within the Department of Defense as well as other federal and state agencies. Yet, despite all of the attention afforded it, the convening of this colloquium is indicative that much work in this complex area still remains to be accomplished.

It is in this regard that I offer the suggestion that "gaming" may represent a valuable "tool" with which to tackle the complex issue of mobilization. War gaming, of course, certainly is not new; indeed, it has been used in one form or another for centuries in developing decisionmaking skills, exploring alternative concepts, and testing plans. However, given the recent "computer" revolution, war gaming has acquired added dimensions. No doubt all of us at one time or another have been involved with one of the computer-assisted "war fighting" games currently in the military's inventory of training aids. While such games are beneficial in terms of honing "war fighting," skills, they offer little with regard to mobilization. Unfortunately, there presently are no computer-assisted games that pertain to mobilization in its entirety. To be sure, work is on-going in this area. For example, the DA DCSPER has directed data base development and automation of a model as a Reserve Component manpower mobilization simulator. This model will provide a practical and timely means to examine Reserve Component "yields" under various legal and administrative

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requirements and constraints. Additionally, the U.S. Army War College has been tasked to assist in the development of a model focusing on the critical area of training base expansion.

Another on-going effort that offers great potential in dealing with the complex issue of mobilization is the U.S. Army's Tactical Command Readiness Program or TCRP. Indeed, during the past nine months the U.S. Army War College has been working directly with the Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMk) VIII under the auspices of the TCRP focusing on the issues of mobilization planning and procedures. This supported effort culminated on 30 October 1983, with the completion of a two-day seminar "game" involving over seventy active and reserve component senior level participants from the ten-state region on ARMR VIII as well as representatives from other ARMRs, FEMAs, Sixth Army, Forces Command, the Army National Guard Bureau, and the Army Reserves. Based on the benefits derived from this project, it is anticipated that further such endeavors will be initiated in the near future.

Originally developed for the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, (CINCLANTFLT), the U.S. Army's version of the Tactical Command Readiness Program initially appeared as a recommendation in the Army's 1978 Review of the Education and Training of Officers (RETO) study. Specifically, the study recommended that the "U.S. Army War College develop and manage an Army-wide Tactical Command Readiness Program (TCRP) for use by field commanders at the corps level and above," as a means to keep "abreast of major operational considerations in the deployment and tactical employment of major Army and supporting forces in both contingency and general war situations."¹

Approved for implementation on 4 May 1979, by General Bernard W. Rogers, then serving as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, the TCRP is designed to support

senior commanders and their staffs by providing an instructional vehicle for: exercising command and staff procedures; resolving staff relationships; testing alternatives for operational and contingency plans; and training senior commanders and their staffs. The program is not, however, meant to be a replacement for field exercises. Rather, it seeks to complement command post and field training exercises by increasing the overall effectiveness of command and staff elements prior to conducting such exercises, thereby reducing the amount of lost time and effort during the more resource-intensive training.

The normal "life cycle" of a TCRP project is nine to twelve months and consists of three distinct phases: pre-gaming; gaming; and post-gaming. The first and most crucial step in the pre-gaming phase is issue identification and scenario development. Since each project is designed specifically to assist a senior commander and his staff, it is only logical that they identify the major issues to be addressed and the scenario to be used. Based on subsequent discussions with the supported commander and his staff, numerous sub-issues also are identified and incorporated into the overall project. All of this information is then consolidated into a succinct, command approved, objective statement which serves as the focal point for the supported command's subsequent TCRP activities. In the case of ARMR VIII, the objective statement was to:

Provide a programmed learning text based on an international crisis scenario running from D-30 to D+60 that will assist ARMR VIII in obtaining an enhanced working knowledge of mobilization planning and procedures with particular focus on the issues of: pre-mobilization planning and procedures; mobilization; movement to the mobilization station; post-mobilization training; equipment deployment planning and procedures; personnel deployment planning procedures; and other as identified during subsequent research and coordination. Within each major issue the following sub-issues will be considered as appropriate: command, control, and communications; administrative requirements; personnel matters; operational and training matters; availability of facilities and resources; and logistics. Conduct a seminar

game at USAWC focusing on mobilization planning and procedures.²

With a well-defined objective statement in hand, the second step in the pre-gaming phase is to conduct extensive research. Virtually everything having a bearing on the issue under review is examined such as regulations, pamphlets, plans, memorandums, studies, standard operating procedures (SOPs), briefing charts, and working papers. Additionally, extensive discussions are conducted with staff personnel to obtain their perspectives on the issues and sub-issues under review. Similar research is also accomplished at both higher and subordinate headquarters to obtain pertinent documents. Likewise, in-depth discussions are also conducted with the commanders and staffs to obtain their perspectives relative to the project.

The results of this research is then synthesized into a programmed learning text. The text is self-paced, designed for individual use, and effectively combines a narrative and supporting graphic aids. The focus of the text is on the supported command's issues of concern. By means of a previously approved realistic scenario that moves along a situational timeline, the programmed learning text facilitates the systematic development and analysis of actual or potential problem areas associated with each "situation" while always focusing the reader's attention on the command's primary issues of interest. With regard to the ARMR VIII project, the seven "situations" included Pre-Mobilization Planning; Increased Mobilization Preparedness; M-Day Activities; Movement of Units from Home Stations; Activities at Mobilization Stations; Deployment from Mobilization Stations; and CONUS Reorganization. Characteristic of all programmed learning texts, each situational update includes a series of questions tailored to that situation which are designed to challenge the reader. To improve a reader's knowledge and understanding, an answer booklet is provided which not only provides

the "correct" answer, but also cites the applicable references to which the reader may turn for further information. It should be noted that the "answers" are not developed by the consultants or the Army War College faculty but are extracted from the supported command's own documentation.

Prior to the publication of the programmed learning text, it and the answer booklet are forwarded to the supported command for final review and verification. Once verified, the materials are published and returned to the client for appropriate distribution. At this stage in the project, the supported command now has a document that is ideally suited for familiarizing new personnel on a major issue of concern to the command. Likewise, the programmed learning text represents a long-term training document that the command may use in a variety of ways from individual study to conducting its own command-wide exercise. More importantly, it represents the basic document used during the second or gaming phase of the supported command's TCRP project.

Like the programmed learning text, the gaming phase is tailored to meet the supported command's specific objectives. Gaming activities may consist of a seminar planning game; a seminar game; a computer-assisted simulation; or any combination thereof. Likewise, depending on the game objectives and the desired level of participation, the gaming phase may consist of any number of distinct gaming activities. For example, the ARMR VIII gaming phase consisted of a one-and-one-half-day seminar game while gaming support for Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, consisted of a one-and-one-half-day seminar planning game and two seminar games, each of which was also one-and-one-half-days in length. All three "games" were conducted over a five-month period.

The seminar planning game offers the supported command an ideal vehicle for developing concepts to support new mission requirements or for modifying

existing plans and procedures. Participants in a seminar planning game usually include the command element and the principal staff. Some time prior to the conduct of the "game," four or five principal staff members are designated to present their concept for resolving the problems associated with the issue of concern as if they were the commander. Each presentation lasts approximately twenty to thirty minutes and is followed by a short period of questions and answers designed simply for clarification with regard to the presenter's concept. Once all of the presentations have been completed, the designated game director (usually the supported unit commander) will lead the participants in a general discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of each of the concepts presented.

As a result of these discussions, a consensus emerges as to the concept (normally a hybrid reflecting aspects from all of the concepts presented) or modification to be adopted. This concept or modification, coupled with the commander's amplifying guidance as presented throughout the discussions, provides the staff with the necessary information to develop a new plan or to modify an existing plan. It also serves as the basis for the command's subsequent TCRP gaming activities.

To maximize the benefits derived from the participants' discussions, the entire proceedings are normally relayed via closed-circuit television to another area where each primary participant has a resource staff consisting of one to three assistants. Linked by point-to-point telephones, the "players" and their resource staff thus are able to exchange information quickly without interfering with the overall flow of the seminar. This ensures that accurate, updated information is readily available to all of the participants during their deliberations. Likewise, resource staff personnel also benefit from

monitoring the discussion among the principal participants and also may engage in beneficial discussions among themselves.

In the case of a seminar game there is no role playing by the participants. Rather, the participants are provided periodic scenario update briefings by the project consultants. Each scenario update lasts approximately five minutes and focuses the players' attention on a particular phase of the command's overall issue of concern. Following the update, the designated "game director" facilitates discussion among the players by interjecting pertinent questions prepared in advance. Based on the benefits being derived from the discussions, the time allocated for a particular scenario "update" may be expanded or curtailed. Similar to the seminar planning game, each primary player also has a resource staff in the seminar game. In the case of ARMR VIII, the game director was the ARMR VIII Commanding General. Initially, the primary players consisted of the ten State Adjutant Generals and the 89th and 96th ARMCOM Commanding Generals. However, based on the particular situation under consideration, the primary players were varied so as to interject readiness group and mobilization station perspectives into the discussions.

The final or post-gaming phase consists of the preparation of a final report by the consultants. In addition to documenting the entire project, the report also highlights all of the major points surfaced during the pre-gaming and gaming phases. Accordingly, the report provides the supported command with an ideal document from which to initiate the development of new plans or procedures or to modify existing ones.

In the seven projects completed to date, the TCRP program, as outlined above, has demonstrated its effectiveness.³ A major strength of the program is its flexibility, a flexibility that enables each project to be tailored to the specific desires of the supported command. In the case of mobilization, the TCRP

methodology offers a unique opportunity to examine in detail virtually any and all phases of the mobilization process.

ENDNOTES

¹U.S. Army, Study, Review of the Education and Training for Officers (RETO), Volume 2 (1978), p. F-6, F-3-III-2.

²This objective statement was developed by Center for War Gaming personnel in concert with the Commanding General and staff of ARMR VIII.

³The TCRP projects completed to date include the following:

<u>Command</u>	<u>Issue</u>
1st Infantry Division	Strategic Deployment
VII Corps	Transition to War
V Corps	Warfighting
HQ, USAREUR	Transition to War
SOUTHCOM	Contingency Planning
ARMR VIII	Mobilization
Berlin	Transition to War

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Major Luther Carter
USMCR

and

Captain John Cece
USCGR

In developing the initial format for this colloquium, each of the principals argued both the desirability and necessity for including a track focusing on the mobilization concerns of field commanders. It was generally contended that such a perspective would provide the most realistic barometer assessing the advisability of macro-level schemes and dreams. Moreover, there was a collective implication that field commanders, reserve as well as regular, would tend to be exceptionally critical evaluators, particularly with regard to delineating the operational limitations of their commands.

These early contentions and presumptions have proven to be sound. Few subjects raise as much interest and controversy among field commanders as that of mobilization planning and preparedness. Similarly, few subjects generate as much criticism, much of it self-directed.

In order to infuse a measure of structure into this track, the conferees were asked to prepare comments on the topics of training, procedures, administration and motivation. Captain Hartley (USNR), Commander Ryan (USNR) and Major Boesch (USAR) prepared the enclosed point papers focusing on one or more of these mobilization aspects.

In introducing these papers and the track in general, we find it important to include one caveat. Despite the fact that this track is entitled "Mobilization Considerations from a Field Commander's Perspective," it has become abundantly clear to us that there is no unified perspective represented here...on mobilization or any other command topic. The

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viewpoints of field commanders are as diverse and heterogeneous as the society which they mirror. With that in mind, we are delighted to host the viewpoints and concerns of field commanders on the topic of mobilization.

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MOBILIZATION PLANNING

LTC Larry V. Edwards

Headquarters Department of the Army

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans

November 2, 1983

Mobilization Planning

LTC Larry V. Edwards
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans

Reference
JCS Pub 21, Mobilization
DOD MMP
AR 500-5
AMOPS Vol I

Introduction

Mobilization

The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.

This includes activating all or part of the reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

The complexity and magnitude of the mobilization process make sound planning essential for the success of mobilization. The DOD Master Mobilization Plan (DOD MMP) provides guidance on mobilization decisions to support military operations and detailed plans to support the mobilization process. It specifies planning tasks to be accomplished and provides a framework for the establishment of communication links necessary to influence participation of civil agencies in mobilization planning.

Role of Mobilization in National Security

The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is essential in deterring potential enemies and in measuring US allies. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments for OPLANs that require mobilization. A potential enemy must be convinced that the United States can mobilize and project a total (Active and Reserve component) force in time to influence the early stages of conflict. The Reserve components of the United States must be able to mobilize in the required time, at the right place, and in the state of readiness to meet the commitments stated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

DISCUSSION

Mobilization Planning

Mobilization planning is based on the guidance documents promulgated by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments and on the constraints imposed by resource limitations. Mobilization plans of the Services provide the details for assembling the Reserve component forces and moving those forces from home station to mobilization station (station of initial assignment). These plans also provide details regarding stationing, equipping, and training the Reserve component units and individual reservists to bring these forces to operationally ready status. In addition,

Service mobilization plans provide guidance to their agencies to support and sustain the wartime requirements of the total force.

Army Mobilization Planning

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Planning System provides for two basic documents: the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) and the Army Program Objective Memorandum. The Program Objective Memorandum describes all aspects of Army programs highlighting the forces, manpower, materiel acquisition, equipment distribution, and logistic support required to meet the strategy and objectives specified by the Secretary of Defense. AMOPS consists of four volumes and uses the planning assumptions of the JSCP; it is among other things, the Army implementer of the JSCP. The AMOPS provides administrative and operational guidance to Army agencies, Army commands, and Army component commands of unified commands for the employment and support of Army forces in the short-range period. Volume III of AMOPS is the primary Army source of guidance for force mobilization and deployment. This guidance applies to plans for alerting, assembling, equipping, and stationing units and individuals required to meet force mobilization requirements.

The AMOPS also specifies that mobilization plans for full mobilization be developed by major Army commands and that they direct all subordinate commands, agencies, and installations with

mobilization responsibilities to prepare implementing plans.

The Army Mobilization & Operations Planning System (AMOPS)

AR 500-5, The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System, prescribes responsibilities and provides guidance for implementing AMOPS.

AMOPS provides a single source document set for issuing policies, procedures, guidance, and planning assumptions on short-range strategic employment, mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of Army forces. It is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of unified commands.

Peacetime Preparation and Planning

Preparation for mobilization proceeds concurrently with planning. The Army programs, budgets, and funds resources to overcome the shortfalls and limiting factors divulged from a continuing analysis of the various operation plans.

War Planning

Joint strategic military planning establishes the forces whose capabilities form the basis for theater operation plans. The process begins by assessing military threats to national security and requirements for military forces to neutralize or overcome them. The focus of the war planning process is the development of OPLANS with their associated Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

Mobilization Planning Process

The focus of Army mobilization planning is to provide the resources required to support various OPLANs. This includes mobilizing the units, manpower, and materiel required for immediate implementation of an OPLAN as well as the resources required to sustain the operation. The TPFDD associated with each OPLAN specifies time-phased requirements for units and materiel.

AMOPS incorporates the guidance of the DOD MMP and JCS Pub 21 and specifies the planning process used to develop HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans. MACOM mobilization plans provide detailed guidance for preparation of installation mobilization plans.

FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan (RCMP), with its associated Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP), details the time-phased flow of mobilizing RC units from home stations to their mobilization stations.

TRADOC Post Mobilization Individual Training and Support Plan (TRADOC-PMITSP) provides installations with guidance on training base expansion activities.

The principal products of AMOPS are "on the shelf," executable plans and supporting information/data bases prepared and maintained for use during national crises.

Mobilization plans incorporate the specific actions and responsibilities which must be accomplished both in peacetime and upon the order to mobilize.

Mobilization Planning System

All elements of the command and control structure participate in mobilization planning within the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning system. Mobilization planning provides the basis for:

- Activation, reorganization and stationing of units
- Preparing mobilization stations to receive units
- Alerting units for mobilization
- Mobilizing RC units at home station
- Preparing RC units for movement to mobilization station
- Moving RC units to mobilization stations
- Receiving units at mobilization stations

The FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) supplements AMOPS. The FORMDEPS establishes the planning system to be used in the development, review, and distribution of the RCMP, subordinate unit and installation mobilization plans, and the MTBSP. See Figure 1 for a visual concept of the Mobilization Planning System.

Upon receipt of the mobilization order, commands and units execute their prepared mobilization plans. The commands and units revise and adjust mobilization plans as necessary to accomplish the mobilization efficiently and on time.

Summary


We've come a long way in the area of mobilization planning. The Mobilization Exercises conducted in 1976, 1978 and 1980 identified that:

Mobilization Guidance is contained in a multitude of documents with none providing a completely clear description.


Documents are mainly peacetime oriented.

Serious disconnects exist between war plans and CONUS mobilization plans.

HQDA and FORSCOM recognized the need for a mobilization planning system. This requirement led to the Chief of Staff approving an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) Office within ODCSOPS. The mission of this office was to describe, design, develop, coordinate and implement a system/process for the planning and execution of mobilization and deployment. The AMPS people met their goal by publishing and distributing AMOPS, Volumes I, II, III & IV, another milestone in the mobilization planning arena. Along came MOBEX 83 and the opportunity to test AMOPS, the results are in. The findings and recommendations have been coordinated, those approved are currently being incorporated into the system at all levels. We have reached the planning circle:



MOBILIZATION PLANNING SYSTEM



*Except FORSCOM

Figure 1
P-3-9

All this planning is an ongoing full time process, not a part time or additional duty function. Full time mobilization planners are required at every level to keep the plans current and workable. Full time manning has provided additional personnel for administrative, training and logistical support at the unit level. These additional personnel will greatly enhance the mobilization planning capability at the unit level. From the TAG/MUSARC level on up the mobilization planning process moves slowly due to the lack of fulltime dedicated personnel. The Army CAPSTONE Program has greatly benefited mobilization planning. Aligning of all units into their wartime organization has fostered closer relationships between Active and Reserve Component units. Identification of wartime missions have allowed units to participate in realistic, meaningful mobilization/deployment exercises.

Conclusions

We have made significant progress in planning for full mobilization. The current planning system must be updated to include procedures that will allow mobilization planners to produce a mobilization plan that will cover all levels of mobilization. Lack of dedicated full time mobilization planners at all levels has hampered our ability to move swiftly in perfecting the mobilization process. Several areas that must receive more emphasis before this mission can be accomplished are:

- Full time manning in all RC units.
- Full time mobilization planners at DA, MACOM, CONUSA, Installation and Major RC Command Level.

- Better coordination between and within services on mobilization planning matters.

- Effort by all concerned to hold unnecessary turbulence with respect to RC unit mobilization planning to a minimum.

- Design mobilization exercises that will thoroughly test all mobilization plans.

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Equipping the Guard and Reserve

In The Total Force

Lieutenant Colonel Webb Ellis

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

The term "Total Force" as it is used today to embrace the elements -- Active, Guard, and Reserve -- of the Nation's defense forces, has been and continues to be the product of an evolutionary and dynamic process. Its formal origin began perhaps with the passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 which called for an increased strength of reserve forces for national security. Further impetus toward realization of a Total Force was provided in 1967 with passage of Public Law 90-168, the "Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act". This Act increased recognition of the Guard and Reserve as vital, yet separate, components of defense. It was intended to strengthen Reserve management and to answer alleged mismanagement of the Guard and Reserve by the Active forces.

The culmination of these and other events had not evolved into a "Total Force" doctrine per se, but that changed in 1970 with the introduction, by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, of the

"Total Force Concept" (See Tab A). It established the Guard and Reserve as equal partners with the Active Forces. The conversion of "concept" into "policy" followed in 1973 with a mandate by then Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger.

In a memorandum (Tab B) to the Service Secretaries, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Directors of other Defense Agencies, Secretary Schlesinger directed that:

"It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy...is the fact that the Guard and Reserve Forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces." He added, "The Total Force is no longer a 'concept'. It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole."

The policy was a decisive step forward in the effort to provide the nation with a credible, effective, responsive, and affordable military force structure.

Ten years now have passed since Secretary Schlesinger's memorandum was issued. The transition of the Guard and Reserve forces from a "reserve" role to a "will be used" posture has not been easy nor is it complete. Fiscal constraints combined with resistance to perceived inroads by the Reserve into missions and functions previously held exclusively by the active forces, have tended to inhibit rapid progress toward a true

Total Force. For example, the end of the draft which came about in the early 1970's, brought with it an assortment of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for the active components to ensure proper levels of volunteer manpower. However, it was not until the late 1970's when the Army Guard and Reserve strengths had attrited to dangerously low levels that funds were made available for similar Reserve incentives. And, then such funding was primarily due to Congressional pressure. This application of the Total Force policy to manpower has resulted in substantial improvements in unit strength to the point that reserve forces can perform missions within their respective Service in the true sense of the Total Force. Some examples of these missions are at Figure 1.

With the manpower problems somewhat alleviated, the focus of attention shifted to an even greater obstacle to Total Force readiness and war fighting capability -- equipment deficiencies. Generally, Guard and Reserve equipment has received far less Total Force attention and action than manpower. Problems such as shortages; incompatibility of Reserve equipment with active equipment, i.e., radios which cannot "talk" to one another; and obsolete equipment continue to present formidable challenges to the Guard and Reserve equipment posture and to the effective war-fighting capability of the Total Force.

While shortages may be a reflection of overall shortages of equipment in the Total Force which have developed over the

years, incompatibility and obsolescence are more closely tied to modernization of the force. Historically Guard and Reserve forces have operated with equipment that has been replaced as outmoded or declared as excess by the Active forces. This process has perpetuated a degree of obsolescence in some cases to the extent of entire communities or models of hardware "dying" in the Reserve forces due to aging, lack of spare parts or support equipment, and/or no plans for replacement.

A critical problem associated with such modernization "fall-out" to the Reserve Components is that of incompatibility with the result that Reserve Component equipment often is neither combat serviceable nor even deployable. Such shortcomings further denigrate Reserve readiness by inhibiting training, penalizing the combat capability of the units affected, increasing the cost and complexity of maintenance and other logistics aspects and, in some cases, by presenting safety hazards as well. Less obvious is the fact that equipment deficiencies of all kinds have a negative effect on personnel recruitment and retention.

No Service is spared equipment problems, and some are common to all Services. For example, aircraft as a category generally is facing serious aging problems, in some cases almost imminent obsolescence. Trucks of many types are short in all Services and communications equipment is frequently outmoded or

nonexistent.

Additionally, the ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps Reserve Components, are faced with shortages of howitzers, tanks, and other combat equipment, plus combat support and combat service support (engineer, medical, transportation, signal, etc.) equipment. Maintenance capabilities are especially affected. The Naval Reserve has its minesweepers (almost the entire Navy minesweeping mission is in the Naval Reserve) rapidly approaching obsolescence to where a retirement program is already underway even before new ships are being received. Shortages of cargo handling and construction equipment also are acute. The Air Reserve Forces are deficient certain types of common support equipment.

Recognition of the severity of these problems has not arisen overnight, or even since the advent of the Total Force Policy. "In view of the continuing failure of the Department of Defense to provide adequate quantities of combat serviceable equipment to Army Reserve and Army National Guard units..." is a quote from a House Armed Services Committee report of August 17, 1962. Unfortunately only now, 21 years later, are positive actions being taken to deal with the problems. The Nation's leadership, which previously could be faulted for less than adequate concern with equipping its Reserve forces, has now given way to an Administration fully dedicated to that end.

President Reagan stated in July, 1981, that:

"My Administration is determined that these vital Reserve Forces will be manned, equipped, and trained to meet their full responsibility as a combat-ready element of the Total Force."

Defense Secretary Weinberger in a 21 June 1982 memorandum (Tab C) to the Service Secretaries and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated:

"Our early-deploying and employing Guard and Reserve units must have the equipment to perform their missions. Active and Reserve units deploying at the same time should have equal claim on modern equipment inventories. I expect each Service Secretary to ensure that his Service policies state this claim explicitly and to ensure further that such policies are strictly followed unless extraordinary circumstances prevent it. I believe that it would be appropriate for you to insist upon personally approving any deviation from those policies within your Service."

A similar memorandum also was forwarded to the members of the Defense Resource Board (DRB) exhorting their assistance, as the managers of all defense resources, in improving the status of Guard and Reserve equipment (Tab D).

In a follow-up memorandum of 10 August 1983, the Secretary asked for "...each Secretary to provide me ... with the extent of the equipment situation in the Guard and Reserve, his Service plan and schedule for addressing the problem, and the programming and distribution progress to date."

Other procedural actions also have been implemented to manage the problem. Renewed emphasis is being given to an earlier Department of Defense directive which states that withdrawals, diversions or reductions of equipment from Guard or Reserve forces must receive the prior written approval of the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983, the Congress required the annual submission of a report from the Secretary of Defense on the status of Guard and Reserve equipment. This report was intended to display, for a representative sampling of equipment in each Guard and Reserve Component, the procurement, distribution, and withdrawals and plans for replacement of each item over a several year period. Two such reports have been provided; each submission having been followed by a Congressional hearing on the report. The Congress has further demonstrated its support for proper and prompt equipping of the Reserve Components by consistently allocating additional monies to the Defense budgets for Guard and Reserve procurement of new, compatible equipment.

With all of these expressions of support for equipping the Guard and Reserve it is not surprising to see some progress being made, albeit at a snail's pace. The Air Force, which clearly has taken the lead in implementing the Total Force

Policy, finds its newest aircraft, the F-16 and KC-10, in the Air Reserve Force inventories. The Army is fielding its newest tank, the M1, into the Army National Guard, and the Naval Reserve will be receiving the new F/A-18 aircraft in the near future. In the Marine Corps, modernization of its Reserve aviation component remains of the utmost importance.

Needless to say, these are but steps in the right direction. They are indicative of a rational approach which the Administration is now taking to equipping the force. As indicated by Secretary Weinberger, "... we cannot afford to wait until a world crisis dictates mobilization to correct the quantitative and qualitative equipment problems of the Total Force." Equipment cannot be created overnight, nor is it even affordable in the near term to overcome past shortages in order to meet all of the equipment needs. Thus it is imperative that all efforts continue to enforce the policy of equipping the units first that fight first, irrespective of component, while not losing sight of the ultimate goal to fully equip all units to their wartime requirements.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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Aug 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Department of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces

The President has requested reduced expenditures during Fiscal Year 1971 and extension of these economies into future budgets. Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves. I am concerned with the readiness of Guard and Reserve units to respond to contingency requirements, and with the lack of resources that have been made available to Guard and Reserve commanders to improve Guard and Reserve readiness.

Public Law 90-168, an outgrowth of similar Congressional concern, places responsibility with the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments for recruiting, organizing, equipping and training of Guard and Reserve Forces. I desire that the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide, in the FY 1972 and future budgets, the necessary resources to permit the appropriate balance in the development of Active, Guard and Reserve Forces.

Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces. Application of the concept will be geared to recognition that in many instances the lower peacetime sustaining costs of reserve force units, compared to similar active units, can result in a larger total force for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget. In addition, attention will be given to the fact that Guard and Reserve Forces can perform peacetime missions as a by-product or adjunct of training with significant manpower and monetary savings.

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TAB A

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Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces. Toward this end, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is responsible for coordinating and monitoring actions to achieve the following objectives:

- Increase the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve and individuals of the Reserve.
- Support and maintain minimum average trained strengths of the Selected Reserve as mandated by Congress.
- Provide and maintain combat standard equipment for Guard and Reserve units in the necessary quantities; and provide the necessary controls to identify resources committed for Guard and Reserve logistic support through the planning, programming, budgeting, procurement and distribution cycle.
- Implement the approved ten-year construction programs for the Guard and Reserves, subject to their accommodation within the currently approved TOA, with priority to facilities that will provide the greatest improvement in readiness levels.
- Provide adequate support of individual and unit reserve training programs.
- Provide manning levels for technicians and training and administration reserve support personnel (TARS) equal to full authorization levels.
- Program adequate resources and establish necessary priorities to achieve readiness levels required by appropriate guidance documents as rapidly as possible.

(Signed: Melvin O. Laird)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

T H I S I S A T R U E C O P Y

AUG 23 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Director, Defense Program Analysis and
Evaluation
Directors of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Readiness of the Selected Reserve

An integral part of the central purpose of this Department -- to build and maintain the necessary forces to deter war and to defend our country -- is the Total Force Policy as it pertains to the Guard and Reserve. It must be clearly understood that implicit in the Total Force Policy, as emphasized by Presidential and National Security Council documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, is the fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces.

Total Force is no longer a "concept." It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.

As a result of this policy, the Selected Reserve has moved towards timely responsiveness and combat capability. Application of this policy has improved equipping, funding, facilities, construction, programming and some training areas.

I recognize and appreciate the great amount of effort that has been made to develop the Guard and Reserve. Progress has been made.

T H I S I S A T R U E C O P Y

TAB B

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However, gross readiness measurements (which should be improved) indicate that we have not yet reached a level consistent with the objective response times. It is clear that we should move as much post-mobilization administration as possible to the pre-mobilization period and streamline all remaining post-mobilization administrative and training activities.

We must assure that the readiness gains in the Selected Reserves are maintained and that we move vigorously ahead to reach required readiness and deployment response times in areas still deficient.

I want each Service Secretary to approach affirmatively the goals of producing Selected Reserve units which will meet readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. Each Secretary will provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans. You will have my support and personal interest in overcoming any obstacles in these areas.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is charged by statute and by Defense policy and Directives with the responsibility for all matters concerning Reserve Affairs. It is my desire that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, as a matter of priority, take such actions as are necessary to bring the Selected Reserve to readiness goals. In this respect, the Services, the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation and other Defense Agencies will provide support on a priority basis. Particular emphasis will be placed on assistance in manning, equipping and training. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) will continue to function in accord with current statutes and directives.

To emphasize and to strengthen Selected Reserve management, I suggest a civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs in the office of each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. This Deputy should be supported by an adequate staff and be assigned responsibilities and functions similar to those assigned the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

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At the military level, the Navy has been given specific guidelines for developing the new office of Chief of Naval Reserve. The Air Force and Marine Corps management structure has produced combat readiness and that is the vital test. I expect that the Army's reorganization, with strong command emphasis and good selection of leaders will produce demonstrably visible improvement and I shall follow the results with interest.

The Chiefs of the National Guard and Reserve components will be the staff level managers of the Guard and Reserve programs, budgets, policy, funds, force structure, plans, etc. They will be provided the authority, responsibility and means with which to accomplish their functions effectively. The overall management responsibility of the Chiefs of the Selected Reserve, under the Service Chiefs, will be supported by all other appropriate staff agencies.

In addition to the foregoing emphasis on Reserve Force policy and management, I am asking my Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, with your support, to manage a study covering the issues of availability, force mix, limitations and potential of Guard and Reserve Forces.

In summary, strong management with achievement of readiness levels in the Selected Reserve is among our highest priorities -- we must and will accomplish this objective as soon as possible.

(Signed: J. R. Schlesinger)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

21 JUN 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Priorities for Equipment Procurement and
Distribution

The combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the Army and Air National Guard and the other Reserve Components are a critically necessary part of our Total Force, and are essential to our country's security. In effecting the Total Force Policy, each Secretary is charged with assuring that Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans.

The long range planning goal of the Department of Defense is to equip all Active, Guard and Reserve units to full wartime requirements. The underlying policy enunciated in DoD Directive 1225.6, is that units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component. Therefore, equipments should be distributed regardless of component in a manner that ensures organizational integrity, maintenance compatibility, single generation supply support, and battlefield interoperability.

Our early-deploying and employing Guard and Reserve units must have the equipment to perform their missions. Active and Reserve units deploying at the same time should have equal claim on modern equipment inventories. I expect each Service Secretary to ensure that his Service policies state this claim explicitly and to ensure further that such policies are strictly followed unless extraordinary circumstances prevent it. I believe that it would be appropriate for you to insist upon personally approving any deviation from those policies within your Service.

You must ensure equipment compatibility among Guard, Reserve and Active units which will serve together on the battlefield. Equipment inventories adequate for effective training are also essential. Furthermore, your equipment inventory reporting systems need to be able to identify obsolete, incompatible and/or unsupportable equipment as well as quantitative shortages. Finally, Guard and Reserve Component equipment reports prepared in the future for the DoD Force Readiness Report to Congress will be expanded to

TAB C

include key items of equipment required for successful combat operations. The Services must also evaluate the progress of the Guard and Reserve equipment fill, present a plan to correct the identified deficiencies at the earliest possible time within the Five Year Defense Program, and evaluate the degree to which the respective Services are meeting the annual program and budget projections for planned equipment fill.

I have asked the DRB to consider Guard and Reserve Component equipment shortages in this summer's program review. In addition, new guidance will be included in the next Defense Guidance. Our next POM Preparation Instruction will contain requests for data that will permit us to evaluate our progress in getting adequate equipment for our reserve forces. The staff of the ASD(MRA&L) will be asking the assistance of your staff to determine what specific guidance and recording formats would be most useful.

The President has stated his determination that the Reserve Forces "...be manned, equipped, and trained to meet their full responsibility as a combat ready element of the Total Force." I wholeheartedly endorse the President's statement and assure you that Reserve Force readiness will continue to be an issue of foremost importance. The Guard and Reserve Forces must be prepared and be maintained in a state of readiness for immediate use should the need arise.

We cannot afford to wait until world conditions dictate a partial or full mobilization before we concern ourselves with the present quantitative and qualitative equipment problems of the Total Force. I will, therefore, follow with great interest your progress and efforts to implement these policies and correct the present deficiencies.




Our equipment distribution procedures should serve to simplify the logistics (supply, maintenance, and transportation) train. Furthermore, equipment distribution procedures must guarantee the interoperability of all assigned units.

I want you to apply all of your talent and expertise toward achieving the interoperable equipping of our Active, Guard and Reserve Components as swiftly as possible. To that end, I have asked the ASD (MRA&L), in conjunction with the DUSD (AM) and the Director (PA&E) to prepare a Guard and Reserve equipment issue paper for your use in reviewing the POM. After you have completed the program review, please submit a report to me on how successful you were in rectifying the problem of Guard and Reserve unit equipment shortages.

Our next Defense Guidance will include more specific statements about the priorities I expect the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to place on Guard and Reserve Component equipping. In the interim I am sending memoranda to each of them setting forth the basic department policy on equipping Active, Reserve and Guard units.

Finally, I believe that we must all keep President Reagan's commitment, stated 6 July 1981, squarely in the forefront of our decision process:

"My Administration is determined that these vital Reserve Forces will be manned, equipped, and trained to meet their full responsibility as a combat-ready element of the Total Force. Only through this Total Force can our nation remain strong enough that no potential adversary will dare attack our nation or endanger our vital interest."





21 JUN 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD

SUBJECT: Equipment Shortages in the Guard and Reserve (U)

I would like each of you, as members of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) during the imminent FY 84-88 Program review, to find solutions to the current equipment shortages in our Guard and Reserve units.

The Total Force Policy, enunciated nine years ago by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, clearly established that the National Guard and Reserve Forces "will be used" should this country enter into armed hostilities. The policy was a decisive step forward in the effort to provide our nation with a credible, effective and affordable military force structure.

The underlying policy enunciated in DoD Directive 1225.6, is that units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component. Therefore, Active and Reserve units deploying at the same time should have equal claim on modern equipment inventories. The DRB must ensure that equipment is distributed regardless of component, in a manner that supports that policy.

Under the Total Force Policy each Service Secretary is responsible for providing the manning, equipment, training facilities, constructions, and maintenance necessary to ensure that Selected Reserve units meet the readiness standards and deployment schedules required by our national contingency plans.

The current imbalance of old and new equipment within, and between, the Active, Guard and Reserve Components must be rectified. The DRB is the responsible body, and must act to ensure that our Defense program will produce compatible, responsive and sustainable combat, combat support, and combat service support forces throughout the Active, Guard and Reserve force and support structure.

CLASSIFIED PARAGRAPH REMOVED

TAB D

In your deliberations over the next few weeks, the DRB should seek decisions that will swiftly overcome these problems and ensure against their recurrence. Specifically the DRB should:

- (1) address equipment shortages and equipment obsolescences for early deploying/employing Guard and Reserve units. I choose early deploying/employing units as a first priority; eventually we must ensure that all Guard and Reserve units are adequately equipped. (By early deploying, I mean those deploying to overseas theaters by D+60 at the latest under our current plans for Europe, Southwest Asia and Korea. By early employing units, I mean those critical to the early mobilization effort, e.g., training base expansion, physical security of the United States or critical facilities.);
- (2) ensure that the remainder of our Guard and Reserve units have sufficient equipment for training;
- (3) be certain that any funding increments to Service programs intended to rectify equipment shortages decided in our program review can be audited, in subsequent program/budget reviews, to verify that the funds were spent for the intended purpose;
- (4) recognize that fiscal constraints may necessitate trade-offs between our rate of modernization and the procurement of non-modernization items.

Your deliberations should begin with our long range planning goal to equip all units within the Active, Reserve and Guard components to their full wartime levels. Simultaneously, you should carefully consider the distribution of combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment.

20 October 1983

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MOBILIZATION OPERATIONAL READINESS DEPLOYMENT TEST
(MORDT)

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In the closing days of the Ford Administration, the then Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, published guidance to the Service Chiefs directing their support of the Total Force Concept. Included in this guidance, was an emphasis for the Reserve Components to significantly improve their overall readiness as part of this Total Force. Since this guidance was published, many steps have been taken by the Services to ensure that the Reserve Components will be a force in readiness should the mobilization of this asset be necessary.

One of the steps adopted by the United States Marine Corps to improve mobilization readiness is the Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test (MORDT). The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve requires that Selected Marine Corps Reserve units be at a high state of readiness for mobilization and deployment to combat. The MORDT program was developed by the 4th Division Wing Team (DWT) in 1976 with the stated purpose to test and evaluate the readiness of 4th DWT units to mobilize and deploy to combat. The Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division/4th FSSG is directed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to conduct a minimum of 6 MORDT's annually. The MORDT's concentrate on the evaluation of the training readiness of 4th DWT units to perform those actions that are essential to the mobilization process. Major areas inspected include:

- ★ Unit Emergency Recall Procedures
- ★ Mobilization Administration Readiness
- ★ Mobilization Logistics Readiness
- ★ Embarkation Readiness

In addition to the above, the MORDT evaluation program also renders any assistance required to resolve problems that may be adversely affecting the units accomplishment of its mission.

Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Tests are conducted on a short/no-notice basis during a scheduled or non-scheduled drill weekend and normally include several of the 330 4th DWT units which are located at 188 Training Centers in 45 states, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

There are three types of MORDT evaluations which are conducted by the 4th DWT. Descriptions of the MORDT's are as follows:

- * MORDT/GO - This type of MORDT involves the administrative and logistical readiness inspections followed by the mobilization processing of at least 10% of the inspected unit's personnel. A deployment ensues from the Home Training Center to a constructive Station of Initial Assignment (SIA) for either a training evolution or a tactical exercise.

- * MORDT/STAY - This type of MORDT involves administrative and logistic readiness inspections followed by the mobilization processing of 100% of the unit's personnel, and a personnel and embarkation inspection. The unit will not depart the Home Training Center under the MORDT/STAY concept.

- * COMPOSITE MORDT (GO/STAY) - This type of MORDT involves a combination of the two previously mentioned MORDT's but may also include the execution of civilian contracts or Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA's) for the embarkation of equipment for movement.

It should be noted that when MORDT scenarios include a tactical exercise, an operations order is provided by the Inspection Team. Upon commencement of the exercise, units are evaluated using the Mission Performance Standards identified in the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES).

Each unit participating in a MORDT will receive an overall evaluation in each of two main areas; administrative and logistical readiness. Those evaluations can be one of the following.

★ **FULLY READY** - The unit is carrying out the policies and procedures outlined in the DWT Mobilization directives or orders of higher headquarters; is able to execute all mobilization tasks without assistance, and is among the best in the 4th Marine Division/4th MAF/4th FSSG.

★ **SUBSTANTIALLY READY** - The unit is carrying out the policies and procedures outlined in DWT mobilization directives or orders of higher headquarters; is able to execute all mobilization tasks with minimal assistance from higher headquarters, however some minor discrepancies were noted.

★ **MARGINALLY READY** - The unit is carrying out the policies and procedures outlined in DWT mobilization directives or orders from higher headquarters; is able to execute all mobilization tasks with considerable assistance from external sources, however critical trend discrepancies were detected.

★ **NOT READY** - The unit is not carrying out the policies and procedures outlined in DWT mobilization directives or orders of higher headquarters; would require an inordinate amount of assistance in executing mobilization tasks and a significant number of critical trend discrepancies were detected.

MORDT inspection teams are composed of personnel from the Division/Wing Readiness Sections, augmentees from the other Division/Wing Staff Sections, and Reserve Marines from Headquarters Detachments of both the Division and Wing. Each of the teams are composed of highly qualified Marines that can provide expertise in both administrative and logistic

mobilization procedures.

Although there is no specific policy on the priority of those units to receive MORDT evaluations, units are generally selected in the following descending order:

- a. Augmentation and Reinforcing Units.
- b. Those units who have received adverse or marginal evaluations during earlier MORDT's.
- c. Those units who have not had a MORDT inspection for a prolonged period, e.g., 30 months.
- d. Those units in receipt of adverse comments from inspections other than MORDTs.
- e. Units who are task organized in preparation for ATD.

Initially, the MORDT program was an unfunded venture. The 4th DWT had to rely solely on the United States Air Force Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training (JA/ATT) program to provide airframes (C130/C141) for either static load embarkation training or the actual physical deployment of the unit to a SIA.

The Joint Airborne/Air Transportability Training is an integral part of the United States Air Force's aircrew continuation training which is required to maintain mission ready status. From the Air Force point of view, skills and techniques that are developed by Air Force personnel in the joint unilateral training environment offered by the MORDT, are sharpened and refined. In order for the 4th DWT to take advantage of this no-cost JA/ATT Air, the MORDT scenario must accommodate maximum event training for both the Marine Corps Reserve and the Military Aircraft Airlift Command (MAC) aircrews. The MAC concept of operations for

utilization of JA/ATT fits perfectly within the scope of the MORDT program.

The 4th DWT is able to provide MAC aircrews with the following training objectives:

- ★ Upgrade and continuation training for MAC aircrews
- ★ Emphasis is placed on maximum participation by the 4th DWT; i.e., load team composition, personnel processing, cargo inspection and documentation

- ★ JA/ATT missions are planned by the 4th DWT to simulate austere operating conditions. Minimum Airlift Control Element/Mission Support Team (ALCE/MST) support is used and a combat operating environment is simulated. Combat tactics and methods of operation are used to the maximum extent possible compatible with safety and peacetime restrictions.

Though the JA/ATT program is the most preferred way to transport units of the 4th DWT undergoing MORDT's, JA/ATT air is not always available. In these instances, the 4th DWT must rely on either commercial transportation or Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM) for air support. Funding for these categories of airlift generally fall under the appropriation "Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve" (O & MMCR). This appropriation provides for expenses, not otherwise provided for necessary operation and maintenance of the Marine Corps Reserve including training, organization, and administration; repair of facilities and equipment; hire of passenger motor vehicles; travel and transportation; care of the dead; recruiting; procurement of services, supplies, and equipment; and communications. There are some instances, however, where funding for MORDT transportation may fall under the appropriation "Reserve Personnel, Marine

Corps" (RPMC); specifically, when a MORDT is conducted in conjunction with a unit's annual training duty.

The MORDT program is fully funded today. In FY 84, the MORDT funding level for the 4th DWT under the O & MMCR appropriation is \$476,000 for the 4th Marine Division, \$16,000 for the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing for a total appropriation of \$492,000. This funding level will allow these commands to achieve their stated MORDT goals. For example, the 4th Marine Division is planning to conduct eight MORDT's which will encompass eighty-one 4th Marine Division units. One MORDT/GO and two composite MORDT GO/STAY's will exercise the SIA Mobilization Personnel Processing Centers at Camp Lejeune, NC, Camp Pendleton, CA and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, CA. Five evaluations will be MORDT/STAY's which will involve the execution of civilian contracts/ISSA's to embark equipment on commercial carriers.

The MORDT program is an excellent/extremely cost effective system that can offer Reserve Component Commanders a means to evaluate the mobilization readiness of their units. Within the United States Marine Corps, the detailed results of all MORDT's conducted by the 4th DWT are provided to the Commandant of the Marine Corps within 30 days after the conduct of the MORDT. The results of these MORDT's have been used by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to highlight Reserve mobilization readiness during his appearances at both the Senate and House Armed Services Committee appropriation hearings. Additionally, these results are also used to support Reserve readiness programs and to provide information to external agencies conducted by audits of the Marine Corps Reserve. The MORDT program further provides another form of readiness measurement and

complements the UNITREP system.

The MORDT program is a readiness evaluation check and balance which commences unexpectedly and requires, by its unpredictable date of occurrence, that every unit maintain the highest state of readiness at all times. It has proven to be the most viable, economically sound, and all-encompassing inspection program for measurement of Reserve mobilization readiness in existence to date.

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Army Modernization and Mobilization

Friends or Foes?

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Introduction

Army Force Modernization and the planning of Mobilization of the Reserve Components have virtually the same goal -- to increase the readiness of the Army to fight a war. We must be prepared for an opponent which outnumbers us in personnel, equipment, and units. Despite having the same goal as mobilization, Force Modernization causes significant problems in the mobilization planning arena. Without strict attention to the way we are modernizing, the result could very well be a decrease in our readiness to mobilize rather than an increase. Are modernization and mobilization friends or foes? Before getting into details, some definitions of terms and policies will help minimize confusion.

Army Force Modernization

First, Army Force Modernization includes both the transition to new organizational structures (the Army 90 Transition Plan), and the deployment of new equipment.

Army 90 Transition Plan

The Army 90 Transition Plan is the blueprint for the future. It includes the new force structure for all the

Heavy Divisions (Mechanized Infantry and Armor). It also includes new organizational structure for units at Corps and in Echelons above Corps. The goal of Army 90 restructuring is to increase the combat effectiveness of the units we currently have. The precepts followed in the design were that the new units should:

1. Be optimized for complex, modern equipment.
2. Be capable of locating, targeting, and attriting follow-on forces simultaneously with defeating the forward echelons.
3. Have a higher leader-to-led ratio in combat elements.
4. Be able to fight on an integrated (chemical, biological, electronic warfare) battlefield.
5. Be fully sustainable logistically.
6. Be capable of continuous operations.

The capabilities of the oncoming generation of new equipment exerted a strong influence on the force structure designs. In fact, in some cases, the new equipment causes new units to be created. However, the new structure will cause an increase in combat effectiveness in and of itself, with or without the new equipment.

New Generation of Equipment

Army equipment modernization refers to the introduction over the next eight years of over 400 new materiel systems into the Army inventory. The cost of those new systems is estimated to be \$155 billion for procurement (through 1989) and over \$16 billion for operations and support. Over 40,000 military members and civilian workers will be added as a result. The estimated cost of new major construction to support the new systems is \$1 billion.

Army Mobilization

Mobilization is defined as the process by which the Armed Forces are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This can be done piece-meal for a National Emergency short of war. But Full Mobilization requires Congressional action, and allows expansion of the active force to its full wartime structure and the relaxing of laws necessary to accelerate wartime production of materiel and equipment. It also makes possible the call-up of all members of the Individual Ready Reserves, required standby reserves, and required retirees. Full Mobilization is the basis for most Army planning.

The Army's mobilization objective is to be ready in peacetime to move to a rapid expansion of the active force and deployment overseas.

Modernization Versus Mobilization

Modernization is directed at making Army units more capable and mobilization is concerned with bringing them to a state of readiness to deploy. Yet it appears that the more we modernize, the less ready we will be to mobilize. To explain why, we must delve a little deeper into modernization and mobilization policy. Some important elements of policy in this regard are:

1. The United States has only one Army, the "Total Army", which consists of the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components. Upon mobilization, these units will not necessarily be deployed in the order stated. Depending on their missions, some Army National Guard and Army Reserve units will be deployed days or weeks before some active units.

2. The Army has decided to keep most of its Combat Service Support (CSS) units in the reserve components. So although they provide only about one-half of the Total Army combat power, the Guard and Reserves provide two-thirds of the Total Army's CSS structure.

3. Modernization policy has been generally to plan distribution of new equipment to active units first, followed by Guard and Reserve units.

4. Equipment currently in active units will generally be "displaced" to reserve component units. Because they have never seen it, this equipment will pose the same problems to those units as the new equipment does to active units.

5. Finally, standing policy is that there will be no mix of old and new equipment (of the same type) in the same division. Realistically, this means the time of overlap is to be minimized. This policy is important for supportability as well as operational considerations.

(NOTE: This is not, and was not intended to be, a complete list of modernization or mobilization policies.)

Certain exceptions to these policies have become necessary. For instance, because certain National Guard brigades have been designated round-out units for active divisions, they will receive their new equipment and transition to new force structure during the same time period as the active divisions. While this is reasonable and logical, it creates other related problems.

The following are some examples of issues raised recently; note that none of them is applicable solely to round-out units:

Personnel.

New equipment going into Guard and Reserve units often requires long training periods for some MOS's. Since those personnel to be trained do not usually have the time to devote to long periods of active duty for training, the solution appears to be to convert those positions to full time manning in reserve component units. When that is done, however, the Army will not routinely program training seats for those personnel because the positions are not carried on the sophisticated data base (SIDPERS-USAR) from which training requirements are projected.

Equipment.

When new equipment is issued to an active component unit, the older generation equipment is typically displaced to reserve component units. In the case of Armor Battalions, for instance, the M1 Tank displaces the M60 series, which in turn goes to Guard and Reserve units. As mentioned previously, however, the Army has two-thirds of its Combat Support and Service (CSS) structure in the reserves. It follows that upon mobilization, some of those CSS units will have to support

active combat units which operate the M1 Tank. The personnel in that reserve component support unit may have never seen an M1 Tank. This becomes significant because the M1 is a quantum leap ahead of the M60 series in technology.

Training.

Transitioning to new organizational structure and the reception of new equipment often require that units receive concentrated periods of New Organization Training, New Equipment Training, or Displaced Equipment Training before they are considered fully ready. This training is given in fairly large blocks of instruction, which typically can be up to six weeks in duration. This situation poses no obstacle to active units. However, Guard and Reserve units seldom, if ever, can get their entire units together for such long periods. The result is that although both active and reserve components of a rounded-out division may get their equipment at the same time, there will be a definite lag in the attainment of full operational capability in the round-out brigade.

This has been only a sampling of the problems that Force Modernization can cause in the mobilization planning

arena. The Army is taking some important steps in the management of Force Modernization to alleviate these and other problems. The first step is to identify these types of problems. In fact, during the Functional Area Assessment (FAA) held on 30 September 1983, over 100 issues (to include those mentioned above) were identified in the Field Artillery area alone.

Functional Area Assessments

What is a Functional Area Assessment? On 11 July 1983, GEN Thurman, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, directed that a format for an Army-wide functional review be developed. The Functional Area Assessment (FAA) was developed and approved by GEN Thurman on 28 July. The basic philosophy behind the FAA is that the Army must look at modernization from the unit perspective, not solely from the new system perspective nor from the separate functional viewpoints (e.g. personnel, logistics, training, etc.). The FAA is done by focusing on selected types of units within a branch (e.g. Field Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, etc) of the Total Army. The FAA is a high level forum, chaired by the VCSA, which examines planned force structure actions in the current year plus two, with excursions beyond as required. The goal is to

assure the success of Army Force Modernization through a thorough, integrated assessment of the Army's capability to execute force development plans with minimum disruptive effects on readiness. The VCSA is briefed, in detail, by Department of the Army proponents on their plans in each of the following areas:

1. Force Planning
2. Force Design
3. Documentation
4. Force Structure
5. Manpower
6. Personnel
7. Resources
8. Logistics
9. Equipment
10. Procurement
11. Distribution
12. Redistribution
13. Supply
14. Maintenance
15. Training
16. Mobilization
17. Deployability
18. Facilities

19. Automation
20. Command and Control

The first FAA, on Field Artillery, was held on 30 Sep 83, and focused on the Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) Battalion, the 155mm Howitzer Battalion, the Target Acquisition Battery (TAB), and the Pershing II Battalion.

Resolution of the issues identified during the first FAA and the following reviews will be monitored by action officers in the Functional Area Assessment Coordination Cell in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. They will ensure that proper action is taken so that modernization can proceed. It is expected that as the other branches are assessed, some of the same issues will surface. Those will then be identified as "systemic issues" and tasked out for special resolution. This will be a slow process. It will take about eighteen months to go once through all the branches (also referred to as "functional areas"). The time required for resolution will depend on the issue, with systemic ones generally taking longer to resolve.

Summary

The magnitude of Force Modernization through the

1980's, to include transition to new force structure and the introduction of many items of new equipment, will impact heavily on the Army's capability to mobilize rapidly and effectively in time of war. The interactions within the force modernization process are complicated, not easily understood, and require making a thorough, integrated appraisal of our capabilities to execute near term force development plans. The effects of modernization upon mobilization (and other plans) are not apparent to people working strictly within their own functional areas. The required integration of effort is being improved dramatically by the Functional Area Assessment process just recently begun. Although some issues may in fact not be cabable of resolution, at least the leadership will be able to make decisions with full knowledge of the impacts on other plans.

Conclusion

Modernization and Mobilization, then, are both friends and foes. Friends in the long term, because the Army will eventually be prepared better than ever before to mobilize, fight outnumbered, and win; foes in the short term, because the capability to mobilize rapidly and effectively will be hampered by the introduction of a new generation of equipment.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTRAINING METHODOLOGIES TO PERMIT GREATER RELIANCE ON
RESERVE FORCE NON-DIVISIONAL MAINTENANCE UNITS

Decreases in numbers of Active Component maintenance units, defense planning that visualizes a "come as you are" war scenario, and new tactical weapons and support systems employing advanced technology place ever greater reliance on Reserve maintenance and other logistical support units. This study was proposed to determine if Army Reserve Component (RC) Combat Service Support (CSS) maintenance units could effectively mobilize, deploy, and ultimately sustain a committed force. When the study proposal was presented to MG Vincent E. Falter, Chief, Army Force Modernization Coordination Office (AFMCO), HQDA, in October 1982, he challenged the study group " . . . to find and recommend innovative ways to train RC maintenance units prior to M day in support of the Army's latest tactical equipment." Thus, the study presents training initiatives designed to increase the capability of non-divisional maintenance units to respond to early deployment to a major theater.

Findings

1. Over seventy percent of the Army's CSS maintenance capability is in the Reserve Components.
2. Early deploying RC non-divisional CSS maintenance units do not have the MOS proficiency necessary to effectively support current generation tactical systems without extensive post-mobilization training.
3. RC maintenance units have little or no access to major AC combat systems and must develop individual training plans around older model wheeled vehicles and other less sophisticated pieces of tactical equipment. Such equipment does not provide a proper training medium for early deploying units expected to support the Army's latest equipment.
4. Wartime mission spare parts, special tools, test equipment, and repair manuals are not on hand in RC maintenance units.
5. Unit commanders are not always aware of their CAPSTONE mission in terms of MOS proficiency and equipment requirements.
6. The RC chain of command does not fully appreciate the wartime mission training requirements of their non-divisional CSS maintenance units. Active Army unit advisors focus primarily on annual training and unit training programs rather than MOS proficiency. Decentralized training management does not provide adequate emphasis on MOS training.
7. The Army's unit readiness report system does not accurately portray the true training readiness of RC CSS maintenance units.

8. Under current doctrine non-divisional DS and GS maintenance units are organized to repair all tactical systems in the Army inventory except aircraft, medical and special systems. Since deployment and employment concepts are by companies and battalions, training is often accomplished in the same manner.

9. Geographic dispersion limits unit access to wartime mission equipment for training.

CENTRALIZED PREMOBILIZATION TRAINING CONCEPT

The study group made an early assumption that the Army could not afford to individually equip all early deploying RC maintenance units with enough equipment, tools, test sets, repair parts and other training items needed for mission training. Yet, the Army must provide a system for training such units. The training solutions proposed below are a logical development of several ongoing programs which attempt to solve the complex problem of training RC CSS maintenance units.

Centralized premobilization maintenance training is a way of ensuring that selected RC maintenance units have access to tactical equipment, tools, test sets and instructors. Simply stated, the Reserve member sustains MOS proficiency by attending formal MOS instruction on weekends in lieu of unit drill. Training would be provided by an appropriate active Army installation or depot, TRADOC service school, or full-time ARNG/USAR maintenance facility, supported by the USAR school system. USAR school instructors and qualified RC full-time personnel would be used in support of the concept. TRADOC developed training materials would be the basis for the program.

The concept requires the development of a master plan at the FORSCOM and CONUSA level that would designate selected installations, maintenance depots, service schools, and RC maintenance facilities as a Centralized Reserve Maintenance Training Center (CRMTC). With the augmentation of certain equipment and instructors, a CRMTC would have the capability to train Reservists on weekends or on other ADT periods. Planners would identify a unit as an early deploying unit (CAPSTONE) based on its proximity to one or several CRMTC facilities. Unit commanders, in turn, would develop their annual training plans based on their ability to train at specified CRMTC facilities. The selection of CRMTC facilities would be based on geographical location, RC maintenance unit densities, USAR school locations and the availability of equipment and instructors.

Seven geographical areas were identified that contain sufficient Army facilities, both Active and Reserve, to be mutually supportive. These areas could provide integrated training programs to approximately thirty percent of the existing RC non-divisional maintenance units. Additionally, by judiciously converting some existing direct support (DS) units to general support (GS), another ten to fifteen percent of RC non-divisional maintenance capability could be included in these zones.

Conclusions

The Army has focused primarily on post-mobilization unit training. Very little emphasis has been placed on premobilization training of highly technical skills. This paper attempts to bring together a "menu" of high payoff, low cost options that may be tailored to the needs of the unit. They are designed to counter systemic problems of long duration as well as to capitalize on what now exists in the field and can be made affordable without major dislocations in structure, unit locations, doctrine, or resource distribution.

Recommendations

1. Make maximum use of the Reserve six month initial active duty option by providing additional maintenance training beyond basic and advanced individual training.
2. Establish and conduct weekend IDT MOS proficiency training at selected TRADOC service schools, DARCOM Army maintenance depots, and RC full-time maintenance facilities with the full participation of USAR school qualified instructors.
3. Develop and conduct annual training evaluation programs specifically designed to provide an accurate evaluation of unit MOS maintenance skills.
4. Orient, where appropriate, selected RC units with major weapon systems based on unit need to receive systems specific maintenance instruction.
5. Develop fully integrated regional training programs where unit densities, training facilities and geographical location permit.
6. Revise the Army unit readiness report for RC CSS units to more accurately portray true maintenance capabilities.

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Contract Research on Guard and Reserve
Mobilization

by

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Through the last twenty years both the Active and Reserve Components have come slowly to accept the concept of the Total Force. All components now know that they must consider most long term, major subjects within a Total Force context. Despite that understanding, however, not all Total Force implications have yet been fully translated into the equipment, manning and organizations needed to make the Total Force meet all its objectives. The process is still underway.

The Services vary greatly in the relative weights of the Active and Reserve Components. The Army Guard and Reserve form a larger part of the Total Army than the other Reserve Components do of their Services. For example, 70% of Total Army non-divisional logistic support is in the Guard and Reserve. In the other Services the Reserve Components have high percentages of some units, particularly logistic units. Most of this logistic support must be in place and operational by M+30 days.^{1/} Obviously units with such a schedule require a high state of readiness.

^{1/} Reliance on Reserve Component Logistics Units, Logistics Management Institute, 1982

During the same period that the Total Force has been coming to fruition the world has become more dangerous. There have been unfavorable changes in the world strategic balance. The Soviet Union has moved also to influence additional areas far from the USSR itself. New problems have appeared in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

All this change going on within the DOD and throughout the world demands that we stay alert to changes in our ability to serve the national interest. That, in turn, requires us to ask new questions, reexamine persistent problems from new directions and compare thoroughly all potentially viable alternatives. It demands research.

In this paper, I will concentrate on contract research, and specifically contract research on subjects particularly applicable to Guard and Reserve mobilization.

Recent Research

Classifying research as particularly applicable to Guard and Reserve mobilization requires some rather arbitrary decisions. Some research is not specifically mobilization oriented, such as hardware R&D, and thus is not included here. Other studies, even though directed at mobilization subjects, involve internal OSD plans (e.g., DOD Master Mobilization Plan) or DOD's approach to obtaining resources from other government agencies on mobilization, all of which lie

far from our subject of Guard and Reserve mobilization. I have considered only the remaining research, and of that only the work accomplished by OSD via contract.

If we examine the OSD research which is particularly, but not necessarily exclusively, applicable to Guard and Reserve mobilization we have a relatively modest sample. Figure 1 shows the contractors involved in most of this work over the past five fiscal years.

FIGURE 1 Contractors Prominently Involved in
Recent OSD Research Particularly Applicable
to Guard and Reserve Mobilization

Subject Area	Fiscal Years		
	1979-1980-1981 ^{2/3/}	1982 ^{3/}	1983 ^{3/}
Organization, Management, and Planning	BDM; Systems Research & Applications Corp (SRA); Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO)	BDM; HERO; The Rand Corporation	Rand; Logistics Management Institute (LMI); SRA
Manpower and Personnel	Linton & Company, Inc (L&C); General Research Corp (GRC); Management Consulting and Research, Inc (MCR)	GRC; MCR	-
Training and Exercises	L&C; Stewart Analysis Corp (SAC); SRA	SRA	SRA
Logistics	-	LMI	LMI
Recruiting and Retention	Rand; LaBrie Associates; Presearch, Inc; GRC	Rand; LaBrie	Rand
Readiness	-	-	Ketron, Inc.

^{2/} A Report on the Utilization of Manpower, Personnel and Training Research
and Development, Fiscal Years 1979-1980-1981, Syllogistics Inc., 1982

^{3/} Information provided by LTC Robert A. Nemetz, OASD(MRA&L)

Figure 2 shows the funds committed to the applicable subject areas for each of the last three fiscal years by the office most directly involved in Guard and Reserve mobilization.

FIGURE 2 Funds for Recent ODASD(RA)
Contract Research ^{4/}

Subject Area	Fiscal Year (Thousands of Dollars)		
	1981	1982	1983
Organization, Management and Planning	275	360	400
Manpower and Personnel	250	235	-
Training and Exercises	-	-	-
Logistics	80	-	70
Recruiting and Retention	375	350	180
Readiness	-	200	25
Total	980	1145	675

4/ Ibid

Research Appropriate for Contract

Unfortunately Figure 2 alone does not tell us which subjects should receive additional attention for possible contract research. It is simpler and cheaper to address some problems than others (because of differing levels of data base development, for example). One problem, perhaps, is being solved while the solution to another depends on results of current research in a different field. Another may be at a stage where it is appropriate for in-house work rather than for contract. Funds may be insufficient to support the next step, or to cover other than the top priority projects. Thus there are a number of legitimate reasons for reducing or temporarily halting a program.

On the other hand, serious problems which are preventing the Total Force from reaching its necessary capability level, and for which no solutions have yet been found, demand continued research. Several categories of research shown on Figure 2 seem to fall into this category.

Programs, even critically important programs, sometimes grind to a halt because the responsible office can not see anything new to try. A series of unsuccessful trials combined with a few added constraints on the program tends to discourage all but the strongest, most dedicated program managers.

Such frustrating situations are the perfect time to take advantage

of the innovative ability, experience and strength of the contract community. A request for new approaches to the problem will normally get a healthy response. No one in the research business will criticize such an action because anyone with much experience in the field has faced the same type of impasse.

This is a time for new directions in research on Guard and Reserve mobilization. Most should be by contract.

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AN INFORMATION PAPER

ON

THE UNITED STATES NAVY FULL-TIME TRAINING
AND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM FOR THE NAVAL RESERVE

FOR

A COLLOQUIUM AT THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

SPONSORED BY:

OSD/MRA&L(RA)

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

THE MOBILIZATION CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENT CENTER
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

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FOREWORD

The United States Navy Full-Time Training and Administration program for the Naval Reserve, the TAR Program, was established for the purpose of training, administering, recruiting, and instructing Naval Reserve personnel serving on inactive duty. The TAR Program provides a career opportunity for Naval Reservists, both officer and enlisted, selected to serve on full-time active duty in support of the Naval Reserve.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief history of the TAR Program and to describe the purpose and use of the TAR Program within the U.S. Navy Total Force context. Additionally, recent changes in the focus of the Naval Reserve mission will be discussed vis-a-vis TAR Program management of the Naval Reserve.

History of The TAR Program

With the reduction of active duty forces following World War II, and with the emergence of the United States as a world power, the requirement for a viable military reserve force became apparent. Resources for this force were available from the large number of officer and enlisted personnel released from active service. The establishment of a Naval Reserve was initiated early in 1945 when the Secretary of the Navy convened a board headed by Rear Admiral McQuiston, who was charged with developing policy for the creation of a Naval Reserve training program.

Initially, plans were developed to utilize regular Navy personnel to manage Naval Reserve training requirements and to fill reserve management billets at the Navy Department, Reserve Headquarters, and reserve field activities. It was concluded, however, that the estimated 1200 officer and 12,000 enlisted personnel required to manage the reserve program would seriously inhibit the regular establishment in pursuit of assigned responsibilities. In addition, congressional guidance directed that the Naval Reserve would be funded from a budget separate from the Regular Navy. The McQuiston Board concluded that the post-war Naval Reserve program should be managed primarily by Naval Reserve personnel on active duty for that purpose. Additionally, the Board recommended that Regular Navy officers should also be utilized to fill various reserve billets in the reserve training

program. Both of these recommendations were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on December 1, 1945. The term Continuous Active Duty (CAD) Program was adopted as the nomenclature to identify those reservists retained on active duty in reserve management billets.

During the formative years of the CAD program, differences in management objectives resulted in a disagreement between the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) and the Chief of Naval Personnel concerning the use of regular personnel in reserve management billets. The Chief of Naval Personnel desired reserve management billets to be manned by regular personnel; CNO (Air) preferred reservists in the majority of these billets. The regular establishment was unable to provide the necessary numbers to fill CAD billets and the reserve management task remained with Naval Reservists. By the end of the decade, the Naval Reserve had grown to 300 Naval Reserve training centers and 26 Naval Air Reserve sites supporting a population of 180,000 paid drilling reservists. CAD personnel numbered 860 officers and 9849 enlisted.

In 1947 the Officer Personnel Act was passed by Congress excluding TAR officers from the Active Duty List. In 1952 the Armed Forces Reserve Act established the legal basis for maintaining reserves on active duty for the specific purpose of training and administering the Naval Reserve (both of these acts were later codified in Title 10 U.S. Code). This became the basis of the present TAR Program. In 1953 the Bureau of Naval Personnel

reaffirmed congressional intent to retain reservists on active duty for the purpose of managing the Naval Reserve and established TAR Program guidelines for application, selection, performance review, and attrition procedures.

The Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) was passed in 1954 establishing promotion procedure for all reserve officers, including TARS.

In addition to the laws and policies favorably affecting the TAR Program, management studies were undertaken during the 1950's to further enhance the TARS ability to manage the Naval Reserve training program. The first Johnson Board, convened in 1954 by the Secretary of the Navy, evaluated all Naval Reserve programs. Recommendations concerning the internal management of the TAR Program included the establishment of a Reserve program billet structure and an increased opportunity for TAR officers to gain operational experience in fleet assignments. The second Johnson Board, meeting two years later, recommended separate promotion numbers for TAR officers and reemphasized the need for a reserve program billet structure.

At the end of the decade, measures were taken to replace declining TAR officer numbers and to revitalize the billet structure. TAR program accessions were expanded by an annual

review of all lineal list reserve officer records. By this method, 442 new TAR officers were made available to fill newly created reserve management billets. This increase in billet numbers and the requirement for improved billet management culminated in the creation of the Reserve Program Billet (RPB) structure. This concept organized all active duty billets having responsibility for the training and administration of reserves into a structure assigning each billet a functional area code (FAC code). Codes of T, E, or R indicated that the billet could be filled by a TAR officer, either a TAR or regular officer, or a regular officer only. Initially, the RPB consisted of 98 TAR officer billets, 1940 TAR or regular officer billets, and 22 regular officer billets; a total of 2060 billets. The sum of T and E billets was established as the TAR officer strength ceiling.

As the TAR Program entered the 1960's, a phase-out of the TAR enlisted program had begun. This resulted from a Chief of Naval Personnel study which concluded that although the program had fulfilled all requirements for reserve program management, gradual transition and integration of TAR enlisted personnel into the Regular Navy would contribute to the attainment of Regular Navy manpower objectives. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) did not support the program change; consequently, TARS assigned to aviation activities were retained, and the phase-out of the surface TAR enlisted program was continued. After a three year

period of surface enlisted TAR integration into the Regular Navy, manning problems necessitated the rescission of this policy, and in 1962, the surface TAR enlisted program was reestablished in the administration ratings. Reduction in enlisted strength in subsequent years reflects the decrease in inactive duty reserve forces during that period. TAR enlisted strength history is provided in Appendix I.

During the remainder of the 1960's, the TAR Program continued to be improved by administrative action; TAR flag tenure policy was established, TAR officers enjoyed increased availability of operational assignments, enlisted TARs were formally removed from a sea/shore rotation system, and recruiting and accession procedures were solidified. During this period the Navy Manpower Management Study reviewed and validated the TAR Program concept, reaffirming its effectiveness.

In 1973 a special committee of the National Naval Reserve Policy Board met to examine once again the validity of the TAR Program. The Board recommended the continuation of the program with changes in various personnel policies. Two years later, the Chief of Naval Personnel convened a TAR officer study group which was comprised of regular and TAR officers. Recommendations from this study group suggested changes to numerous internal management procedures of the program. This included quality control of accessions and increased opportunity for TAR/regular officer rotation between reserve billets and operational assignments.

These changes were approved by the Chief of Naval Personnel, and implementation began in late 1975.

In December 1976, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA) directed that the TAR Program mission, the training and administration of the Naval Reserve, be transferred to the regular establishment. This required a gradual phase-out of TAR officers with undiminished career opportunity but provided for the continuation of the TAR enlisted program. In addition to replacing TAR officers with regular officers in reserve program billets, the voluntary recall of Selected Reserve officers (inactive duty reserve) was directed to fill seat of government and headquarters billets, as required by section 265 of the Title 10 U.S. Code. In February, the Reserve Management Planning Group convened to develop the methodology for transitioning the TAR officer reserve management responsibilities to the regular establishment.

This decision by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy met with considerable opposition in Congress, in the Naval Reserve, and in the regular establishment, and caused substantial disruption within the TAR officer community. TAR officer selection boards were held in abeyance and a disproportionate number of TAR officers transferred from the TAR Program or requested release from active duty. As a result, a significant decrease in TAR officer strength was experienced during this period. TAR officer strength history is provided in Appendix II.

In February 1978, the House Appropriation Committee denied the proposed phase-out of the TAR officer program and a TAR officer selection board was held in April 1978, after an eighteen month hiatus. The mission of the TAR Program in the management of the Naval Reserve was reaffirmed by the House Appropriation Committee and the following program aspects reemphasized; need for TAR officer operational experience in fleet billets, requirement for a Reserve Billet Program (RPB) structure, and use of regular officers in designated RPB billets. Additionally, the requirement was recognized for formalized training of regular and reserve officers assigned to Naval Reserve management billets. Also, the assignment of inactive Selected Reserve officers recalled to Reserve Program Billets under Section 265 of Title 10 US Code was approved, in limited numbers, by House Appropriation Committee action.

Subsequent to the reinstatement of the TAR officer program, accessions increased for both officer and enlisted and the program benefited by the Navy's renewed emphasis on pride and professionalism. In 1982 the Navy was required by Congress to fund all TAR and 265 recall personnel from the Reserve Personnel, Navy account (rather than from the Military Personnel, Navy account, as was previously the case). This necessitated the assignment of officer and enlisted strength planners and community managers within the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)

organization. This placed the management of TAR end strength, personnel funding, and community development on a comparable basis with Regular Navy personnel and manpower management.

The foregoing historical sketch of the TAR Program demonstrates that the Full-Time Training and Administration system employed by the Navy has, since its inception 38 years ago, satisfied requirements for a trained Naval Reserve force. TAR officer and enlisted personnel, as part of the Navy Total Force, have proven the TAR Program to be an integral and irreplaceable aspect of the Naval Reserve training structure.

Purpose And Use of The TAR Program

The TAR Program today consists of 1422 officers (including "265" recall officers) and 10,616 enlisted. These personnel are assigned to 238 Naval Surface Reserve facilities and 23 Naval Air Reserve facilities. Additionally, TAR officers and enlisted are assigned to policy, planning, and management positions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Reserve Headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana. The active duty Naval Reserve organization is provided in Appendix III.

TAR personnel are primarily responsible for the training of 100,000 drilling reservists and the mobilization of 400,000 members of the Ready, Retired and Standby Reserve. Ready Reserve personnel are currently structured as a trained manpower source to mobilize in accordance with Presidential and/or Congressional directives to reinforce and augment the active duty. These personnel, who are paid, drilling reservists, constitute 12 percent of the Navy's trained military manpower. Reserve manpower may be mobilized as a total force or selectively, depending upon the mission area to be expanded. Navy warfare capabilities in various mission areas reside totally or in part with the Naval Reserve; Appendix IV provides a list of these mission areas. Additionally, the Naval Reserve has organized and trained personnel in 2100 reserve units which would support and expand various Navy programs; a list of these programs is found in Appendix V.

The primary function of the TAR reserve program manager is that of mobilization training. This training is based on the individual, team, and unit training requisites required of each Reservist by his active duty mobilization platform. Successful completion of these requirements contributes to enhanced readiness of the mobilization platform. Training is organized around the individual's reserve unit and is conducted one weekend each month and during two weeks of annual active duty. Depending upon the qualifications required to be achieved, training is held at the

reserve facility, the mobilization platform, or an alternate site which can provide the necessary instruction. Final qualification of each reservist is the responsibility of the active duty site or unit to which the reservist is assigned.

The Naval Reserve is structured in support of certain warfare mission areas to which reserve forces have been assigned. The TAR Program contributes directly to Naval Reserve mobilization capability, to attainment of individual training qualifications, and to unit mobilization readiness.

Current Initiatives in The Naval Reserve

As the structure of the Naval Reserve has aligned itself with the mobilization needs of the regular establishment, the value and need for a strong Naval Reserve has been recognized at the highest levels of Navy leadership. Dependence upon the Naval Reserve in specific mission areas is increasing as is the support required of individuals mobilizing to active duty ships, staffs, and shore stations. This dependence is reflected in the significant growth programmed for the Naval Reserve in the five year Defense Plan. Naval Reserve personnel (inactive duty) growth is provided in Appendix VI. Management support for these expanded numbers is

provided by concomitant growth of the TAR Program and is quantified in Appendix VII.

Specific areas of expansion within the Naval Reserve include the acquisition of 24 modern combatants. Six of these ships have already been delivered to the Navy Reserve Force (NRF) with the remainder to be transferred from the regular Navy by 1988. These ships represent surface Navy state-of-the-art technology and will significantly increase the role of the Naval Reserve in the Navy's surface warfare strategy. Approximately half the crew of NRF ships is to consist of TAR personnel, the remainder to be manned by inactive duty Selected Reservists. The responsibility for all facets of shipboard operation, as well as the mobilization training of the reservists, is to reside totally with TAR personnel.

In support of these ships, as well as other NRF assets, maintenance facilities have been or will be established in each ship's home port. These maintenance facilities will have the capability to perform routine shipboard maintenance as well as intermediate level repair. Active duty personnel assigned to these facilities will be primarily TARs. Enlisted personnel will rotate between this assignment and duty aboard NRF ships.

A warfare mission existing totally in the Naval Reserve is the Navy's inshore/underwater detection capability. The operation and

maintenance of radar, sonar, boats, and associated equipment is the responsibility of inactive duty Naval Reservists supported administratively by TAR managers. This capability will expand in the Naval Reserve as the need for increased port security and coastal defense is identified.

The Navy's ability to move cargo and personnel will be increased significantly during 1984 as C-9 transport aircraft are added to the Naval Reserve inventory. These aircraft will be assigned to reserve aviation squadrons which are manned almost entirely by inactive duty reserve and TAR personnel. In addition, these assets will provide increased capacity for transport of Naval Reservists training at distant mobilization platforms.

Finally, a system of readiness reporting for Naval Reserve units has emphasized the requirement for increased readiness within the Naval Reserve. This system is intended to support and enhance the readiness reporting system used by Regular Navy units and has had a significant effect in directing the training efforts of TAR and inactive duty reserve program managers.


Naval Reserve mobilization training, managed by TAR personnel, has benefited from the acquisition of modern equipment by Reserve units and from the utilization of fleet training assets. The

direct involvement of the mobilization platform in the training and qualification of individual reservists is an essential element in the improvement of readiness within the Navy.

Conclusion


The history of the United States Navy Full-Time Training and Administration Program for the Naval Reserve demonstrates that the TAR Program provides a resilient and effective cadre to manage Naval Reserve training and mobilization. As dependence on the Naval Reserve by the active force has increased, TAR personnel have functioned as the catalyst that aligns reserve unit capabilities with active force missions and provides trained individuals in support of mobilization platform readiness requirements. The synergetic effects of this union have provided the Naval Reserve with definitive mobilization training goals and enhanced the Navy's capability to respond in time of emergency. TAR management of the Naval Reserve contributes measurably to Navy Total Force requirements.

TAR PROGRAM ENLISTED STRENGTH HISTORY



Appendix I

TAR PROGRAM OFFICER STRENGTH HISTORY



Appendix II



U.S. Navy Mission Areas Supported By
Immediate Naval Reserve Mobilization

<u>Percent Residing in Naval Reserve</u>	<u>Of</u>	<u>Mission Area</u>
100%		Naval U.S. Based Logistic Airlift (VR)
100%		Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons (HAL)
100%		Navy Combat SAR Capability (HC-9)
100%		Naval Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
100%		Navy U.S. Based Composite (Service) Squadrons (VC)
99%		Naval Control of Shipping Organization
86%		Naval Ocean Minesweepers
86%		Navy Cargo Handling Battalions
68%		Navy Mobile Construction Battalions
66%		Naval Special Boat Forces
35%		Naval Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons (VP)
35%		Military Sealift Command (MSC) Military Personnel
34%		Naval Intelligence Personnel
30%		Naval Medical Support Personnel
14%		Navy Tactical Carrier Air Wings (CW)
9%		Navy Base Operating Support Personnel
4%		Navy Surface Combatants (Frigates)
3%		Navy Amphibious Warfare Ships


Appendix IV

Programs
U.S. Navy Supported by
Naval Reserve Mobilization Forces

Submarine Forces	Military Sealift
Mine Forces	Naval Control of Shipping
Mobile Logistics Support Forces	Bases and Stations
Surface Combatant Forces	Naval Material Command
Air Forces	Air Systems
Construction Forces	Electronics Systems
Amphibious Forces	Facilities Engineering
Marine Corps	Sea Systems
Special Warfare Forces	Civil Defense
Major Fleet/Force Commands	Supply Systems
Unified/Joint Shore Commands	Merchant Marine
Support of Allies	Medical
Telecommunications	Training
Security Group	Personnel System
Intelligence	Public Affairs
Oceanography	Law
Research	Chaplain
	Selective Service


Appendix V

NAVAL RESERVE PERSONNEL (INACTIVE DUTY) GROWTH




Appendix VI

TAR PROGRAM GROWTH: OFFICERS



TAR PROGRAM GROWTH: ENLISTED



Appendix VII
Page 2 of 2

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Programing Resources for Mobilization

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November 2, 1983

DISCLAIMER STATEMENT

"The views expressed in these Proceedings are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as necessarily reflecting the views of the Department of Defense or any other organization public or private. The purpose of these Proceedings is to disseminate information and opinion on issues of importance to those concerned with various aspects of mobilization, especially of the Guard and Reserve Components."

Introduction

The theme of this paper is how to get money in a national budget to support mobilization. Without the money, all the planning for men, equipment and training will come to naught. The discussion reviews the evolution of programing resources for mobilization beginning with the fiscal year 1980 (FY80) to fiscal year 1984 (FY84) program. The remainder of this introduction describes the relationship between mobilization and programing resources. It offers some definitions and rationale that need to be understood, if not accepted, in order to appreciate the main discussion and conclusions. The conclusions will include some lessons learned which may be of help to U.S. as well as NATO mobilizers.

Definition of Mobilization

Mobilization as a process has many parts with specific definitions for those parts. For the purpose of this paper, mobilization is defined as the actual preparation for deployment by Army Guard and Reserve units after an order has been issued by the appropriate authority. On a time line it is that period of time from the day when a unit gets an alert to the day when it completes loading at an airport or seaport of embarkation. See figure one for a visual concept of the events along a hypothetical time line.

Influence of Time


The important difference between planning for past wars and future wars to keep in mind while reading this paper is that the time line between alert day and embarkation day will be compressed. The Soviet threat carries with it a factor in days of warning. In a worst case scenario for NATO, the days of warning are assumed to be few. Therefore, the requirement for early deployment of Guard and Reserve units along with the active Army is greater than say, ten years ago, when the days of warning were assumed to be many.

When the days of warning allowed more time between alert and embarkation, for example, 120 days for Guard combat units, all of the necessary resources to man, equip and train the units were assumed to be made available after mobilization. In short, money was no problem. Consequently, there was no need or justification for an expenditure of resources in peacetime which could be provided after the alert and before embarkation. The assumption took for granted that a long time would always be available between alert and embarkation. But, as pointed out above, the planning time is now short, therefore the assumption is no longer valid. It is this logic which drives program analysts to address resources needed in peacetime for units that won't have time to be manned, equipped and trained before embarkation. In short, money becomes a problem.



DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

TIME LINE



* Personnel Overseas Replacement
 * Seaport part of embarkation
 * Seaport of debarkation
 * Area of operation

Description of Programing

Program analysis in the current Planning, Programing, Budgeting, Execution System (PPBES) looks out to the future for the next seven years. In particular it concentrates on the last five years. The next program period is fiscal year 1986 (FY86) to fiscal year 1990 (FY90). The Department of Defense document which will summarize the resources programed in this period is called the FY86-90 Program Objective Memorandum (POM). It is normally classified as secret. The discussion of this paper covers six POMs without getting into secret detail and looks to mobilization requirements for future POMs. It is important to remember that development of the POM takes place two years before the POM period. For example, the FY80-84 POM which is the first one discussed in this paper was submitted by the Army to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in May of 1978 after about one year of preparation. The political and military events in 1977-78 had an influence on POM development, as they do every year.

MOBILIZATION ⇄ ⇄ ⇄ ⇄ BATTLE
(EXAMPLE)

HEAVY DIVISION

MOBILIZE

56 Days

BATTLE

Mobilization Functions = 20 Days

Movement and Organization for Combat = 25 Days

Unit Training = 11 Days

Conclusions

For Army programers in the United States or NATO countries there are several lessons learned which may be adapted as the situation requires:

1. Mobilization must become a topic in a public forum in a democracy. Return to the draft became a hot public issue in the late 1970's. It was debated in Congress, in the newspapers and on TV. It was tied to one aspect of the mobilization problem -- adequate pretrained manpower. However, it created a concern over mobilization in general.

2. A total solution package like RRA-77 was too expensive. One must eat the elephant one bite at a time. We agreed on an affordable solution for the highest priority; for the Guard and Reserve, it was to increase personnel strength in the early deploying units first. Then came training. Then came equipping. Now comes maintaining and testing capabilities.

3. A massive command information plan must be set to go at once when the final approval is achieved. It takes a long time to get the word down to individual Guard/Reserve units. Perhaps other NATO countries have more effective and responsive channels of communication. However; in the U.S., it takes a long time before we see positive results. Public information must be generated at national and local levels for civilian support, especially with families, communities and employers.

4. A time-line analysis is the most universal and acceptable means to communicate the mobilization requirement. Everyone seems to understand and to appreciate the inverse planning sequence. Once the major events which occur between the soldier's foxhole and his home have been agreed upon, the question then is how much time does he have to complete them. How much has to be accomplished before mobilization, i.e., in peacetime, thereby costing resources? How much can be done after the alert and before embarkation? Comparing one answer to the other then gives one a rationale for programing and budgeting resources for mobilization.

**Military and Civilian Reserve Programs
at the Federal Emergency Management Agency**

by
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National Defense University
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INTRODUCTION

The ability of the nation to mobilize its resources and respond quickly and effectively to major peacetime or wartime emergencies is crucial to our national security.

Manpower sources are primarily and obviously the military services, both active and reserve components. However, in the present state of technology and business which comprise the industry supporting the logistics of the military forces, a cadre of personnel who, by being part of the civilian executive establishment, are needed to bridge the gap between the armed forces and the civilian sector.

By using the Federal Emergency Management Agency, a fairly new federal body, as a model, this paper shall address itself to the benefits derived by a close cooperation of highly skilled managers with the military establishment and the subsequent benefits which come from such interface to the national mobilization objectives.

CONCEPT

In order to rapidly expand the capability of the government operations from a peacetime to an emergency or wartime basis, a rapid implementation of a mobilization program is critical. In the case of our defense policy, the security of the country and its population is a basic tenet of our civilization, our background and our laws.

The power to respond effectively to major peacetime or wartime emergencies involves government at all levels - Federal, State and local - in a common planning effort to ensure the preservation of our democratic system, the mobilization of our human and economic resources in time of crisis and the protection of people and their property.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the central point of contact within the federal government for a wide range of emergency management activities in both peace and war. By working closely with both military and civilian sectors, it achieves a realistic state of preparedness and a capacity to respond to emergencies of all types. Through the coordination of planning and preparedness activities and the provisions of financial and technical support, FEMA provides the vital ingredients for comprehensive emergency management which spans the full spectrum of crises, from local disasters to nuclear war and extends through all levels of government and the private sector.

Among FEMA's activities are:

- o Coordinating civil preparedness for nuclear attack, nuclear power plant accidents, and nuclear weapons accidents.
- o Ensuring continuity of government and coordinating mobilization of resources during national security emergencies.
- o Determining which materials are strategic and critical and setting goals for the national defense stockpile.
- o Supporting state and local governments in a wide range of disaster planning, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts.
- o Coordinating federal aid for Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies.

- o Providing training and education to enhance the professional development of Federal, State, and local emergency managers.
- o Reducing the nation's losses from fire.
- o Developing practical application of research to lessen damaging effects of emergencies and disasters.
- o Administering national flood insurance, crime insurance, and riot reinsurance programs.
- o Developing community awareness programs for weather emergencies and home safety.

It appears obvious from this listing that a close system of national cooperation is not only desirable but actually imperative.

In FEMA's case a backbone of manpower is being trained to be available within hours of a declaration of an emergency or mobilization, and the dual aspect of this resource is unique in many ways as well as shamefully unknown to the community at large. We shall discuss in detail the supportive manpower and efficiency of response given by the informed services through the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) program of the Department of Defense as well as the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) provided by the civilian business, industrial, financial and academic sectors.

THE INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTATION PROGRAM

In a national emergency or mobilization, civil government organizations engaged in emergency management at all levels - Federal, State and local - will

need additional trained professionals in various aspects of emergency operations. One primary source is the military reserve, many of whose members possess the knowledge and skills, acquired in their military or civilian capacities, to provide invaluable assistance to those agencies.

Certain military reservists are available to support civil governments, not only in time of mobilization or emergency but also in preparation for that possibility through the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program, in cooperation with the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation.

The Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program has been established by Department of Defense (DOD) Directives allowing members of the Selected Reserve and the Standby Reserve Active Status List to participate in emergency management activities, and spelling out administrative procedures affecting the participation of these reservists in emergency management activities.

Thus, the IMA Program within FEMA is based on the above DOD Directives which authorize the Secretaries of the Defense and Transportation Departments to allow selected members of the Reserve to serve as IMAs to emergency management agencies. Each Secretary, in turn, has issued regulations and instructions for the implementation of the program with the objective to strengthen the emergency capabilities of civil government (i.e., local, State and Federal) by augmenting their staff with trained and experienced reserve personnel assigned to functions designated as necessary in time of national emergency or mobilization.

The amount of training each IMA is required to accomplish in peacetime to insure immediate and effective performance of duty during critical periods is determined by the Agency. In order to assure that reservists report their to their assigned positions and begin without delay, orientation and post-mobilization training are pre-assigned to them.

IMA personnel are personally selected by the emergency management director, because of skills either military or civilian which meet the requirements of the position; there is no mandatory assignment. Thus, the objective of the program is to strengthen the capabilities of civil government by fleshing out their staff with trained and experienced reserve personnel assigned to functions designated as necessary in time of national emergency or mobilization. In a national mobilization the IMAs are subject to recall to active duty in their assigned jobs under the provisions of 10 USC 673b, the Presidential 100,000 callup. In a peacetime disaster they may volunteer for active duty if their services are requested by the local director and approved by the FEMA Regional Office. In non-emergency periods, they will assist in the preparedness and operational planning for the offices to which they are assigned. Thus, IMAs assigned to FEMA have a greater possibility for peacetime mobilization, with their consent, than reservists in this program who are assigned to their Services for augmentation.

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXECUTIVE RESERVE

The National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) program recruits and trains experienced civilian executives to serve in key government positions during periods of national emergency. Reservists augment the staffs of federal

departments and agencies when organizations must rapidly mobilize to respond to a peacetime or wartime emergency.

The NDER program was established in a 1950 amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950. The program is currently administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which establishes rules and standards for the program, authorizes new units and approves reservist designations. The amendment also allows FEMA to use the services of other agencies to update membership records and develop training programs for reservists.

Candidates for the NDER must be U.S. citizens without military reserve or National Guard obligations. Federal, state and local government officials with emergency assignments and individuals campaigning for or elected to office will not be considered for the program. Executives are recruited on the basis of their managerial, professional and technical skills. Criteria for selection include specialized experience, demonstrated ability and eligibility for a "secret" security clearance. Designations to agencies are made for a three-year term.

Reservists receive training in emergency procedures and policies by their sponsoring agencies and are invited to attend conferences and participate in exercises and alerts. Annual training is usually for a few days.

Benefits of the program include specialized training and mutual understanding between the federal government and the private sector. Executives acquire knowledge of government programs, priorities and personnel, as well as establishing contacts in their own industry or specialty.

There is no statutory limit on the number of persons authorized to participate in the program, but FEMA sets ceilings for each NDER unit based on

agency requests. The extent of the program depends on the emergency needs and responsibilities of the participating agencies.

Approximately 2,000 reservists are currently assigned to 17 units in nine federal agencies.

At present the following NDER units are active in the following governmental departments and agencies:

- A. Department of Commerce - Office of Industrial Resource Administration
- B. Department of Commerce - Office of Export Administration
- C. Department of Energy
- D. Department of the Interior - Emergency Minerals Administration
- E. Department of the Interior - Emergency Water Administration
- F. Department of Labor
- G. Department of the Navy - Military Sealift Command
- H. Department of Transportation - Office of Emergency Transportation
- I. Department of Transportation - Maritime Administration
- J. Interstate Commerce Commission
- K. Federal Emergency Management Agency
- L. Department of the Army - Military Traffic Management Command

Of particular interest for the purpose of this colloquium are the units of the military services and specifically the one of the Department of the Navy, Military Sealift Command which was the first NDER unit established within the Department of Defense. The unit has four groups handling dry cargo shipping,

tanker shipping, labor concerns, and shipbuilding and repair. Members come from top executive levels in major maritime unions, shipping lines, and shipbuilding firms.

In a national emergency, MSC executive reservists would support a variety of shipping duties, including meeting emergency requirements for managing ships; coordinating the acquisition and operation of tanker ships; advising on the availability, routing and cargo capacity of ships; and maintenance, repair, operation and material support of ships under MSC control.

More recently the Military Traffic Management Command of the Department of the Army has also established its own NDER unit.

In a national emergency FEMA is responsible for advising the President as to whether Reservists should be called to duty. Departments and agencies seeking to activate their Reservists should present their recommendations to FEMA.

Authority for appointing reservists to positions after they have been activated may be found in the Federal Personnel Manual, Part 910-9. Reservists may also be appointed as Federal employees or consultants at any time other than a national emergency, according to procedures established by the Office of Personnel Management.

CONCLUSIONS

There will always be emergencies; planning for them, responding to them and recovering from them is a responsibility shared by all. Any preparedness program which must cope with emergencies has these four phases:

1. Planning
2. Resource Acquisition
3. Response
4. Recovery

Planning covers everything from maintaining the necessary economic and military functions of the nation to providing for the survival of as many citizens as possible.

Resource acquisition includes obtaining people and materials necessary to meet an emergency.

Response provides for the survival through an emergency.

Recovery is the process by which the nation returns to a state of non-emergency.

An emergency can be any disruption to a part of the population from a localized hurricane to a general war.

The mobilization of IMA and NDER personnel assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency would normally occur during the resources acquisition phase and that is in the event the entire country was threatened. However, if the emergency were sufficiently widespread, the reservists might be called to duty.

Resources acquisition not only involves getting the personnel, but insuring that they can accomplish their assigned functions. Training and exercises are, therefore, a necessary element actively pursued by the agencies and competently accomplished by the reservists.

In order to avoid planned obsolescence exact figures for military and civilian reservists actively assigned and trained by FEMA are not given, but, for working purposes there are approximately one thousand IMAs from the services' reserves and about two thousand civilian NDERs. The programs' success and efficacy are based primarily on the selectivity of the personnel. As stated elsewhere, it is imperative that all individuals seeking emergency assignments with FEMA be personally interviewed and screened for their skills, experience and education. Personality factors should not be overlooked, especially due to the close relationships which must develop between civilian and military personnel under conditions other than normal and obviously under stress. The figures given above should be doubled in the least. No guarantee exists that 100% of those presently (or at any one time) assigned will be available for duty on a mobilization date. The NDER, especially, is comprised of many older citizens and retired executives and, in some instances, military retirees who may not be available at a time when the call comes, in spite of their good intentions.

We should accept the fact that World War II was the last conventional war. Our theories and historical backgrounds on land warfare are obsolete and being rewritten, perhaps not fast enough. The Korean experience is to be seen as a curious, spurious phenomenon, a link between the past and the present.

Since 1944, with the advent of the nuclear age, we also entered the age of subversion, guerilla warfare and terrorism which has eradicated old concepts of tactics and logistics as they were once taught and applied on the battle fields; the battle fields simply do not exist any longer.

We need the cross-pollination of our industrial experts within the defense system as much as we need the military expertise within industry and the civilian sector. It is well within the framework of such a system that we have programs such as the IMA bringing the military staff expertise to civilian agencies as well as the NDER program which brings the executive level business knowledge to our military and defense departments. In many cases a dual knowhow is provided inasmuch as most military reservists are also executives in the civilian communities and NDERs may have some military experience.

Somehow these two programs are not as widely known within the military services and the industrial-business-academic complex. With the mood of the country showing a definite return to such ideals as patriotism and the common good, a greater promotion of these opportunities should be undertaken, thus attracting a still larger resource of valuable personnel to contribute their knowledge and skills, as Sallust said, "pro patria, pro liberis, pro aris atque focis suis."*

*On behalf of their country, their children, their altars and their hearths.

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